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My study takes as its point of departure two elements in the work of the late 
Arne Næss. The first is his conviction that “there is nothing in ‘ecosophy’” that 
is “established,” that his writings were only “on the way” (Næss 2005: 316). 
This attitude of Næss’ will inform my approach to deep ecology, which sees it 
as still young, still plastic and open to fruitful contact with other bodies of 
thought. The second point is Næss’ “optimism for the 22nd century” (Ibid.; 
611). This is the view that just as more ecologically appropriate ways of living 
will require consideration of longer time frames, the movement towards 
establishing those ways of living will necessarily operate in a longer time 
frame than is used for most goals of social transformation. Such movement 
will need to be maintained throughout a 21
st
 century shaped by the inertia of 
contemporary circumstances and the consequences of ecological overshoot. 
Næss conjured images of more ecologically harmonious societies of the early 
22
nd
 century, while noting that “the societies developing in the twenty-second 
century, at the earliest I suspect, will not all look like the ideal green societies 
envisioned since the 1960s. Many will have traits more in common with what 
we have today” (Ibid.: 614-615). 
In the following pages I would like to interrogate, in an admittedly very limited 
way, the question of what traits found in today’s societies will best be 
transplanted to the conjectured greener societies of the future, and which traits 
will flourish most and best help those societies flourish. Searching present 
circumstances for elements of our 22
nd
 century ecological societies is not only 
a project of long-term planning, but also a project of constructing an image of 
the future in the immediate present. This, I believe, is in congruence with Arne 
Næss’ conviction “that we have a mission, however modest, in shaping a better 
future that is not remote” (Ibid.: 616, emphasis in the original). 
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To simplify an investigation into the present moment, this study will borrow 
Manuel Castells’ description of a global Network Society. This refers, in brief, 
to a particular regime of economic and political arrangements, arising in the 
1970’s, initiated by changes in the organization and techniques of capitalist 
production and accumulation, made possible by new developments in 
electronic information technology (Castells 2010). This regime is in turn 
associated with a range of social phenomena often grouped under the label 
‘postmodernity.’  
While postmodernity may be a contestable and somewhat arbitrary 
periodization, the relevant notion here is that politico-economic arrangements, 
always and increasingly influenced (although never strictly determined) by 
technology, now especially information technology, induce certain social 
conditions, and, as Castells and Zygmunt Bauman argue, new selves and self-
perceptions. It is this juncture, between technology and the self, which will be 
taken as most potentially productive for the purposes of this exploration. This 
focus follows also from Transpersonal Ecology (1990), in which Warwick Fox 
convincingly argues that what distinguishes Næss’ ecosophy from other 
positions in environmental ethics, and provides much of its appeal, is its 
conception of the self, and its norm of Self-realization, basically understood as 
“the realization of as expansive a sense of self as possible” (Fox 1990: 106). 
This expansive self is the Ecological Self. 
For self-concepts and subject formation in the present moment to be useful for 
reaching an imagined 22
nd
 century ecological society, there should not only be 
a certain compatibility between contemporary selves and a future society, but 
also some path forward for subjects to take. The scale and scope of changes to 
economic and social institutions required to make them more ecologically 
appropriate clearly requires political action all along the way. It is necessary, 
then, not only to look for frames of self-conception compatible with the 
ecological Self, but political theories that address self-concepts and subject 
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formation. For this, I will draw on sources such as Robyn Eckersley’s The 
Green State (2004), Chantal Mouffe’s The Return of the Political (1993) and 
Jacques Rancière’s Dissensus (2010). 
I will take contemporary social and economic arrangements and their attendant 
conceptions of self as a necessary starting point for investigation. In doing so I 
will also ask whether global technological and economic networks contain 
subsidiary networks which foster, or potentially foster, self-concepts and social 
relations more like those of our future ecological societies. In order to achieve 
a practicable focus, I will mostly discuss file-sharing networks: social 
arrangements that take advantage of information technology networks to freely 
exchange information and aesthetic objects: music, books, images and 
software. This is partly to avoid offering too many definite conclusions about 
the larger “digital commons,” or information technology networks more 
generally, about which many grand statements have lately been made, and 
which are notorious for their rapid rates of change, with an accompanying 
quick obsolescence of much analysis regarding them. However, I will forward 
the argument that file-sharing networks are paradigmatic of the potentials of 
the digital commons and the network society. File-sharing networks will 
function here as a stand-in for a larger phenomenon, but also as an exemplary 
case. 
Here, my project is inspired by Næss' ecosophy in another sense. It follows his 
foundational concerns with immediate experience and intuited first principles. 
The particular combination of topics addressed in the following chapters, and 
my search for an approach capable of integrating them, is in part an attempt to 
answer the question of whether and how an ecosophy and an ecological 
movement that draws on the importance of immediate experience can thrive in 
a context where experience is heavily mediated by technology. The 
combination follows from an intuitive sense that connections between ecology 
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and file-sharing networks exist on more than a superficial level, based on my 
own lived experience. 
Since the invention of the telegraph, new electronic information and 
communications technologies have prompted predictions of social liberation, 
political empowerment and cultural flourishing, and opposed visions of 
cultural degradation, social malaise and political disintegration. With each new 
development, optimists and skeptics have claimed a few points each for their 
side, while the uses of the technology have in the meantime evolved in ways 
that very few anticipated.  While today the breeziest technological optimists 
tend to treat technological networks and the digital commons as having clear, 
predetermined political consequences, this oversimplified view ignores how 
technology can have politicizing and depoliticizing effects, and be used toward 
a variety of opposing political goals. Still, a figure associated with techno-
optimism, such as Clay Shirky (2011), and a sharp critic such as Evgeny 
Morozov (2011) can both broadly agree that the most significant potentials of 
network technology are in its longer-term effects on cultural change and the 
development of discourse in the public sphere, and less in the direct use of 
communications technology in organizing protest movements and other forms 
of political action, or their suppression by state actors. In Castells’ (2009b: 
427) terms, networks do more than organize activity and transmit information. 
They are the “actual producers, and distributors, of cultural codes.” The 
ultimate effect of network technology on the prospects for democracy (and, 
further, ecological democracy) around the globe is far from certain and far 
beyond the scope of this project. My goal is instead to discuss file-sharing, a 
specific implementation of network technology falling within the digital 
commons, as a project with certain political characteristics, and as a type of 
site for political mobilization. Moreover, I wish to use file-sharing as a site 
from which to explore how ecological concepts may be meaningfully applied 
to human culture. 
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Since the network technologies are still primarily, although certainly not 
exclusively, phenomena of high-income (‘developed, ‘post-industrial’, 
‘Northern’ or ‘Western’) societies, it must be asked whether cultural and 
political developments that arise in and around them are applicable or relevant 
to lower-income societies, or if the attempt to apply them is a form of 
universalizing cosmopolitanism from on-high, either oppressive or simply 
irrelevant. On the other hand, deep ecology, along with many other 
environmentalist or ecological positions, is often seen as being irreparably 
based in domestic and international situations of economic privilege. Writing 
from a decidedly Western perspective, in a high-income country, I hesitate to 
claim to definitively establish or identify attributes of digital free exchange or 
deep ecology that can or should be spread throughout the world. Deep ecology 
and the digital commons can both be interrogated as to the extent to which 
they promise to preserve, enable and encourage substantial diversity instead of 
homogenization. However, there are some avenues that can be explored to 
make a very precursory evaluation of their liberatory cosmopolitan potentials. 
Informational capitalism arose in tandem with the globalization of production 
processes. If we are to analyze the digital commons as one segment of the 
spectrum of postmodern culture, we cannot ignore that this culture has a 
globalized material basis. To take seriously the causal link between economic 
and cultural change, we must consider the possibility of globally relevant 
cultural characteristics arising in a global economic system. While the 
geographical distribution of production and capital accumulation that 
accompanied this globalization has been highly variable and unequal in effect, 
access to the technology of the digital commons, led by mobile phones, has 
continued to spread throughout most of the lower-income regions of the world. 
The questions pertaining to the institution of intellectual property raised by the 
digital commons, meanwhile, have significant implications for lower-income 
nations in the realms of agriculture, medicine, industrial policy, and trade.  
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Regardless of how universal or positively cosmopolitan the culture and politics 
of either deep ecology or the digital commons may be, it is the system of 
economic production in the higher-GDP states which threatens to create 
ecological catastrophes and it is this system of economic production that the 
‘developing’ states are, broadly, emulating or attempting to emulate. Perhaps 
new economic regimes, social relations, political institutions and cultural 
practices will arise in high-GDP, Western nations, and prove themselves as 
viable alternatives for emulation by developing states. Perhaps lower-income 
regions will develop their own distinct solutions, or perhaps a new 
cosmopolitanism will be seen simultaneously developing around the world, 
matching the global nature of economic and technological networks. In any of 
these scenarios, it is the current high-income model that must change. The 
continual return of xenophobic political currents and the frequent scaling back 
of international aid at the first sign of stalled economic growth strongly 
suggest that the political systems in most high-GDP countries, and the ideas 
that underpin them, are an inadequate basis for the moves towards global 
justice that would necessarily be a part of the transition to an ecologically 
sustainable human civilization. The notion of global justice, as with the notion 
of sustainability, is too far from the ideas that inform both daily experience and 
political structures to take precedence over other prevailing concerns. While 
actions taken outside higher-GDP countries may well prove to be decisively 
important in transitions to both a more just and a more ecologically sustainable 
global system, predictions as to the role of the lower-GDP world in no way 
reduce the ethical imperative within the high-GDP world to address the issue 
of how changes there can orient those countries in such a direction. Thus, I 
find it worthwhile to explore both deep ecology and the digital commons, even 
if they currently remain predominantly (but certainly not exclusively) Western 
phenomena. 
Whether or not a universal, heterogeneous and non-hegemonic 
cosmopolitanism is possible (if this is even a question that can be definitively 
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answered) is, again, far beyond the scope of the project. It should be stated 
directly that the political theorization I draw upon in this project is by Western 
writers working from within European and North American political traditions. 
There is, perhaps, one way in which the concepts I propose are directly 
relevant to the question of the global applicability of political solutions - to the 
extent that ecological notions of the self help bridge the gap between cultures 
which place differing emphasis on notions of interdependence and 
independence.
1
 The networked image of the ecological self that I will propose 
does, I believe, allow for the coexistence and reconciliation of those two 
principles. In this aspect, at least, there may be some potential for cross-
cultural compatibility. One of the central ideas animating my project is the 
creation of political coalitions through what Laclau and Mouffe (1985) term 
“chains of equivalence”. Whether the equivalences I propose here apply across 
all cultural and national contexts, the prospect of extending those chains in the 
future remains open. 
My attempt to illuminate traces of  22
nd
 century ecological societies in today’s 
network society, while perhaps not entirely unique, will go on to serve the 
other purpose mentioned in the first paragraph of this introduction. That is: to 
treat deep ecology, as a philosophy, as open to progressive reconsideration and 
modification. In the process of looking for the ecological Self in networks, I 
hope to productively reconceptualize the ecological Self by way of networks. 
This is not only to suggest avenues for Self-realization in the network society 
of the present historical moment, but to strengthen deep ecology itself. By 
explicating and expanding its metaphors and images, I hope to bring it into 
greater accord with other schools of thought oriented towards social 
transformation. Even within the spectrum of ‘green’ or ecological thought, 
there are many criticisms and dismissals of deep ecology which appear to arise 
from misunderstandings more than fundamental and substantive 
                                              
1 See e.g. Markus and Kitayama (1991), Triandis et al. (1988) and Waterman (1981) 
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disagreements, at times drawing conclusions about it which are directly 
contradicted by Næss’ own positions. With further conversation, and new 
terminology, I hope to ameliorate such disputes, while adapting deep ecology 
to the legitimate criticisms which ecological thinkers from other traditions 
have for it. Similarly, deep ecology, as a term defined first by an ecosophy, but 
further by an inducement to political action, can glean important lessons from 
compatible political theories, and make its own contributions to a broader 
political discourse in turn. 
To this end, I will ultimately propose a view of the ecological Self which takes 
the network as its foundational model and metaphor, an ecological Self as 
network Self. I hope that this revised image will effectively contain and 
connect those modifications and clarifications of deep ecology, and hone it as 
a tool in “shaping a better future that is not remote”, by drawing the ecological 
Self out of the network society, and offering some ways to draw out the 
vectors of its constituent networks in ways that better match the ecological 
whole. The network image, and the project of bringing political theory to deep 
ecology, is also an attempt to conceptualize the relationship between 
movements for environmental justice and the prevention of severe 
disturbances to ecosystems and the ecosphere, and other struggles for freedom 
and equality, in a way that neither places ecological concerns above all others, 
nor considers it to be just another demand among others. 
The movement towards greener future societies will, certainly, require not just 
the existence of ideas and institutions which may be integrated into those 
societies, but forms of education which explain and promote those ideas while 
clarifying their connections to our contemporary problems and their potential 
solutions. A meaningfully thorough review of the literature on pedagogical 
method, and particularly ecological education, was beyond my purview here, 
and I do not propose any specific pedagogical projects. That aspect of 
transitioning from conceptual to concrete remains an area open for further 
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study. One very preliminary point that does have some relevance to the main 
concerns of my project is Næss’ contention that seemingly unlikely deep 
changes in education will be made more probable if “more teachers boldly 
introduce changes based on an epistemological pluralism” (Næss 2005: 503). 
This is of a piece with the charting of the value of pluralism in political, 
aesthetic and political realms made in the chapters ahead. 
Because of the broad range of elements which I attempt to synthesize or bring 
into contact, this project is necessarily something of a preliminary sketch. But 
it is one which attempts to take seriously the idea that in an epoch defined by 
the joint emergence of ecology as an approach to the world and globalized 
ecological crisis as both reality and possibility, everything must be newly seen 
in an ecological light. 
In the first chapter, I introduce the elements of deep ecology and Næss’ 
ecosophy which I will be employing. In the second, I provide an overview of 
the economic structure and cultural effects of the network society, and 
introduce the relevant political theories. The third chapter will concern the 
digital commons, file-sharing, as well as the history of copyright and the 
notion of intellectual property. In chapter four, I introduce the concept of the 
Anthropocene and discuss its implications for global society. I then lay out the 
network model of the ecological Self. In chapter five, I treat the implications 
of the previous chapters for competing notions of community, 
cosmopolitanism, and the commons. Finally, I return to the project of 
constructing greener societies for the 22
nd
 century. 
No particular 'theory' informed the process or 'methodology' of the project as a 
whole. It is, simply, a certain path made through a certain field of texts, in the 
hope that the trail so taken would prove to be at very least unique, and perhaps 
to some extent insightful. 
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1. Deep Ecology and the Society of Selves 
In this chapter I aim to provide a brief overview of deep ecology, and to 
identify the aspects of deep ecology and Arne Næss’ ecosophy most useful for 
the project at hand. Næss’ ecophilosophical writings are numerous and wide-
ranging, and Næss was, of course, only one contributor to the field of deep 
ecology. While it is tempting to enter into an extended exploration of its 
richness, I limit myself here to a condensed explanation of those aspects of the 
ecosophical framework which are relevant for discussing the digital commons, 
the network society and political democracy. First, a note on the terms ‘deep 
ecology’, ‘ecophilosophy’ and ‘ecosophy’ is in order. As described by Næss, 
“The study of ecology indicates an approach, a methodology which can be 
suggested by the simple maxim 'all things hang together'.” Ecophilosophy is 
“the study of these problems common to ecology and philosophy” and 
ecosophy is “a view of the world which guides one's own decisions (...) when 
applied to questions involving ourselves and nature” (Næss 1989: 36). Deep 
ecology is a constellation of ideas in which activism follows from such 
questions. 
While Næss repeatedly emphasizes that the “eight-point deep ecology 
platform” should be taken as a necessarily incomplete statement, arising in the 
context of an ecological movement in certain parts of the world at a certain 
time (and thus meant more to point out substantive differences within that 
movement, rather than propose universally applicable principles) it can still be 
useful in briefly communicating the core ideas of deep ecology. Those points, 
as formulated with George Sessions in 1985, are as follows. 
1. The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on 
Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent 
worth). These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-
human world for human purposes. 
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2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of 
these values and are also values in themselves. 
3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to 
satisfy vital needs. 
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a 
substantially smaller human population. The flourishing of non-human 
life requires a smaller human population. 
5. Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, 
and the situation is rapidly worsening. 
6. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic 
economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state 
of affairs will be deeply different from the present. 
7. The ideological change will be mainly that of appreciating life quality 
(dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an 
increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound 
awareness of the difference between bigness and greatness. 
8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation 
directly or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes (Næss 
1989: 29). 
For the purposes of exploring commonalities with other political philosophies 
and possible ecological approaches to phenomena of the network society and 
digital commons, I propose that points 2, 3, and 7 prove most relevant – that is, 
the principles of intrinsic value, diversity, and life quality judged as consisting 
in “situations of inherent value.”  
I will list, in no particular order, some other principles of deep ecology, as 
articulated by Næss, which I plan to use in the following chapters. (For the 
purposes of this section, I will simply use the description “deep ecology” to 
mean “Næss’ deep ecology” or “Næss’ ecosophy.”) Deep ecology posits that 
humans and non-humans both have a “right to live” that “is one and the same 
for all individuals” (Næss 2005: 67)2 but that interests may be prioritized in 
                                              
2 Citations from Næss 2005 refer to the tenth volume, “Deep Ecology of Wisdom” of the anthology The Selected 
Works of Arne Næss, edited by Harold Glasser and Alan Drengson. 
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concrete decision-making based on vitalness (of the interest) and nearness (of 
beings to those prioritizing).The ecosophical insistence on the equal right to 
flourishing can be seen as an extension to the non-human world of Walzer’s 
ethics of “reiterative universalism.” This is the universal right to the “rights of 
reiteration, that is, the right to act autonomously and the right to form 
attachments in accordance with a particular understanding of the good life.” 
Immorality is commonly expressed in a refusal to recognize in others 
the moral agency and the creative powers that we claim for ourselves. 
And immorality passes into evil when the refusal is willful and violent, 
turning the others, against their will, into beings “less than human” (or, 
less human than we are) (Walzer 1990: 535). 
Just as deep ecology allows for vitalness and nearness, under reiterative 
universalism 
I have a special concern for my own children, my friends, my comrades, 
and my fellow citizens. And so do you. What reiterative universalism 
requires is that we recognize the legitimacy of these repeated acts of 
moral specialization. I make some people special, but that only means 
that they are special for me; and I am capable of acknowledging and 
ought to acknowledge that other people are special for you (Ibid.: 531). 
These ideas will be important in formulating a view of democracy which can 
apply to humans and non-humans both. It will also have implications for 
viewing deep ecology in terms of networks. The network image will in turn be 
useful in explicating the meaning of deep ecology’s embrace of “the whole 
planet (...) [as] the basic unit ” (Næss 2005: 18). 
Deep ecology emphasizes the importance of consistently articulating basic 
goals in a society which is in a storm of constant communication. Deep 
ecology generally calls for decentralization, simplicity, community, 
“appropriate technology” (Næss 2005: 14, Næss 1989: 31), and the absence of 
hierarchy and patriarchy. Deep ecology acknowledges that many of the steps 
towards greener societies do not need to have direct reference to the non-
human environment.  
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Næss argues that “acting from inclination is superior to acting from duty” 
(Næss 2005: 214), that ‘beautiful’ acts, in the Kantian sense, are preferable to 
‘moral acts.’ This is not because he believes the beautiful to necessarily be 
superior to, or separate from, the moral, but because he posits it is a practically 
more effective path to ethical behavior – when “inclination occurs… the moral 
act glides into a beautiful act.” (Ibid.: 125). Næss does not dismiss the need for 
ethics, but rather questions the sufficiency of strictly ethical discourse.  
We certainly need to hear about our ethical shortcomings from time to 
time (…) but, when people feel they unselfishly give up, even sacrifice, 
their interest in order to show love for Nature, this is probably in the 
long run a treacherous basis for conservation (Fox 1990: 218). 
Since acts from inclination follow from a certain view of being and certain 
forms of identification, this is an outlook in which ontology precedes ethics. It 
will be an important element in exploring how the integration of notions of 
“the political” and “the aesthetic” allow for novel approaches to questions of 
value. 
As regards political action, in deep ecology 
questions are of the form “What would be a greener line in politics at 
the moment within issue x and how could it be realized?” rather than of 
the form “What would be the deep green line of politics within issue 
x?” Green is dynamic and comparative, never absolute or idealistic 
(Næss 2005: 217). 
This puts deep ecology in line with the political theorists who have inspired 
this thesis and who treat democracy not as a static set of institutions, but as a 
dynamic, ongoing, unfinished (likely unfinishable), still young, historically 
revolutionary process, which can be continually deepened and made more just 
in a great variety of directions (e.g. Ranciere 2010, Mouffe 1993 and 
Eckersley 2004.).  
One of the maxims of deep ecology is to “increase the sensitivity to and 
appreciation of what there is enough of for all,” and thereby “fight against the 
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confusion of real value with market price” and “maximize our ability to derive 
deep satisfaction from the goods of which there still are, or could be, enough” 
(Næss 2005: 202). This will be an important principle when considering the 
digital commons’ relationship to contemporary modes of economic activity 
and commodity consumption, and its implications for, and role in, more 
ecological societies. 
1.1 Transpersonal ecology 
The final, and perhaps most central, concept of deep ecology I will use in the 
chapters ahead is its particular conception of the self, which Warwick Fox 
identifies as uniquely distinguishing deep ecology from other tendencies in 
environmentalism or ecological thought. “Naess’s (…) norm of ‘Self-
realization!’ refers to the this-worldly realization of as expansive a sense of 
self as possible in a world in which selves and things-in-the-world are 
conceived as processes” (Fox 1990: 113-114). The ‘Self’ of Self-realization is 
the ecological self. “The ecological self of a person is that with which a person 
identifies” (Næss 2005: 15) or “a person’s ‘process of identification’” (Næss 
2005: 517). Since this ecological Self is expansive, its realization depends on 
the self-realization of other living beings – the realization of the interests of 
those beings which arise from their characteristics as a particular type of being 
(e.g. as belonging to a species) and as an individual. Thus, deep ecology is a 
transpersonal ecology in the sense that it rests on abandoning an atomistic 
sense of self. This implies a reconsideration of the traditional liberal subject. 
One way to conceptualize an alternative to an atomistic self is the nodal self, 
which, I will argue, has the advantage that the conditions of the network 
society have already initiated a transition towards such a nodal view. 
The norm of Self-realization depends on the hypothesis that “human nature is 
such that, with sufficient comprehensive (allsided) maturity, we cannot help 
but ‘identify’ our self with all living beings” (Næss 2005: 515). Such an 
insistence on an expansive human nature – given the right conditions - is key 
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to political projects toward greener societies, even when not put in terms of 
Self-realization. In the context of transpersonal ecology, the ideal of Self-
realization is positioned against the underestimation of self as coterminous 
with narrow ego. Green political action is positioned against the supposedly 
unchangeable realities of market dynamics, bureaucratic institutional self-
interest, or international state competition. It is positioned against the under-
estimation of the liberal subject as dependent on a Lockean notion of property, 
and an underestimation of democracy as limited to the mechanics of 
contemporary representative government. In all of these cases, the restrictions 
placed on possible action become naturalized. What can only be contingent is 
portrayed as the direct outcome of an essence, as inevitable. Such a process of 
naturalization can be seen, in a description of the turbulent transition between 
political, economic and social regimes in “formerly Communist Eastern 
European countries” as a “drama” in which “human nature, which had 
previously been suppressed, manifested itself as raw violence in the struggle 
over the private acquisition of collective assets” (Groys 2008: 166). While 
patterns of behavior in one regime, must by definition be expressions of 
human nature just as much as patterns of behavior in another regime, the 
expression of “raw violence” – in, tellingly, a chaotic transitional state that, 
while it might correspond to Hobbes’ ‘state of nature’, does not correspond to 
the forms of organization prevalent for most of the human species’ history - 
becomes naturalized as the ‘Human nature’ which had been suppressed. 
The identification of current patterns of behavior as the product of a definitely 
bounded and unchanging human nature serves to justify the status quo and 
limit the range of possibilities for action. The dictates of the narrow ego are 
cast as the unavoidable result of ‘human nature’. In Realist theories of 
international relations, for example, the relationships between states are 
described as taking place in an anarchic, Hobbesian ‘state of nature’.  Behavior 
that does not follow rules of narrow self-interest is, of course, just as ‘natural’ 
as that which does. Such statements regarding human nature tend to be 
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projections based on the historically contingent, socially determined 
characteristics of the time and place in which they are made. Evidence from 
non-agricultural societies suggests that the Hobbesian view of the state of 
nature does not accurately depict human conditions before the rise of states.
3
 
We need not follow the most optimistic strands of Enlightenment thinking in 
believing human potentials to be absolute limitless; biological existence must 
certainly impose some ultimate restrictions. But the variability of behavior 
through different times and places is such that the most definite 
characterization of human ‘nature’ that we can make is one of adaptability, 
flexibility, and changeability. I do not mean to portray the human being as a 
blank slate upon which the dictates of any political program can be directly 
written. One cannot decree that certain patterns of behavior will accompany 
the imposition of new conditions. However, a project in which changes in 
conditions and expressions of human behavior proceed in tandem cannot be 
limited by the assumption that present behavior is the direct expression of a 
clearly delineated human nature. If civilization is the sign of human 
uniqueness on Earth, surely adaptability is its cause. To reject the depiction of 
present conditions as inevitable and natural is not to dismiss entirely the 
descriptive and predictive power possessed by paradigms based on such 
narrow conceptions. We may accept, for example, that Realist theories of 
international relations accurately describe the behavior of Westphalian states 
much of the time, without accepting that this will indefinitely be the model 
global actors follow. We may accept, again, that much human behavior fits the 
mold of the narrow ego without accepting that this is the natural limit of the 
human subject. Responsible practical action must take into consideration the 
present reality of such limitations, as well as their likely persistence for some 
time.  
                                              
3 See e.g. Sahlins (2006), Sahlins (2011), Tomasello and Vaish (2013), Roughgarden (2009) and Warneken and 
Tomasello (2009) 
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My project does not directly address matters of ‘power’ or apply a particular 
theorization of power. However, the idea of an ecological politics presupposes 
the existence of actors with narrowly-defined interests arrayed against the 
move towards ecological societies, and the power to prevent such a move. 
Indeed, if we were to ignore such real limitations and act as though the 
conditions for Self-realization and a Green hegemony already existed, we 
would have to conclude that politics was unnecessary. However, to act from a 
deep ecological perspective requires that such limitations of the self – and the 
societies and politics built of these selves – be treated as contingent – and not 
natural, necessary, or inevitable. All ecological political action, whether or not 
it explicitly follows (or explicitly rejects) the principles of deep ecology and 
the norm of Self-realization, must share Næss’ belief in an expansive human 
nature to some extent. Without such a conviction, ecological activism is 
restricted to advocating for the efficient management of state and corporate 
bureaucracies. It is shut out of politics. This attempt to project the possibilities 
of politics beyond the strictures of contemporary power relations is not to deny 
their import, but to affirm, with Næss, the importance, in deep ecology and 
ecological politics, of continually returning to the matter of basic goals and 
fundamental values. The actual distribution of power will always, in practice, 
restrict what is immediately achievable. However, to naturalize the conditions 
established by an historically contingent distribution of power is to severely 
restrict the ability to act in pursuit of fundamental values. An insistence on 
both deep questioning and the formulation of ultimate norms on the one hand, 
and the potential for the realization of an expansive human nature on the other, 
inform the (deep) ecological political project. 
Taking deep ecology’s concern for identification as a point of connection with 
political and philosophical approaches is not simply a matter of theoretical or 
methodological convenience. We can find evidence in biology that 
identification is central to our being the kind of social animals we are. Frans de 
Waal argues that to the extent that humans are “highly cooperative, sensitive to 
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injustice, sometimes warmongering, but mostly peace loving” it is because of 
group instincts that emerge from mechanisms for empathy, rather than being 
built down from abstract ethical principles (de Waal 2010). The root of this 
empathy is a form of reflexive identification that functions first on a bodily, 
emotional, precognitive level, before becoming the basis for sympathy and 
ethics. It is based on the ability of our brain to immediately emulate the 
physical and emotional states of others. “Identification is the hook that draws 
us in and makes us adopt the situation, emotions, and behavior of those we’re 
close to” (Ibid.: 55). This identification takes place  
at the level of affective relations which always involves a lived 
understanding within my body of the life of another's body (of her or his 
way of being present in and relating to the world, of the timbre of the 
voice and not merely what is said (…) and it is through these bonds, 
which are deeper than understanding or agreements about practical 
tasks or the values that should govern actions, that each person accedes 
to selfhood and to the world by acceding to the other (Gorz 1989: 174-
175). 
In de Waal’s view, 
without a concept of self, we’d lack mooring. We’d be like little boats 
floating and sinking together. One wave of emotion, and we’d move up 
or down with it. In order to show genuine interest in someone else, 
offering help when required, one needs to be able to keep one’s own 
boat steady. The sense of self serves as anchor (de Waal 2010: 115). 
Yet the deep neurological roots of empathic identification lead him to ask 
“why try to extract the self from the other, or the other from the self, if the 
merging of the two is the secret behind our cooperative nature?” (Ibid.: 73) He 
has arrived at ecosophical Self-realization by another route, and provided a 
further rationale to place the matter of identification and the center of 
questions about human society. 
My intent in examining the digital commons in the light of deep ecology 
follows, as well, from Næss’ assertion that “cultural diversity today requires 
advanced technology, that is, techniques that advance the basic goals of each 
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culture. So-called soft, intermediate, and appropriate technologies are steps in 
this direction” (Næss 1989: 31). I wish to explore the question of how file-
sharing networks and other technologies of the digital commons are 
‘appropriate’ and in what ways they remain ‘inappropriate.’ 
My discussion of the relationships between the aesthetic, the political and the 
ecological will take place within the context of Næss’ ‘gestalt ontology,’ 
which “admits sensory reality with sterling ontological status” (Ibid.: 56). A 
gestalt ontology prioritizes the connection between sense and reality and 
entities and environment. In this view, the characteristics of entities available 
to sensory perception  
are not subjective, but, like smell, bound in an interdependent 
relationship to our conception of the world. This is what is meant by 
calling them ‘relational’ - rather than ‘relative’ or ‘subjective’. It is 
justifiable to refer to them as objective in the sense of being 
independent of a person's likes or dislikes. We arrive, not at the things 
themselves, but at networks or fields of relations in which things 
participate and from which they cannot be isolated (Næss 1989: 48-49). 
Entities themselves are inseparable from these fields of relations –  
Speaking of interaction between organisms and the milieux gives rise to 
the wrong associations, as an organism is interaction. Organisms and 
milieux are not two things - if a mouse were lifted into absolute 
vacuum, it would no longer be a mouse. Organisms presuppose milieux 
(Næss 1989: 56). 
Human nature is not only inseparable from its surroundings and relations, but, 
in Næss’ view, humans uniquely “have a sufficient natural endowment such 
that they can perceive and enjoy their kinship with living beings of the most 
diverse kinds,” and such kinship is necessary to realize the “total potentiality” 
of human individuals, which means “to live out their full capacities for 
identification with other life-forms” (Næss 2005: 185). 
In Næss’ interpretation of deep ecology, at least, the concept and experience of  
identification is key to human potential. Questions of identity and 
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identification are also central to the analysis of what has alternatively been 
called postmodernity, late modernity, liquid modernity, or the network society. 
This analysis is the focus of the next chapter. 
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2. The Network Society and Politics in 
Postmodernity 
In this chapter I will briefly present models of the network society, 
postmodernity, politics and the public sphere. These will serve as the context 
in which I discuss deep ecology and the digital commons in later chapters. 
2.1 The network society’s technological and economic basis 
In the three volume The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture, 
Manuel Castells lays out his description of the ‘network society,’ the global 
system that arose from new methods of organizing and using capital from the 
1970s onward. This new system is one of informational capitalism. 
Informationalism is its mode of development and capitalism is its mode of 
production (Castells 2009a: 503). While industrialism’s central principle was 
the maximization of output, informationalism “is oriented towards 
technological development, that is toward the accumulation of knowledge and 
towards higher levels of complexity in information processing” (Ibid.: 17), a 
process which turns the “capacity to process symbols” into “a direct productive 
force” (Ibid.: 100). Informationalism does not so much replace industrialism as 
“it subsumes it through technological deepening, embodying knowledge and 
information in all processes of material production and distribution on the 
basis of a gigantic leap forward in the reach and scope of the circulation 
sphere” (Ibid.). The reorganization of capitalism along informational lines 
involved not only the application of information and communications 
technologies (ICTs) within nation states, but their use in the creation of a 
global economy, which differs from the world economy that existed before 
that point in that it works simultaneously on a global scale. While a majority of 
production remains localized in nature, nearly all of it is connected to and 
dependent on global institutions which include “financial markets, 
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international trade, transnational production (…) science and technology, and 
specialty labor” (Castells 2009a: 101).  
Although under this system, a majority of new technological developments are 
produced for private markets, the technologies and policies that made the 
system possible were the creation of state initiatives (Ibid.: 69). The 
relationship between new technologies and new patterns of economic activity 
was not unidirectional. Globalization required the development of ICTs but 
was not solely determined by them; that process was part of a political and 
economic project responding to economic crises of the 1970s, characterized by 
slowed economic growth and rising inflation
4
, comprising policies of 
corporate restructuring, including a shift to flexible production, deregulation 
and economic liberalization, all of which  
aimed at four main goals: deepening the capitalist logic of profit-
seeking in capital-labor relationships; enhancing the productivity of 
labor and capital; globalizing production, circulation, and markets, 
seizing the opportunity of the most advantageous conditions for 
profitmaking everywhere; and marshaling the state's support for 
productivity gains and competitiveness of national economies, often to 
the detriment of social protection and public interest regulations (Ibid.: 
19). 
The relationship between capital, labor, and production was also changed by 
the use of ICTs to “replace work that can be encoded in a programmable 
sequence and enhance work that requires analysis, decision, and 
reprogramming capabilities in real time”, with the result that “every other 
activity (…) is potentially susceptible to automation, and thus the labor 
                                              
4 Harvey (1992: 145) explains the crisis thusly: “The momentum of the postwar boom was maintained through 
the period 1969-73 by an extraordinarily loose monetary policy on the part of both the United States and Britain. 
The capitalist world was awash with excess funds, and with few diminished productive outlets for investment, 
that meant strong inflation. The attempt to put a brake on rising inflation in 1973 exposed a lot of excess capacity 
in Western economies, triggering first of all a world-wide crash in property markets (see figure 2.6) and severe 
difficulties for financial institutions. To that were added the effects of OPEC's decision to raise oil prices, and the 
Arab decision to embargo oil exports to the West in the 1973 Arab -Israeli War. This (1) changed the relative cost 
of energy inputs dramatically, and pushed all segments of the economy to seek out ways to economize on energy 
use through technological and organizational change, and (2) led to a recycling problem of surplus petro-dollars, 
that exacerbated the already brewing instability in the world's financial markets.”   
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engaged in it is expendable (although workers as such are not, depending upon 
their social organization and political capacity)” (Castells 2009a: 258).  
Castells asserts that the movement from a world economy to a global economy 
means that “for the first time in history, the capitalist mode of production 
shapes social relationships over the entire planet,” and in this new global 
mode, “capital accumulation proceeds, and its value-making is generated, 
increasingly, in the global financial markets enacted by information networks 
in the timeless space of financial flows” (Castells 2009a: 502-503). The 
relations of production, trade, and financial transfer comprise the space of 
flows.  
This pattern of segmentation is characterized by a double movement: on 
the one hand, valuable segments of territories and people are linked in 
the global networks of value making and wealth appropriation. On the 
other hand, everything, and everyone, which does not have value, 
according to what is valued in the networks, or ceases to have value, is 
switched off the networks, and ultimately discarded (Ibid.: 134). 
Power and wealth is contained within the space of flows, “while people’s life 
and experience is rooted in places, in their culture, in their history (…) elites 
are cosmopolitan, people are local,” occupying the space of places (Ibid.: 446). 
While power in the space of flows is still geographically concentrated, at times 
to a greater extent than before, its operations are more detached than ever. 
Thus the financial center of a world city can be radically separated from mere 
‘places’ that surround it. The “infinite social distance” between the space of 
flows and the space of places creates a situation in which “the network society, 
increasingly appears to most people as a meta-social disorder” (Ibid.: 508) as 
“core economic, symbolic, and political processes” are moved away from the 
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space of places where social meaning can be constructed and political control 
can be exercised” (Castells 2009b: 182).5 
While elites exercise power through the manipulation of flows of capital, 
information, and symbols, even individual capitalists are in some ways 
subordinate to the network itself. This is seen most clearly in the patterns of 
ultra-high-speed electronic financial trading, which form a “faceless collective 
capitalist” that “does not truly follow the law of supply and demand: it 
responds to the turbulences, and unpredictable movements, of non-calculable 
anticipations, induced by psychology and society, as much as by economic 
processes” leaving even those with power  
ultimately dependent upon the non-human capitalist logic of an 
electronically operated, random processing of information… capitalism 
in its pure expression of the endless search for money by money through 
the production of commodities by commodities (Castells 2009a: 505). 
The partition of a space of flows and a space of places, and the corresponding 
distributions of power are subsidiaries of a network logic, and the technology 
which instantiates it, that logic functioning as the actual hegemon of the 
network society. In this network, 
power relationships… must be understood as the capacity to control 
global instrumental networks on the basis of specific identities, or, seen 
from the perspective of global networks, to subdue any identity in the 
fulfillment of transnational instrumental goals (Castells 2009b: 358). 
Struggles to “control global instrumental networks” are fundamentally cultural 
struggles: “power, as the capacity to impose behavior, lies in the networks of 
information exchange and symbol manipulation” (Castells 2010: 379). The 
transformation of the manipulation of symbols into the central practice of 
power is accompanied by a range of cultural changes. 
                                              
5 As will be discussed in chapter 6, in Castells’ view this means that “the emphasis of ecologists on locality, and 
on the control by people of their living spaces, is a challenge to a basic lever of the new power system” (Castells 
2009b: 182). 
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2.2 Postmodern culture in the network society 
The phenomena that have been placed under the umbrella term 
“postmodernity” emerge more or less contemporaneously with the crises at the 
foundation of the network society. For the purposes of this project, I will treat 
postmodernity, broadly, as the cultural symptoms of the information age. In 
summarizing its characteristics, I will be mainly drawing on Castells, as well 
as Harvey (1992), Bauman (2006) and Postman (2005). 
In their analyses, postmodernity is defined by insecurity, instability, and 
uncertainty, which accompanies the diffusion of power into heterogeneous, 
shifting cultural codes and narratives, and the compulsory individuation of 
problems, solutions, and activities. This diffused power ‘escapes’ to the space 
of flows, and is exercised at a distance by those able to manipulate cultural 
codes in information networks. The most powerful symbols in this system are 
those encoded in images, transmitted and received through televisual 
communications, first on television and later its computerized cognates. For 
Castells, the shift to an informational, network society is characterized by the 
transition from ‘role’ to ‘identity’ as an organizing principle. Where roles were 
defined by a particular position in social structures, identity is defined by a 
constellation of cultural attributes. The distancing of power means that at the 
same time life experiences become mandatorily individualized, transformative 
agency seems to disappear. The “modernizing impulse…the compulsive 
critique or reality” becomes “privatized,” turning it into “compulsive self-
critique born of perpetual self-disaffection.” 
Being an individual de jure means having no one to blame for one's 
own misery, seeking the causes of one's own defeats nowhere except in 
one's own indolence and sloth, and looking for no remedies other than 
trying harder and harder still  (Bauman 2006: 38).  
As the movement of capital accelerates, the rate of consumptive activities 
increases and ICTs collapse the time between places and events. There is a 
shift in the identity of the “cultural mass” from an association with the 
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working-class to the ideals of individualism and “entrepreneurialism” (Harvey 
1992: 348). This also entails a shift from life organized around production, to a 
life organized around consumption. In the former regime, some desires are cast 
as needs, while others are limited by social norms. In the latter, this is replaced 
by an unbounded cycle of desire, satisfaction, and new desires. This more 
rapid cycle also leads to a “shift of emphasis from production of goods…to the 
production of events” (Harvey 1992: 157). This “culture of consumerist 
narcissism” is part of a larger phenomenon along with the “culture of urgency” 
among socially precarious urban populations, “a culture of the immediate end 
of life” in which “everything has to be tried, felt, experimented, accomplished, 
before it is too late, since there is no tomorrow” (Castells 2009b: 67). 
In a world of floating, disconnected cultural codes, of atomized individuals 
and a collapsed time frame, the basis of political action is no longer civil 
society, in the sense of a stable, well-defined public sphere in which common 
cause is found around notions of a common good, featuring centralized 
political actors, such as the “mass political parties, which characterized the 
political left of the industrial era” (Castells 2009b: 155). They are replaced by 
what Bauman (2006: 37) calls communities of shared intimacies, which are as 
fragile and short-lived as scattered and wandering emotions, shifting 
erratically from one target to another and drifting in the forever 
inconclusive search for a secure haven: communities of shared worries, 
shared anxieties or shared hatreds - but in each case ‘peg’ communities, 
a momentary gathering around a nail on which many solitary 
individuals hang their solitary individual fears. 
Castells, more optimistically, terms these “defensive identities” that arise in 
urban localities or other limited spaces as “resistance identities,” which hold 
the potential, but not yet the actuality, of the “project identities” of the 
previous era. Such resistance identities amount to “the exclusion of the 
excluders by the excluded (…) the building of defensive identity in the terms 
of dominant institutions/ideologies, reversing the value judgment while 
reinforcing the boundary” (Castells 2009b: 9).  
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The political role and strategies for legitimization of the state also changes 
under postmodern conditions. 
The (re)construction of political meaning on the basis of specific 
identities fundamentally challenges the very concept of citizenship. The 
state could only shift the source of its legitimacy from representing 
people’s will and providing for their well-being, to asserting collective 
identity, by identifying itself with communalism to the exclusion of 
other values and of minorities’ identities (Castells 2009b: 402-403).  
For a resistance identity to become a project identity, individuals must become 
subjects, “the collective social actor through which individuals reach holistic 
meaning in their experience (…) the building of identity is a project of a 
different life (…) expanding toward the transformation of society” (Castells 
2009b: 10). Such collective social actors can then construct project identities 
as “a blueprint of social values and institutional goals that appeal to a majority 
of citizens without excluding anybody, in principle” (Castells 2009b: 369). 
At the same time that the citizen is replaced by the individual, the postmodern 
state, while certainly not powerless, begins to lose its autonomy vis-à-vis the 
global circulation of capital, as power escapes into the space of flows. Caught 
between these two forces, with legitimacy resting on the assertion of collective 
identity, “the management of insecurity” becomes the “most appropriate mode 
of functioning of (…) states” (Rancière 2010: 106). Meanwhile, with power 
diffused in cultural codes, transmitted through a predominantly televisual 
media, “leadership has been replaced by the spectacle” (Bauman 2006: 155). 
In this form of “television politics (…) the politician does not so much offer 
the audience an image of himself, as offer himself as an image of the 
audience” (Postman 2005: 142). This is the process of identification through 
which power-as-cultural-codes consolidates in certain actors: by those actors 
presenting images of themselves as in alignment with whatever codes are 
dominant at any particular time. In this situation, “the most poignant yet the 
least answerable question (…) is not ‘What is to be done?’ (in order to make 
the world better or happier), but ‘Who is going to do it?’” (Bauman 2006: 
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133). Bauman’s limited answer to this question refers to a new role for critical 
theory, which was once 
the defence of private autonomy from the advancing troops of the 
‘public sphere’, smarting under the oppressive rule of the omnipotent 
impersonal state and its many bureaucratic tentacles or their smaller-
scale replicas (…) [but] is now to defend the vanishing public realm, or 
rather to refurnish and repopulate the public space (Bauman 2006: 39)  
In Castells’ terms, the ‘who’ is a public that shares a project identity, 
developed from the linking and expansion of various resistance identities. 
Examples of such processes, as observed in contemporary social 
movements and politics, are the construction of new, egalitarian families; 
the widespread acceptance of the concept of sustainable development, 
building intergenerational solidarity into the new model of economic 
growth; and the universal mobilization in defense of human rights 
wherever the defense has to be taken up. For this transition to be 
undertaken, from resistance identity to project identity, a new politics will 
have to emerge. This will be a cultural politics that starts from the premise 
that informational politics is predominantly enacted in the space of media, 
and fights with symbols, yet connects to values and issues that spring from 
people’s life experience in the Information Age (Castells 2010: 389). 
To further develop the idea of this transition from resistance identity to project 
identity, through a cultural politics fought with symbols, we turn to other 
theorists. 
2.3 The democratic and ecological radicalization of (post)modernity 
In The Green State (2004), Robyn Eckersley applies a form of analysis she 
terms “critical political ecology” as a method for identifying paths from 
contemporary forms of liberal representative governance towards more 
ecologically sensitive forms of state organization. In brief, critical political 
ecology begins from the tradition of critical theory, “the practice of critically 
reflecting on and harnessing those moral resources within existing social 
arrangements that might enable new forms of community with higher states of 
freedom” and then “extend[s] the project of emancipation to include both the 
human and the nonhuman world.” It inherits from critical theory a view of 
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“claims that there is an objective reality” as “always and unavoidably 
evaluative, historically contingent, and filtered through different social frames 
and social standpoints” and the goal “not to discover what is really true or false 
but rather what is found to be more rational, [meaning] reflectively acceptable 
by social actors” (Eckersley 2004: 8-9). 
In drawing on traditions of civic republicanism and Habermasian conceptions 
of public-sphere deliberation, the critical political ecology approach has many 
similarities with the work of Laclau and Mouffe, who formulated earlier 
proposals for the expansion and deepening of democratic politics and 
governance, without an explicit ecological focus. Both aim to build on the 
foundation of liberal democracy rather than to reject it. These perspectives 
have parallels with both deep ecological thought and structures of the network 
society. In this they are particularly suited to my present project of finding 
contemporary points of application, explication and expansion for deep 
ecology. 
Eckersley’s approach calls for creating institutions which increase the extent 
and efficacy of public deliberation, and fostering critical public discourses. 
The goal is to include all those affected by risk-generating decisions in the 
decision making process, as both a matter of justice and as a practical means to 
reduce environmental risks in public action. This involves a rebalancing of 
liberal freedoms and a redefinition of liberal autonomy. Action which 
“undermine[s] public environmental goods such as the waterways, oceans, 
atmosphere, and biodiversity” (Eckersley 2004: 96) is, in this view, a 
restriction of the freedom and autonomy of all those who use such 
environmental goods. This leads to a critique of the classic liberal conception 
of autonomy, which “rests on an incoherent and undesirable ontology—that of 
social and biological detachment” (Ibid.: 104). Here we begin to see a direct 
connection to Næssian deep ecology, as the difference between liberal and 
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ecological democracy is rooted in different conceptions of the self, as either 
atomistic of interrelated. 
The principle of including all ecological stakeholders in democratic 
deliberation also requires institutions which reach beyond contemporary 
nation-states. This includes transnational states, such as the EU, which Castells 
sees as a symptomatic response to conditions in the network society. Næss 
(2005: 197) similarly states that the political implications of deep ecology call 
for simultaneous centralization and decentralization. Such a system of layered, 
networked governing institutions at local, regional, national and transnational 
levels requires forms of political participation and citizenship with new 
balances of the principles of belonging and affectedness. Belonging is defined 
by characteristics such as nationality and civic participation, and affectedness 
by ecological embeddedness and exposure to risks. Eckersley imagines these 
forms developing through transnational arrangements which supplement 
political institutions based on belonging with new structures which provide a 
form of ecological citizenship rooted in affectedness. Such transnational 
institutions may also include the international NGOs which John Keane (2013: 
25) casts as important actors in monitory democracy, a system of “one person, 
many interests, many voices, multiple votes, multiple representatives” in which 
political and economic power is checked by reporting and communication 
wherever it is exercised. 
Chantal Mouffe places the issue of belonging at the core of political questions. 
Liberal deliberation is not simply a matter of individuals pursuing their 
interests through rational public discourse. Politics requires the creation and 
maintenance of group identities and membership in forms of political 
association. Rather than accepting the liberal notion of natural rights, Mouffe 
(1993: 46) argues that all notions of rights, and of justice, “cannot exist prior 
to and independently of specific forms of political association - which by 
definition imply a conception of the good.” As with Næss’ prioritization of 
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ontology and relations over ethics, here questions of value cannot be abstracted 
from the particular ways in which persons and (social and natural) 
environments are constructed. For Næss (2010: 534) “the conditions of life on 
Earth are such that increase of self-realization is dependent on conflicts.” 
Similarly, for Mouffe, politics must be agonistic, and it is through 
confrontation and debate that group identities, publics and politics are realized. 
The relevant question becomes what sort of identifications are to serve as the 
basis for politics. “In the question ‘What shall we do?’, the ‘we’ is not given 
but rather constitutes a problem” (Mouffe 1993: 50). This is echoed in Michael 
Zimmerman’s description of deep ecologists as “claim[ing] that before 
knowing what we ought to do, we must understand who we really are” (Fox 
1990: 227). In Keane’s estimation, the institutions of monitory democracy, 
human rights organizations and networks, aim to answer this same question, of 
“who decides who ‘the people’ are?” by answering that “every human being is 
entitled to exercise their right to have rights” (Keane 2013: 41). This particular 
formulation may be a bit unclear, but it is similar to Mouffe’s in that instead of 
presenting rights as given, universal, or ‘natural’, they arise from deliberation, 
contestation, and communication. The “right to have rights” leaves the 
determination of specific rights a contextual matter, but it denotes the 
fundamental consideration of others having value in themselves. The right to 
have rights can be read as the “value that is the same for every human being, 
namely intrinsic value” (Næss 2005: 95). 
While politics is agonistic, it also requires an element of homogeneity in order 
to constitute a single demos. Instead of searching for this homogeneity in 
exclusionary, insular forms of communitarian identification such as ethno-
national belonging, Mouffe believes that democratic politics can proceed from 
a group identification with the principles and institutions of liberal democracy 
itself – most fundamentally, the principles of liberty and equality. This is 
Habermasian “constitutional patriotism,” which is supposed to provide “a 
more abstract, more cosmopolitan, and more inclusive foundation than 
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ethnicity upon which to ground social solidarity” (Eckersley 2004: 147). It is a 
project of identifying with a framework. For Mouffe 
the real task (…) is to foster allegiance to our democratic institutions, 
and the best way to do this is not by demonstrating that they would be 
chosen by rational agents 'under the veil of ignorance' or in a 'neutral 
dialogue', but by creating strong forms of identification with them. 
(Mouffe 1993: 151) 
As with Self-realization, identification with the (in this case, political, 
institutional) environment is cast as more important than abstracted ethical 
arguments. Thus: 
It is not liberalism as such which should be called into question, for as 
an ethical principle which defends the liberty of the individual to fulfill 
his or her human capacities, it is more valid today than ever...What is 
involved is the production of another individual, an individual who is 
no longer constructed out of the matrix of possessive individualism. 
The idea of ‘natural’ rights prior to society - and, indeed, the whole of 
the false dichotomy individual/society - should be abandoned, and 
replaced by another manner of posing the problem of rights. It is never 
possible for individual rights to be defined in isolation, but only in the 
context of social relations which define determinate subject positions. 
As a consequence, it will always be a question of rights which involve 
other subjects who participate in the same social relation (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985: 184). 
Similarly, the rights of non-human members of the ecosphere are not ‘natural 
rights’ which derive from some minimum level of sentience which qualifies 
them for ethical consideration, but are rights that arise from their participation 
in ecological relations, express by Eckersley as “affectedness.” This is to 
abandon the idea of ‘natural’ rights prior to ecological embeddedness, and the 
dichotomy individual/ecosystem, and to extend critical theory’s project of 
emancipation to the non-human world.  
In such a political framework, agreement on the principles of liberty and 
equality serves as the basis for political association, but disagreement on the 
precise meanings and implications of those terms becomes the basis for 
political contestation. Mouffe’s goal within this frame is to increase 
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democratic identification by increasing the range and reach of democratic 
practices, and thus the range of identities that can be linked to political 
democracy. The expansion of democracy is created through a particular form 
of identification that Laclau and Mouffe term the creation of “chains of 
equivalence.” This is “the construction of a new ‘common sense’ which 
changes the identity of the different groups, in such a way that the demands of 
each group are articulated equivalentially with those of the others” (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985: 183). Jameson (2005: 245) describes this as a kind of “poetic 
relationship” in which “the literal cause of one group is adopted as a figural 
abstraction (autonomy, democracy) by another group which has a different 
conception of autonomy.” Creating an awareness of common ecological 
vulnerability is one form of constructing common sense. Any such equivalence 
can never be total, and the continuation of democratic practice precludes the 
creation of a single form of equality. Different forms of equality and liberty 
apply to different political spaces; constructing chains of equivalences 
involves identifying the way in which particular struggles around these 
principles are commonly opposed by certain actors, structures or discourses. 
For Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 185), “the extension of democratic rights from 
the classic ‘political’ domain to that of the economy (…) is the terrain of the 
specifically anti-capitalist struggle (…) [which] defends the right of the social 
agent to equality and to participation as a producer and not only as a citizen.” 
For Eckersley, the extension of democratic rights from the classically political 
domain to non-humans and all those affected by environmental decision-
making is the terrain of the specifically ecological struggle. Equivalences can 
be created, as has been discussed in this chapter, to the extent that they are 
commonly opposed by established (‘hegemonic’) liberal discourses and 
institutions and actors that benefit from the suppression of such freedoms. In 
contrast to Mouffe’s negatively-defined equivalences, Næss (1989: 80) 
conceives of equivalence as addressing the “problem [of] what can be 
established as the greatest common goal, to which all personal and social 
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endeavours should be directed.” As will be explored in the further chapters, 
other extensions of rights and freedoms are specific to the domains of 
aesthetics and digital networks. In this section, I have begun to suggest that 
one such commonly opposed discourse is the discourse of property rights in 
classical liberalism. One of my main concerns going forward will be to 
identify such equivalences between specific conceptions of liberty and equality 
in different domains, and to use network imagery to further conceptualize such 
chains. 
Næss repeatedly asserts the appreciation and defense of diversity for its own 
sake as a fundamental part of his ecosophy. Bauman, Eckersley and Mouffe all 
promote pluralism as both a goal and a strength of democracy in general, and 
of the particular democratic project they wish to pursue. For Bauman (2006: 
178), “the pluralism of modern civilized society is not just a ‘brute fact’ which 
can be disliked or even detested but (alas) not wished away, but a good thing 
and fortunate circumstance.” Eckersley (2004: 96) calls for “the flourishing of 
more plural possibilities,” and for Laclau and Mouffe, the principle of liberty 
cannot be instantiated outside a pluralistic context. However,  
the specificity of modern democratic pluralism is lost when it is 
envisaged merely as the empirical fact of a multiplicity of moral 
conceptions of the good. It needs to be understood as the expression of 
a symbolic mutation in the ordering of social relations (Mouffe 1993: 
147). 
In order to get a better understanding of what it means for democracy to be a 
“symbolic mutation,” we can look to Tomasello and Vaish’s (2013) proposed 
phylogeny for human cooperation. In this hypothesized sequence, the 
development of prosocial, altruistic instincts (which appear very early in 
infants) and the cognitive ability to track reciprocity over time engendered 
close cooperation among small interdependent groups in regular, direct 
contact. Later, intergroup competition motivated the development of larger 
groups in which  
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many interactions were not based on personal histories of individuals 
with one another but rather on group membership alone (…)This kind 
of group-mindedness, underlain by skills of collective intentionality, 
engendered truly impersonal, agent-neutral, objective social norms 
(Tomasello and Vaish 2013: 239). 
Once social activity extends beyond an immediate group, it comes to rely on 
abstract, symbolically constructed norms and identities. Democratic principles 
of liberty and equality, then, are not simply the historical reemergence of 
small-group egalitarianism, but a remapping of those egalitarian instincts to a 
novel construction of group identity and its supporting norms. Democratic 
pluralism is then a historical mutation in the symbolic construction of norms 
which allows and even calls for a pluralism within the identity of groups. The 
deepening of democracy comes from more pluralistic and encompassing 
mutations in the forms of identification and normative structures.  
To further explore the character of the democratic symbolic mutation, and to 
draw connections between politics as presented in this section with the notion 
of aesthetics, I will draw upon the work of Jacques Rancière. The connection 
between politics and aesthetics will later prove useful in further exploring the 
relationship of ethics and ontology in deep ecology, and the place of all of 
these concepts in the digital commons. 
2.4 Politics and aesthetics 
Rancière’s notion of what constitutes politics is compatible in many ways with 
the definitions that Eckersley and Mouffe use. However, it requires some 
explanation. The key ideas are the distinctions he draws between consensus 
and dissensus, between the principles of police and politics. These distinctions 
in turn draw on a particular definition of democracy and the demos. In 
democracy 
politics means the supplementation of all qualifications by the power of 
the unqualified. The ultimate ground on which rulers govern is that 
there is no good reason as to why some men should rule others (…) The 
demos is not the population, the majority, the political body or the lower 
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classes. It is the surplus community made up of those who have no 
qualification to rule, which means at once everybody and anyone at all 
(Rancière 2010: 53). 
That is to say, the demos of democracy is not an aggregate of atomistic 
individuals, who negotiate their competing interests through public 
deliberation and representative bodies. The demos, as a ‘surplus community,’6 
is a category that arises outside of the particular characteristics of the members 
of the group, when those members are brought together under the principles of 
liberty and equality. The politics that this particular surplus body, the demos, 
pursues, “invents new forms of collective enunciation; it re-frames the given 
by inventing new ways of making sense of the sensible” (Rancière 2010: 139). 
This is a process of dissensus, which is to create “forms of subjectivation in 
the interval between two identities; creating cases of universality by playing on 
the double relation between the universal and the particular” (Rancière 2010: 
57). Rancière also refers to dissensus as the putting of two worlds into one, of 
contrasting one distribution of the sensible with the distribution of ‘common 
sense.’ Laclau and Mouffe’s creation of chains of equivalence are an activity 
of this dissensual sort. Chains of equivalence create new political subjects out 
of specific struggles by reframing the given sensory world to identify 
discourses, structures, institutions and actors which oppose them in common. 
Opposed to this particular conception of dissensus, then, is consensus, which  
does not consist in peaceful discussion and reasonable agreement, as 
opposed to conflict or violence. Its essence lies in the annulment of 
dissensus as separation of the sensible from itself, in the nullification of 
surplus subjects, in the reduction of the people to the sum of the parts of 
the social body and of the political community to the relations between 
the interests and aspirations of these different parts (Rancière 2010: 43). 
We may be aided in understanding this idea by comparing it to the distinction 
that Fox draws between transpersonal ecology and various rights-based 
                                              
6 This is not a “surplus community” in the sense of a subaltern, an army of reserve labor, or a ‘multitude.’ It is 
surplus in the sense of being beyond a simple aggregation of characteristics; it is ‘anybody at all.’ 
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accounts of environmental ethics. As in the difference between the principles 
of dissensus and consensus, right-based approaches attempt to isolate 
individual living beings and their characteristics – sentience, the ability to 
experience pain – that would then afford them certain natural rights. This is 
also “the nullification of surplus subjects,” in that it limits consideration of 
living beings to characteristics thought to reside within them, instead of 
considering qualities that emerge from their participation in an ecosystem. 
Rancière’s particular interpretation of democracy might be understood through 
a comparison with ecology. An ecosystem is not simply the aggregate of living 
beings and other elements, but is a kind of surplus community that arises when 
these entities are brought together in relation. Ecology is a way of viewing the 
sorts of relations that turn a community of objects and subjects, living and non-
living entities, into an ecosystem. Democracy, a “specific partition of the 
sensible” (Rancière 2010: 157), is a way of viewing the sorts of relations that 
turn a community of subjects into a demos.  
For Rancière (2010: 42-43) “consensus is the ‘end of politics’: in other words, 
not the accomplishment of the ends of politics but simply a return to the 
normal state of things - the non-existence of politics.” This end of politics 
Rancière associates with the principle of the police, by which he does not 
simply mean actually-existing police forces, “not a social function but a 
symbolic constitution of the social (…) a partition of the sensible that is 
characterized by the absence of void and of supplement” (Rancière 2010: 36). 
The supplement is the supplemental character of people as demos, a character 
which exists due to its constitution as a group, and not as a sum of preexisting 
attributes; void is its character of “at once everybody and anyone at all,” and 
the void of there being “no good reason as to why some men should rule 
others.” The police is the principle of managing populations based on the 
characteristics attributed to separate individuals and groups, “patterns and 
procedures of ruling that are predicated on a given distribution of 
qualifications, places and competencies” (Rancière 2010: 53). This sense of 
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the police, of managing populations, is akin to the anthropocentric relation to 
the non-human world. 
To understand human beings as a kind of animal—more precisely, as 
livestock—is, almost automatically, to belittle their dignity. That is also 
true—indeed, especially true—when this understanding makes it easier 
to take better care of the bodily well-being of this human animal (Groys 
2008: 176). 
Consensual ‘biopolitics’ and domestication treat both animal and human 
populations according to their characteristics, as objects of management and 
not subjects. Thus many of the medical interventions made in the lives of cattle 
– for example the antibiotics administered to corn-fed cows - would be 
unnecessary if the animals were allowed to more closely pursue their own 
interests rather than being managed according to the maximization of certain 
characteristics. In the case of non-human animals, this is the maximization of 
characteristics for some human purpose; in the case of humans, it is the 
maximization of ‘their own good.’ This logic of such policing can be seen in 
the contemporary world in such phenomena as “situational crime prevention,” 
in which  
it becomes possible to prevent not just actual crimes but even pseudo-
crimes—that is, acts that become “criminal” simply because people 
meeting a certain profile engage in them (at which point, SCP might 
sound more like sorting than policing) (Morozov 2013b: 245). 
Such management of societies based on the characteristics of individuals leads 
to a “world (…) of atomistic, selfish individuals, perpetually concerned about 
security and unable not only to trust others but to engage in moral reasoning at 
all” (Ibid.: 247). As Morozov argues, such approaches are defended on the 
basis of rational-choice theory, which similarly informs programs of economic 
rationalization and interest-group models of politics. Again, police and actual 
policing are tied back to consensus. Management by characteristics and 
management by economic rationalization are both forms of “hetero-regulation” 
or “totalization.” 
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There are, however, two types of hetero-regulation or totalization (…) 
first, one which derives from a totalization (which no one wanted, 
anticipated or planned) of serialized actions by the material field in 
which they inscribe themselves; and secondly, one which involves 
organized programming, an organization chart drawn up for the purpose 
of getting individuals, who are neither able to communicate nor to 
arrive at a mutual agreement, to realize a collective result, which they 
neither intend nor are, in many cases, even aware of. The former type of 
hetero-regulation corresponds more particularly to regulation by the 
market. There is a tendency to consider this kind of hetero-regulation as 
self-regulation. In fact, it is a pure ‘systemic mechanism’ (Habermas) 
which imposes its laws from without on individuals who are then ruled 
by them and are forced to adapt and to modify their conduct and 
projects according to an external, statistical and totally involuntary 
balance of forces. The market for them is, then, an a-centred, 
spontaneous hetero-regulation. It can only be regarded as a form of self-
regulation if the social whole is viewed from the outside as a purely 
material system whose constituent parts, like the molecules of an inert 
gas or liquid, are only externally related to each other and, since they 
lack the capacity to pursue any goal, are individually of no interest 
(Gorz 1989: 34). 
These differing forms of hetero-regulation are all anti-ecological. They 
explicitly or implicitly deny that ‘all things hang together’. 
However, this is not to say that Rancière’s politics exists only outside the 
operations of state and corporate bureaucracies and other institutions of power. 
While politics is “a supplement to the sensory worlds framed by state, military, 
economic, religious and scholarly powers,” the sensory framework particular 
to politics intersects these other frameworks, and exists both inside and 
opposed to these institutions. Politics is a continual process that occurs 
throughout social realms, because politics is itself the displacement of “the 
limits of the political by re-enacting the equality of each and all” (Rancière 
2010: 54). Similarly, Mouffe locates the demos in a community united around 
the principles of liberty and equality, the precise interpretation of which at any 
moment becomes the ground of contestation. This principle which founds the 
demos is similar to Næss’ interpretation of intrinsic value in deep ecology, 
which is “a value that is the same for every human being (…) incompatible 
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with fascist racism and fascist nationalism, and also with the special ethical 
status accorded the (supreme) Leader” (Næss 2005: 95). To the extent that 
intrinsic value is taken as central to deep ecology, it can be defined as the 
application of the democratic principle to life on Earth. 
Rancière identifies commonalities between the modern notions of political 
democracy and aesthetics, in a shared historical genesis and a shared 
dissensual nature. What he terms the ‘aesthetic regime’ arises with modern 
literature, and replaces the ‘representational regime.’ “The representational 
power of doing art (…) was bound up with the power of a social hierarchy 
based on the capacity of addressing appropriate kinds of speech-acts to 
appropriate kinds of audiences” (Rancière 2010: 157). The aesthetic regime 
ends “every determinate relation correlating the production of art forms and a 
specific social function” (Ibid.: 138); in modern literature, “the writer is 
anybody and the reader anybody” (Ibid.: 157). Like the police, the 
representational principle demands particular relations between specific actors 
and specific acts, while the principles of politics and aesthetics respond by 
enacting and re-enacting liberty and equality: “the ‘politics’ of literature 
emerges as the dismissal of the politics of orators and militants, who conceive 
of politics as a struggle of wills and interests” (Ibid.:163). Thus, it is not only 
similar to Rancière’s concept of politics, but to Eckersley and Mouffe’s 
opposition between deliberative democracy and interest-group politics. In the 
aesthetic regime, liberty and equality take the form of the “indifferent gaze” – 
all subjects are free to look upon, and evaluate, all objects, equally. (This is not 
indifference in the form of apathy or disengagement, but a lack of prejudgment 
in the kinds of objects open to the gaze.) In a discussion of political 
photography, Ariella Azoulay describes the indifferent gaze thusly: “the 
aesthetic existence of an image must be understood as its action upon the 
senses. This action upon the senses, or the impression of the senses, has no 
purpose beyond itself” (Azoulay 2010: 252). For Azoulay, the “political” and 
the “aesthetic” cannot be absolutely separated. All objects are aesthetic, since 
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“the aesthetic is given by way of the object’s being given to the senses” and 
any piece of art, any object can be political, because the political “is not a trait 
[of objects] but [of] the relations between a plurality of persons” (Azoulay 
2010: 250). Both aesthetics and politics are the site of “a struggle for 
recognition.” 
Whereas politics is an arena in which various group interests have, both 
in the past and the present, fought for recognition, artists of the classical 
avant-garde have mostly contended for the recognition of individual 
forms and artistic procedures that were not previously considered 
legitimate. The classical avant-garde has struggled to achieve 
recognition of all signs, forms, and things as legitimate objects of 
artistic desire and, hence, also as legitimate objects of representation in 
art. Both forms of struggle are intrinsically bound up with each other, 
and both have as their aim a situation in which all people with their 
various interests, as indeed also all forms and artistic procedures, will 
finally be granted equal rights (Groys 2010: 13). 
While aesthetic judgments will draw upon the characteristics of human sensory 
and cognitive capabilities, as well as cultural traditions of interpretation, 
including those inherited from the representational regime, each judgment 
emerges anew in a particular situation. This can be reformulated in terms of 
Næss’ gestalt ontology: just as qualities such as color, extension, or mood do 
not exist purely in an object or in an observer, but exist in a field of relations, 
so do all aesthetic and political qualities arise in gestalts of relations between 
objects and subjects. Useful here is his notion of “apperceptive gestalts,” being 
gestalts which bring together at least one sensory element and at least one 
“from a normative and/or assertive area (…) When one's attention is not 
deliberately focused upon perceptual gestalts, all experience is apperceptive.” 
(Næss 1989: 60) Aesthetic objects exist in apperceptive gestalts, combining 
the perceptual aspects, what Azoulay calls the aesthetic existence, the action of 
objects upon the senses, and their “normative/assertive” aspects, the webs of 
meaning connected to those objects via their placement within social spaces. 
Thus, in Næss’ terms, to demand that aesthetic objects be political, or 
apolitical, to criticize them for being too ‘aesthetic’ or too ‘political’ – to wish 
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for the separation of sensory and normative elements – is to focus on what he 
calls ‘lower order gestalts’ rather than the ‘higher order gestalts’ which include 
and expand on them. Since, in the view of a gestalt ontology, characteristics of 
objects do not reside ‘within’ them or ‘within’ a subject observing them, but 
arise in a relational field, aesthetic values, such as beauty, cannot be seen to be 
stable essences found in objects, but values that must arise anew in each 
gestalt in which the objects are placed. This does not preclude the possibility 
of particular objects being associated with the same values in many different 
relational fields over time – but these values will be appearing newly in each 
particular field of objects and subjects, in a web of sensory perceptions and the 
normative assessments that are products of social deliberation. If we look at 
the creation of modern museums and the notion of civilizing the ‘lower 
classes’ and maintaining social peace and order through exposure to ‘high art’ 
we cannot ultimately untangle such intents from the aesthetic qualities of art 
objects (more properly, the aesthetic qualities that arise in a web of relations 
between those objects and certain subjects) and those qualities from the very 
fact of a provision of public goods, the method of that provision, and the social 
milieu in which it takes place. The point here should not be to erase 
distinctions – such as the distinction between the aesthetic and the political – 
but, having identified differences between concepts, to locate them both within 
higher-order gestalts. 
Aesthetics (or, the modern aesthetic regime as described by Rancière) and 
democratic politics are then two modes of describing and enacting relations 
between subjects and objects, and subjects and other subjects, following the 
principles of liberty and equality. “Aesthetic free play involves the abolition of 
the opposition between form and matter, between activity and passivity” 
(Rancière 2010: 176). As we saw in the previous section, this requires the 
expansion and redefinition of the freedoms of classical liberalism, including 
freedoms of listening, viewing, receiving, and participating, not simply 
freedom of speech. Liberty of expression in the form of rational speech alone 
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preserves, to some extent, the notion of “a social hierarchy based on the 
capacity of addressing appropriate kinds of speech-acts to appropriate kinds of 
audiences” (Rancière 2010: 157). 
In this shared conception of aesthetics and politics, we may begin to bring 
together Næss, Rancière, and Mouffe to create a unified axiology without 
absolute divisions between aesthetics and ethics, and between aesthetics and 
politics. These become simply different configurations of the sensible, 
different ways of assigning value, or framing relations of value, between 
entities in the world given by sense experience. It is part of the Spinozan 
project of “placing (…)  joys and other so-called subjective phenomena into a 
unified total field of realities” to overcome the “cleavage into two worlds (…) 
[of] the world of fact and the world of values” (Næss 2005: 114). The point of 
this, as with Næss’ prioritization of ontology before ethics, is that the treatment 
of ‘ethics’ as a separate field or regime does not necessarily reflect the way 
value is actually experienced and acted upon. 
Returning to look at the postmodern patterns of individualization and 
privatization through this lens, we see the shift from roles to identities as the 
shift from one form of identification, made untenable by economic changes, to 
another. The political and eco-political projects enumerated here are all 
proposals for progressive forms of identification to replace the merely reactive 
forms described by Castells and Bauman. 
We can move from this conceptual unity to the specific character of the digital 
commons by returning to Keane’s notion of monitory democracy. He believes 
that in a world in which citizens and civic groups are able, using technology, to 
continually monitor the use of power, 
people are coming to learn that they must keep an eye on power and its 
representatives, that they must make judgments and choose their own 
courses of action. Citizens are being tempted to think for themselves; to 
see the same world in different ways, from different angles, and to 
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sharpen their overall sense that prevailing power relationships are not 
“natural,” but contingent. In this sense, communicative abundance and 
monitory institutions combine to promote something of a “Gestalt 
switch” in the popular perception of power. The metaphysical idea of an 
objective, out-there-at-a-distance “reality” is weakened (Keane 2013: 
48). 
In this estimation, the current uses of monitory technologies in the network 
society inspire a re-framing of the sensory world, and the collapse of sharp 
distinctions between the world of facts and the world of values. Monitory 
institutions belong to the realm of communicative and deliberative justice 
called for by Eckersley and Mouffe. ‘Communicative abundance,’ on the other 




3. The Digital Commons 
In considering the digital commons within the context of this project, I follow 
Næss’ counsel that “the position of technology in our society should be taken 
more seriously, not less, because of its importance for ultimate ends” (Næss 
1989: 33). My intention is to describe how the digital commons might be a 
manifestation of the network society which fits an ecological view of 
appropriate technology, in which  
the value of technical change is dependent upon its value for culture in 
general. To assess change in technology within a lesser context than the 
ultimate cultural aims undermines the very existence of the culture. 
‘Advanced’ technology is what advances the ultimate ends in life. 
Rationality is relational: rational is rational only in order to reach human 
ultimate ends, whether in terms of happiness or perfection (Ibid.). 
A precise definition of the digital commons is made difficult by the rapidity of 
change within its moving boundaries. This fluidity also makes a precise 
definition less desirable, for contestation over the nature and extent of the 
digital commons is an essential aspect of its existence. At its broadest, the 
digital commons could be said to constitute all the material – code, text, image, 
sound – accessible through digital information networks. However, the nature 
and extent of control over the accessibility of this material by private, public, 
corporate and collective actors, and the conditions  of that access, instituted 
through means of software code, law, and physical infrastructure, creates large, 
diffuse border regions in which it becomes unclear what is ‘common’ and what 
is not.
7
  The digital commons is not simply the aggregate of networked digital 
material. It is the image of that material created by public contestation over the 
way the material should be held in common. Adopting the idea of the 
commons to describe digital material already characterizes that body of 
material as a political space. The commons refers not only to collectively held 
                                              
7 For more on the overlapping realms of the commons and intellectual property see e.g. Deazley 2006: 123. 
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property but also to a meeting place. The digital commons encapsulates the 
sum of digital material, all the cultural objects made freely and jointly 
available by way of being digitized and networked, the boundaries between 
public and private, and the political spaces created by contestation over these 
boundaries. Such a definition allows us 
rather than try to grapple with various conflicting or complementary 
interpretations of the public domain [to] consider the public domain in 
the abstract, as symbolic of many and varied individual fights (…) not 
as a ‘territory’ but rather as a concept (Deazley 2006: 105). 
To the extent that the digital commons can be defined and located more 
concretely, this is for same reason its definition must be very broadly 
encompassing. That is: the criterion for inclusion in the digital commons is a 
technical one; the digital commons is that which can be digitized and 
distributed through ICT networks. It creates a commons in fact where there 
may not be a commons in laws covering intellectual property, or in our 
existing conceptions of the public sphere. In the digital commons, digitization 
makes the commons by fostering the means of common access. 
Since the circumstances of the digital commons are varied and changing, 
definitive statements about the whole should be approached with caution. I 
will discuss peer-to-peer file-sharing networks as a specific phenomenon 
within the digital commons, with more certain attributes. My assertions about 
the digital commons should be taken to apply at least to file-sharing networks 
dedicated to the exchange of music and texts (taken to be the paradigmatic 
case) and often applicable to many other cases as well. I will argue that file-
sharing networks are exemplary of the democratic and ecological potential of 
the digital commons, and can and should be used as a model in the struggle to 
determine the future of the digital commons. The digital commons and the 
ecosphere are twin sites for redefining the proper place of property in a project 
of democratic and ecological deepening of liberal democracy. Such a 
reorganization of property rights might include the provision of guaranteed 
 47 
basic income schemes on a state basis, or, on an international basis drawing on 
the taxation of global financial transfers (Blackburn 2007) and the 
transformation of land ownership to land stewardship as proposed by 
Eckersley (2004). My intention here is not to propose any particular reform as 
universally appropriate or immediately practicable. My interest is instead in the 
way that ecological principles and principles of free digital exchange challenge 
the hegemonic position of property rights, ownership and accumulation as 
suitable mechanisms for the organization of society, while adjusting 
conceptions of freedom in the interests of a diverse and vital whole. First, 
however, I wish to place the digital commons in the context of the history of 
notions of copyright and intellectual property. 
3.1 From piracy to copyright to intellectual property 
Contemporary arguments in favor of restricting freedom of exchange in the 
digital commons tend to depict new technologies of reproduction and 
distribution as a threat to the established rights of authors in their intellectual 
property. Such a discourse is myopic in its understanding of the history of 
intellectual property and its encroachment on the public domain. “Rampant 
expansionism (…) is the story of copyright law throughout the twentieth and 
into the twenty-first century” (Deazley 2006: 152). This expansion followed 
two centuries in which copyright, only created in law at the beginning of the 
18
th
 century, was gradually transformed, through elision, mistaken historical 
memory, and the eclipse of public interests by private parties, from a limited 
privilege granted by the state in the public interest, to a natural property right 
in ideas. Simply put, “copyright was an invention of eighteenth-century 
Britain. It was unknown anywhere before 1700, and for much of the ensuing 
century no other nation had anything like it” (Johns 2010: 109). Before the 
creation of copyright, state involvement in printing was not concerned with 
notions of property. The details of regulation were left as a matter internal to 
the trade of printing itself, while the issuing of licenses to print was used as a 
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method to control the publishing of seditious and heretical material (Deazley 
2004: 2). Parliamentarians began to abandon the system of license-driven state 
censorship when they saw how an active, loosely-regulated press could be 
used to garner support for their political positions, within the legislature and in 
the public sphere (Ibid.: 11, 29). The legal history of copyright begins with the 
Statute of Anne, enacted in 1710, which provided for a 14-year copyright in 
printed works, explicitly rejecting the prior existence of a natural or common 
law right to literary property (Deazley 2006: 13). 
A purely statutory phenomenon, copyright was fundamentally 
concerned with the reading public, with the encouragement and spread 
of education, and with the continued production of useful books. In 
deciding the case as they did, these eighteenth-century parliamentarians 
did not primarily seek to advance the rights of the individual author. 
Rather, explicitly denying the existence of a common law copyright, 
they acted in the furtherance of much broader social goals and 
principles. The pre-eminence of the common good as the organising 
principle upon which to found a statutory system of copyright regulation 
was championed, while the notion of an authorial copyright at common 
law had been declared not to exist (Ibid.: 23). 
This dismissal of a perpetual common law right to property in ideas did draw 
opponents, and some of their objections match the more hyperbolic critics of 
digital networks’ effects on cultural production. An early 19th century 
supporter of the notion of an author’s perpetual common law right to works, in 
attacking the establishment of a limited legal right, “lambasted the present era 
of ‘boasted enlightenment’ which bore witness to hardly anything more than 
‘the curtailment of rights, and the imposition of burthens [sic]’” (Deazley 
2006: 38). Unless we wish to consider the body of works printed before 1710 
to be fundamentally superior to the body of works printed after that date, the 
repetition of such objections to the “curtailment of rights” to intellectual 
property should give us pause in too easily accepting similar complaints in 
regards to the effect of new technologies. 
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Copyright was, at the beginning, “an entirely pragmatic bargain involving the 
author, the bookseller and the public,” with a broad “social focus (…) that 
concerned the reading public, the continued production of useful literature, and 
the advancement and spread of education” (Deazley 2006: 13-14). It was 
introduced after a period of fifteen years during which neither copyright nor 
any licensing system existed. Copyright initiated a particular legal regime that 
aimed to encourage the use of mechanical reproduction to increase distribution 
and access to cultural objects and nurture the vitality of the public sphere. 
There is little reason not to consider the possibility that new technologies of 
reproduction and transmission call for a different “pragmatic bargain.” 
In the centuries following the creation of a legal copyright, the gradual 
rewriting of legal history established a standard view that copyright had been 
enacted with an understanding of a preexisting common law property right in 
written works, such that “what had once been so heatedly contested, and 
rejected” came to be “quite simply an understood and accepted orthodoxy” 
(Deazley 2006: 90). Along with this revision of the understanding of copyright 
as a form of natural property right came further legislation that increasingly 
proceeded from such an understanding:  
As the rights of the copyright owner have increased, so the freedoms of 
the lawful copyright user have beaten a retreat. Moreover, underpinning 
this movement is an increasingly powerful process of conceptual 
reification, and the emergence of a ubiquitous discourse of property 
rights (and so, human rights) which operates to naturalise that very 
movement, destabilise any meaningful opposition thereto, and so render 
it seemingly inevitable. The emergence of such rhetoric can be traced 
with relative ease through the language which the legislation itself 
adopts: in 1911 the statute [in the United Kingdom] referred to the fact 
that ‘copyright shall subsist … in every original literary, dramatic, 
musical and artistic work’; the 1956 Act provided the same, but added 
that ‘copyright shall be transmissible by assignment, by testamentary 
disposition, or by operation of law, as personal or moveable property’; 
by 1988 the legislation set out, quite unequivocally, that ‘[c]opyright is 
a property right’ (Deazley 2006: 150-151). 
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Thus, the current discourse of intellectual property portrays the defense of a 
form of natural property in ideas from technologically mediated violations of 
these rights. However, the history of intellectual property is of the notion of 
rights of property expanding to enclose more of the non-human world and the 
cultural commons. John Locke, in establishing a problematically 
anthropocentric theory of property, in which the non-human world is 
transformed into property through labor (Boon 2010: 210) did not consider this 
form of property to extend to the sort of intangible, ‘nonrival’ products now 
covered by the concept of intellectual property (Deazley 2006: 143). This 
theory of property has come to enclose more of the non-human world and the 
cultural commons and invest the holders of such rights with greater privileges.  
Historically, however, the sort of unrestrained reproduction of cultural 
materials termed piracy precedes the concept of intellectual property. “The law 
of what we now call intellectual property has often lagged behind piratical 
practices, and indeed (…) virtually all its central principles, such as copyright, 
were developed in response to piracy” (Johns 2010: 6). While “it is easy 
enough to find complaints of intellectual misappropriation as far back as the 
ancient world (…) these acts never seem to have been called piracies, and (…) 
they were not legal offenses ” (Ibid.: 19). Far from being a natural right, 
intellectual property is a reaction to certain forms of cultural mimesis, 
especially forms newly enabled by technology. In the present moment, the 
extension of the concept of piracy to the reproduction of digital objects has 
meant updating the notion of intellectual property to expand to nearly every 
kind of nonrival good. When intellectual property is seen not as natural but as 
a constructed area of contestation, one may counter that expansion with a 
vision of every kind of nonrival good belonging to a commons. The free 
copying and distribution, or ‘piracy’, of digital objects first creates a partially 
completed version of this commons; the reaction it elicits, in the form of 
intellectual property expansion, creates a space in which to respond with an 
even broader notion of what belongs in the commons.  
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Kant’s model of the public sphere was based on individuals exercising 
“public” reason in a private space which allows them to speak in “in their own 
person.” Following this, 
Kant observed that a bookseller who undertook to produce an edition 
must have an obligation to do so faithfully. This fidelity, he added, was 
facilitated by the provision of exclusive rights. Yet, he conceded, 
decades of attempts to outlaw reprinting by adducing some kind of 
property had failed. They would always fail, Kant now claimed, because 
the author’s property, if it existed at all, was inalienable —it was an 
inseparable extension of the creative self. Instead, Kant returned to his 
idea that a true author exercised a freedom to speak in his own person. 
He reasserted this principle, remarking that a book was not merely a 
passive container of meaning, but a vehicle for a dynamic process of 
communication (Johns 2010: 55). 
The rights of the author, as well as the reader, both being participants in the 
public sphere, can then be seen as the right to a certain placement within that 
sphere. Each participant must be able to speak in their own person, from a 
certain position uniquely their own and not usurped by plagiarism or 
censorship. That positionality must also grant them access to objects which 
serve as “vehicles for a dynamic process of communication” within the 
cultural commons. Such a conception allows for an ecological view of the 
public sphere and the cultural commons, organized around principles of 
location, flow and systemic function rather than property. In this ecological 
view, “the materials that compose our cultural heritage must be free for all to 
use no less than matter necessary for biological survival” (Patterson and 
Lindberg 1991: 50). Just as the richness of the digital commons may be better 
served by the limitation of the property rights that can be claimed on digital 
cultural objects, in the mid-20th century, the social benefit derived from new 
aeronautic technology led courts to limit the ‘property’ held in the airspace 
above owned land (Lessig 2004: 2). A new ecological techno-scientific context 
calls for the redefinition of other property rights – such as the right to emit 
greenhouse gases in that same airspace. A less anthropocentric relationship to 
the non-human world also calls for a reformulation of property rights. A purely 
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Lockean conception, in which nature can be freely turned to property through 
labor, is no longer appropriate. In the digital commons, ‘owning’ becomes a 
form of stewardship – one stores files both for personal enjoyment, but also so 
that they will continue to circulate through the network, keeping the ecosystem 
of cultural objects richly diverse. This is a form of ‘ownership’ that is non-
exclusionary and contributes to the health of the whole. 
As de Sola Pool (1983: 11) states,  
From the beginning some differences distinguished freedom of the press 
from freedom of speech. The physical printing plant was potentially 
hostage to state action, so the printer was sensitive to discriminatory 
taxes or other harassments. Copyright was important, as the publisher 
relied on sales to support costs that did not exist for the face-to-face 
preacher. 
As the cost of each individual act of digital reproduction nears the cost of face-
to-face speech, so might we move the law governing copyright closer to those 
guaranteeing freedom of speech, rather than expanding copyright on the basis 
of protecting a natural property right. Although copyright’s original role was to 
ensure the economic viability of the production of cultural material for the 
public sphere, it did not function as the primary basis for that viability. In the 
vibrant print culture of the North American colonies, “bookmen had to be 
jacks-of-all-trades, selling paper, medicines, and dry goods more than books 
(…) The mainstays of the colonial printer’s craft were not books at all, in 
fact—they were cheaper to import than print—but job work and newspapers” 
(Johns 2010: 180) which were not covered by copyright at all. The efficiencies 
of mechanical reproduction have often, perhaps always, meant that the spread 
of information or discourse, even when nonrival goods are necessarily 
transmitted by way of physical material, must be subsidized by other means; 
either by combination with other commercial ventures, through advertising, or 
state support. The 18
th
 century English printing industry was not injured by the 
legislation of a time-limited monopoly in written works, - the North American 
printing industry thrived with exceedingly loose copyright; and the Dublin 
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printing trade profited under a system in which legal copyright was entirely 
absent (Johns 2010: 137, 146). 
3.2 The digital object as a new commodity form 
File-sharing, the free exchange of sounds, images, texts and software programs 
digitally encoded in computer files, is a product of the shift from industrialism 
to ‘informationalism.’ It relies fundamentally on the communications 
technologies that made possible globally-distributed flexible production and 
circulation of capital. In terms of its material basis, it is wholly a part of the 
economic structure of the network society; of postmodern informational 
capitalism. To see where it diverges from that system, and how it suggests 
alternatives to it, one can look at the nature of what is being shared. It may be 
best to begin with music encoded in MP3 files, the first files to be shared on a 
large enough scale to gain broad attention and participation, and still the 
paradigmatic case for file-sharing. 
While the MP3 file is digital in nature, and there is no distinct material object 
corresponding to each one, it is still experienced as an object by its users; a 
song turned into a computer file can be just as much a discrete object as a vinyl 
disc with that same song encoded in its the grooves. Sterne (2006), expanding 
on Walter Benjamin, argues that since the relationship between collectors and 
objects is an intimate one, the very fact that MP3 files can be collected denotes 
their reality as “cultural objects.” Since they can be the focus of perception, 
they are also already present as discrete aesthetic objects. The material that 
circulates on file-sharing networks might be more specifically labeled 
digitally-encoded aesthetic objects and digitally-encoded information objects, 
but the notion of “cultural objects” serves well as a category containing both 
the digitally-encoded objects distributed in file-sharing and the materially 
distinct recordings of sound, image and text, as well as other physical objects 
that have a role as symbols of communication and objects of aesthetic 
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perception. I will henceforth use the terms “cultural objects” and “digital 
cultural objects.” 
While I do not intend to provide or borrow a definition which would delineate 
the ‘cultural’ from the ‘non-cultural,’ I will make a cursory attempt to provide 
some clarity as to what I mean by ‘cultural object.’ The cultural object is the 
reification of the broad swirl of human activity that can be termed ‘cultural’ 
into a form which can function as a discrete object of consideration by a 
perceiving subject, at least for a moment, and which can be transmitted to 
others as a discrete object. “Information” is not a cultural object, but an article, 
book, or blog post is a cultural object. A folk music tradition is not a cultural 
object, but a recording of a folk song is. The cultural object is a point at which 
the flow of relations that comprises culture becomes momentarily sensible as a 
concrete form, before joining again in the play of influences. 
In economic terms, all digital cultural objects fall, by way of their digitization, 
into the category of “nonrival” rather than “rival” goods, two groupings which 
correspond roughly to “ideas” and “things”, the intangible and the physical. 
Physical goods are rivalrous because they can only be used in one place at a 
time, whereas nonrival goods can be used by an indefinite number of people in 
any number of places simultaneously. “By definition, a nonrival idea can be 
copied and communicated, so its value increases in proportion to the size of 
the market in which it can be used” (Romer 1996: 204). The greatest social 
benefit from nonrival goods may not, then, come from a system founded on 
property rights, and there are indeed a number of proposals for alternate 
methods of funding the production of distribution of cultural objects which do 
not treat them as property (Romer 2002: 216, Lessig 2004: 301). 
Digital and nonrival or not, having a certain reality as an object does create the 
possibility of having a reality as a commodity. Digital cultural objects as 
conceived now do not escape entirely from the realm of commodification. 
Rather, they have a mixed, intermediate character which holds some potentials 
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that previous ideals, such as art severed entirely from market exchange, or an 
entirely un-commodified ‘nature’ or wilderness, do not. 
Sterne, comparing the situation engendered by the MP3 with the earlier system 
of physical recordings, states that “if recording shifted music from use-value to 
exchange-value, then digitization in the form of the mp3 liberates recorded 
music from the economics of value by enabling its free, easy and large-scale 
exchange” (Sterne 2006: 7). Where once consumers would have to sacrifice 
the time in which they would be able to listen to recordings in order to earn the 
money needed to purchase those recordings, now digital cultural objects can be 
more directly used and experienced. Yet even when liberated from “the 
economics of value,” the digital object retains features of the commodity form. 
To borrow from a Marxian analysis; 
under conditions of commodity production, producers do not relate to 
one another in a direct, social way; they first enter into a relationship 
with one another during the act of exchange — through the products of 
their labor. That their social relationship to one another appears as a 
social relationship between things is therefore not at all an illusion 
(Heinrich 2012: 307). 
File-sharing networks are, at their heart, a form of “social relations between 
things,” perhaps most clearly seen in the central function that monitoring of  
the ratio of data uploaded to data downloaded holds in many file-sharing 
networks (Boon 2010: 59). While participants may, and often do, choose to 
communicate person-to-person, either regarding the structure and rules of the 
networks or any and all other matters, the central function, the organizing 
activity for the network, is the relationship between digital objects being 
uploaded and downloaded, in differing ratios, to various computers. Yet this is 
a distinct and far more egalitarian type of relation than under the traditional 
regime of commodity exchange. The concomitant forms of material relations 
between persons are also of a different kind. File-sharing networks, and the 
digital commons more generally, certainly do not initiate or indicate a 
reversion to a situation of direct social relations between people and merely 
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material relations between things, but rather they enact new social relations 
between things, which are linked to new relations between people. While some 
eco-communalists, as represented by Ehrenfeld in Chapter 5, might lament 
this, there are reasons to think that new “relations between objects” are better 
suited to moving the network society in greener and more democratic 
directions than the attempt to return to a prelapsarian ideal of direct relations 
between people. 
In his analysis of the MP3, Sterne suggests that there is a possible parallel to 
be drawn between the compression techniques the technology uses, which 
remove sound frequencies the human auditory system will not detect or does 
not require for perception, and the just-in-time production of globalized 
informational capitalism. Yet he ultimately decides that this is an 
unsatisfactory comparison, and that when “the mp3 encoder instrumentalizes 
and even celebrates the limits of the human ear (…) it suggests how little 
‘input’ people need in order to have powerful and significant aesthetic 
experiences” (Sterne 2006: 14). 
Thus, beginning from the most fundamental aspect of its design, the aptitudes 
of the MP3, an exemplary digital cultural object, are quite close to one of the 
“key slogans of the deep ecology movement” as proposed by Næss: “Increase 
the sensitivity to and appreciation of what there is enough of for all!” He 
argues this “fights against the confusion of real value with market price” and is 
“a way to maximize our ability to derive deep satisfaction from the goods of 
which there still are, or could be, enough” (Næss 2005: 202).  The action of 
economizing the inputs required for aesthetic experiences, built into MP3 
compression,
8
 is paralleled by the central action of file-sharing in general: a 
                                              
8 “To make an MP3, a program called an encoder takes a .wav file (or some other audio format) and compares it 
to a mathematical model of the gaps in human hearing. Based on a number of factors- some chosen by the user, 
some set in the code-it discards the parts of the audio signal that are unlikely to be audible. It then reorganizes 
repetitive and redundant data in the recording, and produces a much smaller file- often as small as 12 percent of 
the original file size. The technique of removing redundant data in a file is called compression. The technique of 
using a model of a listener to remove additional data is a special kind of "lossy" compression called perceptual 
coding […] Perceptual coding sought out the shifting gaps within the field of bearable sounds. Masking and the 
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double maneuver to split market value from use-value by means of making 
cultural objects goods of which there are enough for all, ‘all’ being limited, it 
must be kept in mind, to those who have some access, directly or indirectly, to 
the technology which enables their use. This limitation places, for the time 
being, the digital cultural object somewhere between an object of which there 
still is enough and an object of which there could be enough. 
The objection could be made that freedom of exchange and reproduction is too 
permissive of ‘bad’ or ‘negative’ cultural objects, information, or discourses. 
Such an objection contains several errors. It assumes the existence of a class of 
things which can be definitively said to have a negative value regardless of 
context, when it can only be said that any object or piece of information is 
valued in a certain way by a certain group of people from a certain discursive 
standpoint at a certain time. It is to see anarchic nihilism in the structure of the 
digital commons where there is actually a basic faith of liberalism, that of free 
deliberation producing positive results over time, alongside the embrace of 
diversity for its own sake that we see in Næss, as when he says: 
richness and diversity of life-forms contribute to a realization of these 
values and are also values in themselves. Richness means we have to 
have an abundance of life of all kinds (…) I can’t and I don’t have to 
justify that diversity and richness; plurality of life is good in itself 
(Næss 2005: 18). 
 
                                                                                                                                
 
 
theory of critical bands are probably the most important psychoacoustic concepts for building a perceptual coder. 
In the ear, louder sounds mask quieter ones with a similar frequency content. Auditory masking is the process of 
eliminating similar frequencies, based on the principle that when two sounds of similar frequency content are 
played together and one is significantly quieter, people will hear only the louder sound. Temporal masking is a 
similar principle across time. If there are two sounds very close together in time (less than about five milliseconds 
apart, depending on the material) and one is significantly louder than the other, listeners can only hear the louder 
sound" (Sterne 2012: 1-2, 21). 
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This valorization of the diversity of forms, in the realm of democratic 
deliberation, living systems, and digital cultural exchange, is arrayed against a 
fear of contagion often associated with mimetic behavior, including both 
copying and public deliberation (Boon 2010). Such concerns take the shape of 
fears of the ‘virality’ of destructive ideas and behavior, and the assumption 
that new technology provides a capacity for virality so enhanced as to place it 
outside the sphere of liberal deliberation. Yet the refusal of prejudgment, and 
the bringing together of high and low, is precisely what sits at the founding of 
modern literature and democratic politics (Rancière 2010: 154). Preemptory 
qualifications based on questions of how a system will distribute ‘bad’ or 
‘good’ cultural objects and information will only reflect the valuations at a 
certain time by a certain group with the power to enforce parameters of 
exchange. Such moves would resemble earlier state and church attempts to 
control printing as a means of reproduction, including copyright (de Sola Pool 
1983). They must be implicitly or explicitly based on the reestablishment of a 
stable relationship between speakers and proper speech. An ecological 
democratic project does require institutions that embody and enforce certain 
normative valuations. However, ecological norms address public goods and 
what is necessary for the continuation of the whole, and do not legislate what 
is ‘good’ for the individual. The normative requirement necessary for a free 
digital commons is the same as Mouffe’s norm for the public sphere in liberal 
democracy: consensus on “rules of the game.” ICT networks could well play a 
part in the institutions of a green state “as a facilitator of ecological 
citizenship” (Eckersley 2004: 190) by providing the means for environmental 
information sharing and inclusive fora of environmental decision making. 
Here, however, I am more concerned with how the preeminence of a right to 
copy, exchange and receive over a right to own and control is ‘ecological’ to 
the extent that it prioritizes the richness and diversity of an ‘ecosystem’ of 
information and cultural objects over traditional property rights. 
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The nature of the MP3 as a quasi-commodity imbues it with more radical 
potential than online music streaming and other property-bound digital 
commercial projects, in which copyright holders and service providers entirely 
dissolve the recording as an object, thereby siphoning it away from the digital 
commons. This is demonstrative of the broader distinction between the digital 
commons and the use of digital communications technology in general. 
Internet music streaming services and digital content stores use the same 
network technology to even further dematerialize cultural objects, while 
adhering to and advancing the economic imperatives of informational 
capitalism and the cultural imperatives of postmodernism. The legal 
instruments designed to disable free exchange “mak[e] communal sharing 
practices illicit” while the commercially controlled services that take their 
place function as “technologies of individuation and isolation” (Burkart and 
McCourt 2004: 351), further enforcing the mandatory individualization 
Bauman sees as a fundamental feature of postmodernity. Rancière (2010: 79) 
argues that in the realm of conceptual art, dematerialization “meant that 
intelligence itself came to take the place of its products, implying a 
radicalization in the idea of private property.” The digital cultural object, by 
becoming dematerialized enough to allow nearly limitless reproduction, but 
still preserving an identity as a discrete object, manages to become common 
property. It functions as a counter-commodity or un-commodity instead of 
succumbing to pure dematerialization. The digital cultural object as un-
commodity is not simply a non-commodity; it bears the marks of its 
transformation from physical object and sensory experience, to commodity, 
and then to digital object. 
Freely exchanged digital cultural objects can be used in any personal or group 
context, manipulated, re-appropriated and made a part of a wide array of 
communicative practices. Commercial services and objects restricted in their 
use by software code can only be used in ways permitted by copyright holders 
and service providers. This limits personal and group agency to fully explore 
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the place of specific cultural objects in a broader cultural conversation. The 
MP3 file or similar artifact still has a reality as an object, and can thus be the 
focus of an aesthetically-perceiving subject and serve as the symbolic material 
used by a communicative agent; when the object is dissolved in a stream, the 
aesthetic experience itself is commodified, and becomes an object to be 
acquired by an economically acting subject. We can see here how two uses of 
similar technologies can either follow the dominant economic logic that has 
accompanied their development, as in the move from commodification of 
aesthetic objects to the commodification of aesthetic experience, or drastically 
oppose that logic, with an alternative vision of “file swapping as a communal 
activity of consumption” (Burkart and McCourt 2004: 357). 
The contradiction of file-sharing, which points to larger contradictions in the 
global economic regime, is that while it promises egalitarian access to cultural 
goods, it does not offer mechanisms of similar power for the provision of 
compensation for cultural production. Its method of improving the distribution 
of cultural goods by disconnecting access from compensation implicates the 
wider economic system for the injustices that arise from the discordant 
relationship between social value and the provision of necessary goods in a 
regime of relations defined by property rights and waged labor. That is to say, 
file-sharing networks demonstrate that those cultural goods which can be 
freely copied and exchanged over ICT networks, can be better provided, in a 
greater diversity, to a wider range of people, creating thereby a richer cultural 
space, by severing them from private ownership. In this way they suggest that 
the provision of material necessities through commodity exchange, under the 
primacy of property rights, inhibits the diversity, richness and equality of 
public cultural space. This presents the choice of reinforcing these limitations 
in order to preserve the preeminence of property rights, or working towards 
new systems for distributing the means to acquire material necessities. The 
point is not necessarily to remove the right of property ownership from the 
foundations of liberalism, but, in expanding upon liberalism in more 
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democratic and green directions, to recalibrate the weighting given to property 
rights, to the extent that they damage or threaten other freedoms. In the digital 
commons, property rights in nonrival goods stunts the growth of a free and 
equal communicative space. In the ecosphere, the right to property and the 
freedoms and incentives to employ that property threatens the stability, vitality, 
and continuation of the living systems that are a prerequisite for human and 
non-human freedoms of self-realization. The suggestive power of file-sharing 
points in the same direction as deep ecology, which aspires to provide all 
beings, including non-humans, with what is necessary to their flourishing, 
while increasing overall diversity. 
The transformative potential of digital free exchange can be detected within 
the rhetoric of its zealous opponents. Andrew Keen, for example, blames the 
degradation of public institutions and public discourse on the challenge to the 
ability of copyright holders to control and profit from information and cultural 
objects. In describing the Oxford English Dictionary as “a book in which two 
plus two always adds up to four” (Keen 2007: 37) he invokes the mathematical 
certainty that was for Descartes the key to establishing the stable, hierarchical 
modern cosmopolis
9
, and points to the way in which traditional liberalism 
treats the primacy of property rights as an institution which holds the entire 
human universe together. But, as Boon (2010: 102) states 
such desperate exaggeration, which accompanies the widespread 
production and exchange of “copies,” regardless of aggressively 
enforced laws concerning copyright infringement, still suggests the 
diminished power of this taboo. The fact that the means of producing 
copies are increasingly available to larger and larger groups of people 
around the world instead reveals the taboo that protects and naturalizes 
capitalist production modes, in particular the myth of the naturalness of 
the commodity and of private property. 
                                              
9 This particular notion of cosmopolis will be elaborated upon in the next chapter. 
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The attempt to gather as wide an array of ills in the network society as possible 
in a framework in which they can be blamed on the freedom of reproduction is 
part of a crisis of copyright and property. This crisis of copying is “the 
manifestation of traces of some other economy, future, present, or past” (Boon 
2010: 46). 
3.3 The culture and politics of file-sharing 
I will begin my discussion of the cultural effects of file-sharing, as a subset of 
the digital commons and the Internet, at the level of abstraction at which 
Postman (2005: 15) operates when he states that “our languages are our media. 
Our media are our metaphors. Our metaphors create the content of our 
culture.” Writing in the 1980s, Postman was skeptical that computer 
technology would counter what he saw as the deleterious effects of television, 
radio and the telegraph, warning that  
a central thesis of computer technology—that the principal difficulty we 
have in solving problems stems from insufficient data—will go 
unexamined. Until, years from now, when it will be noticed that the 
massive collection and speed-of-light retrieval of data have been of 
great value to large-scale organizations but have solved very little of 
importance to most people and have created at least as many problems 
for them as they may have solved (Ibid.: 161). 
Much of the benefit of information technology has indeed been centralized, 
and many of the solutions it offers could fairly be judged as of little 
importance. The networked implementations of computer technology that have 
spread from the province of large corporations to consumer use in the 
intervening decades do however deserve a closer analysis, on Postman’s terms, 
with an eye to determining precisely how new media continue or break with 
the characteristics of the televisual regime.  
This includes consideration of how the Internet is a multimedia medium in a 
way that television never was. On television, image, sound and text were in a 
stable, hierarchical relationship, with image dominant. On the Internet, there 
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are manifold, shifting configurations which variously privilege image, sound, 
or text, while combining them in novel ways. While image was preeminent in 
the televisual regime, it is less clear if computer networks have a dominant 
sensory medium, and text may again take on some of the roles it had in 
Postman’s age of typography. By drawing distinctions between different 
configurations of media within networks, we can attempt to separate out, to the 
extent possible, the effects and potentials of subsets of networks, such as file-
sharing networks and other institutions of the digital commons, from the 
overall aggregate effects of information technology. We can hope to thereby 
find points of agreement with the cultural critics of such technology while 
pinpointing the value of the digital commons.  
3.4 Digital media and digital sense objects 
On the difference between image and text, Postman states: “The universe 
offers no (…) categories or simplifications; only flux and infinite variety. The 
photograph documents and celebrates the particularities of this infinite variety. 
Language makes them comprehensible” (2005: 72). This is a useful starting 
point from which to analyze different media forms in the context of this study, 
as it is in accordance with Næss, who holds that  
there is no physical world with specifically physical content. There is a 
reality, the content of which we have direct contact with only through 
and in our spontaneous experiences. It is a reality of infinite richness. 
No dichotomies of fundamental character seem adequate to describe it. 
Distinctions between physical and mental “worlds,” or between 
subjective and objective worlds, are not adequate for describing reality 
(Næss 2005: 582). 
Næss and Postman both present an infinitely diverse universe which cannot 
definitively be said to contain any of the objects we ascribe to it, which are 
ultimately cognitive-linguistic constructs sculpting the material of sense 
experience. This congruence can serve as our basis for understanding the role 
of different sensory media in networks. 
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If language, in a multimedia environment, defines an institutional framework, 
and images celebrate the particularities of infinite variety, then sound functions 
to celebrate that variety in an alternate way, avoiding the claims about reality 
that photographs make, making instead the kind of abstract representation of 
reality which allows the consideration of unrealized possibilities. While 
diversity in the availability of both sound and image allows a richer 
appreciation of reality, sound suggests things beyond itself in a way image 
does not. Stated in more extravagant language, 
certain cultural forms are more copious than others: music, in particular, 
appears and disappears fleetingly, conjures the immanent vastness of 
the Net, constellates into infinite sonic chains, precipitates collective 
joy, is eminently portable, and resists being turned into a thing or 
property (Boon 2010: 63). 
As network bandwidth increases, more and more activity is mediated through 
still images and video, instead of text and audio. If the central place of the 
televisual is detrimental to the public sphere, then the MP3, and music encoded 
in digital objects more generally, should be looked at not simply as a 
pioneering use of technology which succeeded because of efficiencies in 
storage and transmission, but as a potential ally of the typographic in 
protecting the public sphere from the prevalence of the televisual. While 
images, especially photography and film, correspond to the world as it is 
given, sound, especially in the age of electrification, has a unique ability to 
insert into the sensory field that which has no direct referent in the part of the 
sensory world which is generally taken to be given and natural. The sound of 
an acoustic instrument, when a listener hears it directly and sees it produced, 
invokes the materiality of the physical object which produced it. The sound 
which is encoded, reproduced, and especially created by electronic means, has 
no definite correspondence to something present in the world available to the 
eye. By making the unrealized audible, it opens a door to expressing the 
relation between the sayable and the invisible: that which is not yet the case or 
is hidden in the present, which is the heart of any project of using language to 
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propose alternate futures, including the ecological societies that are our 
concern here. Næss identifies a particular connection between music and the 
environment in the figure of a mountain-dweller he met early in his life. 
In the evenings he would talk incidentally about mountains, about 
reindeer, hunting, and other occupations in the highest regions. But 
mostly he would play the violin. It was part of the local culture to mark 
the rhythm with the feet, and he would not give up trying to make me 
capable of joining him in this. But how difficult! The old man’s 
rhythms seemed more complex than anything I had ever heard! (…) 
From the outside the mountain way of life would seem Spartan, rough, 
and rigid, but the playing of the violin and the obvious fondness for all 
things above the timberline, living or ‘dead’, certainly witnessed a rich, 
sensual attachment to life, a deep pleasure in what can be experienced 
with wide open eyes and mind. (…) These reflections instilled within 
me the idea of modesty – modesty in man’s relationships with 
mountains in particular and the natural world in general. As I see it, 
modesty is of little value if it is not a natural consequence of much 
deeper feelings, a consequence of a way of understanding ourselves as 
part of nature in a wide sense of the term. This way is such that the 
smaller we come to feel ourselves compared to the mountain, the nearer 
we come to participating in its greatness. I do not know why this is so 
(Næss 1989: 3). 
In Naess’ description of this encounter with the isolated mountain-dweller that 
he sees some connection between the facts of his living so close to the 
mountain and the dedication of the majority of his free time to violin playing. 
Part of the link between the aesthetic practice of music making and the deep, 
respectful relationship to the mountain is their common character as ways of 
dwelling in situations of inherent value. Relating to the aesthetic commons 
conjured by file-sharing might have a similar connection to the practice of 
cultivating deep, respectful relationships to global ecospheric networks. The 
lone violinist and the file-sharer can be seen as engaged in similar activities 
appropriate to different environmental contexts. 
If it can be said that modern literature’s “absolutization of style went along 
with the ‘democratic’ principle of indifference” (Rancière 2010: 156), with 
indifference again denoting the absence of prejudgment based on the notion of 
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proper forms rather than the absence of affect or import, then music’s 
circumvention of verbal-rational meaning construction, into an even purer 
space of style, is an even greater instantiation of “democratic indifference.” 
The MP3 is a deepening of the aesthetic object as “that which resists both 
conceptual determination and the lure of consumable goods” (Rancière 2010: 
173). 
3.5 Typography and the public sphere 
Postman finds his ideal typographical regime in the United States of the 17
th
 
century through the first half of the 19
th
. We can see, in his description of that 
society, much that is reminiscent of the digital commons. The level of 
discourse in the typographical regime is supported by an egalitarian literary 
culture, in which reading is widespread and printed material is common. This 
was made possible by technologies of reproduction, access to an existing body 
of cultural objects (in this case, the literature of England) and a lack of 
copyright protection, which accelerated and expanded the distribution of 
works. This typographical culture included not just books (domestic, imported 
and pirated) but newspapers and pamphlets, the latter of which “are circulated 
for a day with incredible rapidity and then expire,” as de Tocqueville described 
them in 1835 (Postman 2005: 37). This well describes the written material 
available through digital networks, which circulates (and is replaced) even 
faster, spreads further, and intermixes with ever more cheaply reproducible 
works from a wider range of times and places. While the experience of 
computer networks for many people may be mediated more by images, and 
thus retain many features of the televisual regime, the network configurations 
and institutions in which text is the primary medium have the same 
characteristics as Postman’s historical ideal of a typographical society. This 
can certainly not be said of television. The network ideal could easily be put in 
the terms Daniel Boorstin uses to describe colonial American literary culture: 
“its center was everywhere because it was nowhere” (Postman 2005: 34). 
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Of Postman’s complaints regarding the telegraphic and televisual successors of 
the typographic regime, the one most relevant to text-centered usages of 
contemporary ICTs would be that further technological developments have 
made too much text available, on too many diverse subjects, surpassing the 
ability of readers to process, comprehend and use the amount of information 
they are presented with. This is his general complaint about text after the 
development of the telegraph, the first of the electronic communications 
technologies: that the ease of transmission creates a surfeit of “irrelevant” 
material. As a result, public discourse is conducted in “the language of 
headlines – sensational, fragmented, impersonal,” a non-linear stream of 
disconnected messages, putting the responsibility for deciphering meaning on 
each individual reader. Postman believes that this creates an image of the 
world as “unmanageable, even undecipherable” (Postman 2005: 70). Yet more 
widely distributed responsibility for the active creation of meaning may also be 
advantageous for the further democratization of public discourse. 
Contemporary network technologies (at least where they have not been 
centralized by corporate or state actors) give individuals more chances to 
determine what information they receive from the ever-growing stream, and, 
more importantly, to find, join and create interpretative communities to judge 
the quality of information, and to decipher and create meanings (Dahlberg 
2007). 
If “a clock recreates time as an independent, mathematically precise sequence 
(…) writing recreates the mind as a tablet on which experience is written (…) 
[and] the telegraph recreates news as a commodity” (Postman 2005: 27) then 
how does the digital commons recreate cultural objects? In making cultural 
objects goods of which there are enough for all, the digital commons recreates 
cultural objects as a commonly held inheritance, ‘owned’ as much by its users 
as its creators, part of an historical, ever-growing human heritage, the 
interconnectedness of which is made concrete through a common means of 
access. The digital cultural object is unmade as a commodity, reformed into 
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something which, like non-human entities in Eckersley’s (2004: 101) model of 
a green state, is part of a whole to be held in stewardship. File-sharing brings 
together the experiences of ‘creative destruction’ and preservation: in digital 
reproduction, transmission and storage, the old is buried by the ever-increasing 
onrush of the new - and yet is still available to be discovered intact beneath the 
deluge. Each object is part of an ecosystem both wild and preserved, available 
to be used as the focus of aesthetic appraisal and enjoyment, and as the 
material of public communication. 
The politics specific to file-sharing networks follow from the values that 
motivate activity on the networks and the material basis that makes those 
activities possible. File-sharing networks value the distribution of as many 
cultural objects as possible, as efficiently as possible, in a form which allows 
as much freedom as possible in using those objects. Discussing the digital 
commons, Goldberg notes that  
what is often theorized as a removal or liberation of economic 
constraints limiting the spread of cultural content is more accurately a 
shift of economic constraints from relations of exchange to relations of 
transmission; from economically managing discrete units of culture to 
managing their flows on a massive scale. Put another way, transmission 
has begun to displace exchange as the primary form of managing 
economies of culture, and of collecting the value produced through 
cultural activity (Goldberg 2011: 745). 
On the Internet, this shift from an economy of exchange to an economy of 
transmission has not led inevitably to decentralization or democratization, 
especially in the ‘collection of value’ of cultural activity, as a few large private 
actors (companies such as Google, Facebook, and internet service providers) 
have come to control many of the mechanisms of transmission. Still, there is 
an important difference between an economy of exchange and an economy of 
transmission. The means of transmission are much closer to being a natural 
monopoly, akin to public utilities, and therefore better candidates for public or 
collective ownership and control. Indeed, the vitality of public discourse in 
 69 
Postman’s ideal typographic regime owes much to the creation of a publicly 
subsidized economy of transmission, in the form of the United States Postal 
Service. Collective control of an economy of exchange would require 
collective decisions about what cultural objects and information are to be 
produced, inviting all the failings of a centralized command economy. Such 
control of production could easily work against the key values of diversity of 
content and freedom of use. The digitization of reproduction makes cultural 
objects something “of which there is enough of for all” and enables the switch 
to an economy of transmission. The infrastructure of transmission in file-
sharing networks efficiently uses the existing technological capacity of users – 
content is stored by each participant, instead of a central actor, and sent using 
their existing bandwidth – and any additional network infrastructure that may 
be necessary is treated as a collective cost and a collective good. This network 
infrastructure combines the efficient use of the computing resources of 
individual users with a few central points which function as appropriate points 
for political action and ecologically conscious planning. For example, the 
move to an economy of transmission shifts a large portion of resource usage to 
a few key points, such as server farms and central routers. Most of the energy 
used by these server farms is for air conditioning, although better design can 
drastically reduce the amount of energy required for cooling, and further, reuse 
the waste heat produced (Greenpeace 2012). These central points are easier to 
shape to the demands of ecological efficiency than the wide range of locations 
involved in economies of exchange. 
A file-sharing network is, then, an implementation of technology in which 
shared goods are used to pursue shared values, in an egalitarian and resource-
efficient way. At this level of description, it is quite similar to the institutions 
required by an ecological society.  
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3.6 Subject-formation and atempestivity 
The subject of file-sharing networks (i.e. the file-sharer as a subject) exists in 
an intermediate state. Placed within postmodernity’s conditions of mandatory 
individuation, the file-sharer pursues an activity that is in many ways akin to 
the accumulation of commodities. Yet due to the structure of the network, this 
activity is transformed. The individual commodity-acquirer is now also 
constructing the framework of a commons. The consumptive activity is a dual 
gesture, filling the commons instead of emptying it. It is this combination of 
commodity consumption and commons-construction that places the file-sharer 
in a perhaps uniquely productive position in the context of a commons-
destroying and commodity over-producing global economy.  
Free digital exchange gives a virtual materiality to the type of “common space” 
created by a museum, wherein “representations are disconnected from a 
specific destination (…) all offered to the same ‘indifferent’ gaze” (Rancière 
2010: 139). The digital commons has a museum-function in which the free 
relationship between objects and their perceivers is matched by a 
corresponding freedom of perceivers to train that ‘indifferent’ gaze (a ‘gaze’ 
which also includes the auditory) on any and all objects. The gesture of the 
file-sharing network is the building of a museum atop a market, to enclose 
what were commodities in a common space that recreates them as quasi-
commodities. This re-enclosure initiates the transformation of participants in 
the networks from consumers enmeshed in commodity relations to aesthetic 
and political subjects. If we accept that “’aesthetic’ designates the suspension 
of every determinate relation correlating the production of art forms and a 
specific social function” (Rancière 2010: 138) then the free exchange that 
occurs in file-sharing networks appears as a continuation or deepening of the 
aesthetic regime, in that it suspends the relation between the production of art 
forms and the social function of commodity exchange, of the production or 
capture of exchange value. Since the evaluative role of museums is deeply 
implicated in the contemporary art market, it may be that free digital exchange 
 71 
is not only an expansion of the museum function but currently its fullest 
incarnation. That these digital objects continue to have a life as commodities in 
the larger economic networks is part of the digital commons’ ambiguous and 
critical position. The relevance of the museum function of the digital commons 
in the formation of an ecological society is precisely in manifesting 
foundational liberal freedoms which are to be expanded in more democratic 
and ecological directions. If the genesis of modern democratic freedom is 
intertwined at the root with the modern aesthetic freedoms of the mute letter of 
literature and the space of the museum, then part of my intention here is to 
locate the contemporary point from which new freedoms might grow. If 
aesthetic value arises in a relational field, then democratic aesthetics requires 
not only the freedom of the subject, but freedom of access to aesthetic objects.  
As Rancière states, the aesthetics of politics “lies in a re-configuration of the 
distribution of the common through political processes of subjectivation” and 
the politics of aesthetics “lies in the practices and modes of visibility of art that 
re-configure the fabric of sensory experience.” The political implications of art 
are not limited to the explicit political intentions behind individual works. 
Instead, “the theatre, the museum and the book are 'aesthetic' realities in and of 
themselves… specific distributions of space and time, of the visible and the 
invisible, that create specific forms of ‘commonsense’” (Rancière 2010: 140-
141). If categories as disparate as ‘museum’ and ‘book’ are aesthetic realities, 
we can attempt to ascertain the aesthetic reality specific to the ‘digital 
commons,’ the ‘file-sharing network,’ and the ‘digital cultural object,’ and the 
ways they reconfigure sensory experience, the common, and political 
subjectivation. In other words, the democratic power of the modern aesthetic 
regime was not simply in the freedom to express democratic sentiments, but 
was also tied to the freedom in the very form of relationship between subject 
and object, expression and reception. Thus, Flaubert could have an aristocratic 
disdain for politics while conservative critics saw his prose as “the 
embodiment of democracy” (Rancière 2010: 155). Similarly, the ecological 
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power of the digital commons is not primarily in the freedom to communicate 
ecological sentiments (although it includes this) but in how it redefines 
relationships between subject, object, expression and reception. The promotion 
of information and cultural objects which encourage an ecological 
understanding is secondary to a mode of creating, communicating, and 
experiencing cultural objects which leads to an understanding of the cultural 
commons as a kind of ecosystem, to be best managed following ecological 
principles. Experiencing the digital commons as a participant, speaking and 
listening in a variety of ways, instead of as a consumer, while following 
principles of stewardship instead of ownership, creates a different kind of 
commonsense and a different type of subject. To establish a digital commons, 
such as a file-sharing network, as an ecological common space is to position a 
renewed and expanded conception of freedom of expression against 
encroachment by property rights. It is ecological in that it redefines freedom of 
expression not simply as the right of an individual to engage in speech acts, 
but the freedom to occupy positions as sender, receiver and transformer within 
cultural milieux. Thus, in the creation of a new eco-democratic commonsense, 
the digital commons takes a role similar to that of modern literature and the 
museum in the creation of the modern democratic commonsense. 
We can sketch a model of the file-sharer as a subject by considering file-
sharing as a dissensual practice. First, we should engage with Rancière’s 
(2010: 76) notion of ‘communism’, defined as the transformation of freedom 
and equality “into a sensory reality, embedding them in the forms of an 
existing common world.” Under informationalism, “what contemporary 
capitalism essentially produces – rather than goods for private appropriation – 
is the network of human communication, in which production, consumption 
and exchange are no longer separate but join together in the same collective 
process” (Castells 2009a: 17). Thus  
it can be claimed that communism already exists within, and thanks to, 
new forms of capitalist production… because capitalist production 
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produces fewer and fewer material goods, and more and more services 
or means of communication; and because its production is increasingly 
less material, it tends to shake loose its status as appropriated 
commodity and deceptive fetish (Rancière 2010: 77). 
In this view, capitalist production is increasingly identical to the production of 
the global network, and thus “collective intelligence.” While most would not 
use the term ‘communism,’ this is, in its broad outlines, the argument of the 
most outspoken techno-optimistic advocates of the global network. For both 
the advocates of “open source government” and traditional communists, “the 
necessity of communism has been predicated on the impossibility of politics” 
(Ibid.) In different settings, this implies either a bureaucratic ‘dictatorship of 
the proletariat’ or a network-enabled technocracy, in which participants in the 
network contribute to improving the functionality of the network, but do not 
determine its aims and goals (Morozov 2013a)
10
. 
Rancière (2010: 79) diverges from this view, however:  
If there is a communist power of intelligence, it is not cyberspace, but 
instead the capacity possessed by those who make the computer parts 
and piece them together to be able to have their say, not only about 
computers, but about all the issues of collective life.   
Likewise, the digital commons, as an expression of “collective intelligence” 
and of a common cultural inheritance, is not identical to the Internet, or the 
totality of global informational networks. It is, rather, a particular arrangement 
of technology used to make a particular claim about collective life, specifically 
the extent to which cultural objects are to be held as common property, and the 
extent to which the free distribution of cultural objects is part of the freedoms 
of expression and communication, as elements in the creation of webs of 
                                              
10 Accepting Rancière’s view of communism, as a movement grounded in the identification of aesthetic freedom 
as “the principle of a new revolution to be realized in the materiality of the lived world” (Rancière 2010: 81) has 
other effects. It complicates the position, following Benjamin, which identifies the aestheticization of politics 
with the threat of fascism. Rancière’s interpretation of the historical roots of communism places the 
aestheticization of politics at the foundation of the critical tradition Benjamin was a part of. It should be noted 
that Rancière's alternative formulation does not do away with aesthetics - it merely holds aesthetic freedom as an 
ideal to be pursued in the knowledge that it can never be fully realized in material conditions. There is, then, no 
real, final separation between the political and the aesthetic. 
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meaning. File-sharing networks occupy a unique intermediate position. While 
they are unable, and do not seek, to holistically transform “the materiality of  
the lived world” according to the principle of aesthetic freedom, they do 
establish a certain digital-materiality which corresponds to the principle of 
aesthetic freedom, by creating institutions for the free exchange of any and all 
digital aesthetic objects. Existing parallel to systems which operate under the 
principles of ownership and commodity exchange, file-sharing realizes 
Rancière’s alternative principle of an intempestive ‘communism’ or 
implementation of collective intelligence. “To be intempestive means at once 
that you do and do not belong to a time” (Rancière 2010: 82). An intempestive 
democracy is  
a democracy to come (…) not a democracy that will come in the future, 
but a democracy emploted [sic] within a different time, a different 
temporal plot. The time of a ‘democracy to come’ is the time of a 
promise that has to be kept even though - and precisely because – it can 
never be fulfilled (Rancière 2010: 58-59). 
Mouffe similarly defines her democratic project as “a democracy ‘to come’, as 
conflict and antagonism are at the same time its condition of possibility and the 
condition of impossibility of its full realization” (Mouffe 1993: 8). The digital 
commons is one form of intempestive communism, in that it establishes a form 
of abundance and distributive equality that can never fully be realized in the 
world of material, rival goods, but that can still serve as a model and 
inspiration for further democratization of the economic sphere. Opposing the 
dominant implementation of technological networks according to the 
principles of informational capitalism, file-sharing networks give a substantial 
existence in the lived world to the immaterial principles of freedom and 
equality. It is in this way that file-sharing becomes a dissensual activity which 
overlays one world atop another. 
Maintaining a division between how rival and non-rival goods are treated, 
between the physical and digital, with the former having a price and the latter 
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being free, is to create a realm of abundance on one side and a realm of 
scarcity, and therefore economizing, on the other. The latter becomes the arena 
for a moral order based in satisficing and conscientious limitation, as one 
mechanism through which to achieve the very real need for putting limits on 
the growth of material consumption and for decreasing the adverse ecological 
impacts caused by this consumption. This digital abundance must be thought 
of not simply in terms of an overflowing amount but in the opulence of 
possibility and potential diversity in the exponentially increasing number of 
different combinations and paths that can be made with and through the 
cultural materials of the digital commons. The commons then becomes the 
space for the “collective dream of free access to an infinity of things” that 
currently lies “below the surface of contemporary consumer culture” and fuels 
the mimetic impulses which drive marketing and the consumption it depends 
on (Boon 2010: 44). It becomes a site in which the “ecosophical lifestyle 
appreciates opulence, richness, luxury, affluence” (Næss 1989: 88). 
Ranciere's power of collective intelligence, as the power of those who arrange 
computer parts to have a say in all matters of life, is radically different, and 
articulated in opposition to, ‘collective intelligence’ as understood by a Silicon 
Valley technology theorist such as Tim O'Reilly, and the corporate entities 
who put that understanding into practice, for whom collective intelligence is 
simply the aggregation of information held by those connected to information 
networks, to be applied by central technocratic entities without a process of 
collective decision making about how that collective intelligence is to be used. 
This is collective intelligence purely as collected intelligence, an “architecture 
of participation” which  
amounts to no more than a simple feedback session with whoever is 
running the system. You are not participating in the design of that 
system, nor are you asked to comment on its future. There is nothing 
“collective” about such distributed intelligence; it’s just a bunch of 
individual users acting on their own and never experiencing any sense 
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of solidarity or group belonging. Such “participation” has no political 
dimension; no power changes hands (Morozov 2013a). 
This technocratic form of collective intelligence, unlike the dissensual 
manifestation in the digital commons, does not require or encourage the 
creation of political subjects. This distinction is part of what distinguishes the 
digital commons from the aggregate of all ICT networks. It is not simply the 
sum total of all information and other digital material which can be accessed 
by individuals through computer networks; like the public sphere, it is a 
specific form of relations between people, mediated by symbols. 
3.7 Digital dissensus 
The parallel existence of file-sharing networks, of which the most concrete 
aspect is their continuing illegality, their designation as ‘piracy,’ puts on 
display the dissensual nature of file-sharing as an activity. File-sharing makes 
several gestures which superimpose two worlds atop each other. The file 
shared, the digital cultural object, manages to be what it is by virtue of being 
what it is not. It can only resist commodification by preserving its status as a 
discrete object which is related to, and experienced as, a commodity. This 
allows it to resist complete dematerialization, which would allow the 
commodification of aesthetic experience, as in commercially-controlled media 
streaming. Its intermediate status as quasi-object allows its free reproduction 
and exchange, liberating it from the logic of exchange value. File-sharers 
claim rights they do not have by showing that they in fact possess them. The 
illegality of sharing demonstrates that the institutions of property ownership do 
not provide for the right to treat cultural objects as a commonly held 
inheritance, while the actuality of free exchange demonstrates that they can in 
fact be treated as such (Rancière 2010: 57).  File-sharing exists in the space 
opened up by the tension between the actual development of informational 
capitalism and the possibilities it offers. The digital commons, like Rancière's 
demos, exists as a surplus. It is not merely the aggregate of all cultural objects 
and information that is or can be digitized. The digital commons exists as the 
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possibilities that arise due, and supplementary to, that aggregation. These 
possibilities are present because, once cultural objects are seen as elements of 
communication, the digital commons does not stand as a separate sphere, but 
diffuses through all spheres of communicative activity. It is a freedom of 
access to a common body of language –  textual, auditory, and visual –  given 
to everybody and anybody at all. The digital commons goes forward in 
fulfilling the promise of the ‘mute letter’ in breaking down the hierarchy of 
representation. Where once there was a stable relationship between speakers, 
listeners, and what was to be spoken, the mute letter introduced by modern 
literature “was the letter that spoke to anybody, without knowing to whom it 
had to speak, and to whom it had not (…) a letter that spoke too much and 
endowed anyone at all with the power of speaking” (Rancière 2010: 157). The 
digitization of the cultural object, the expansion of reproduction beyond text to 
image and sound, allows the mute letter to speak to multiple senses, and to 
endow more speakers with the ability to speak in more ways. 
“Literature [as the] new regime of writing in which the writer is anybody and 
the reader anybody” arose at the same time that cultural production entered a 
regime of commodity exchange. Yet the logic of this regime, and its 
technologies of reproduction, begins to reestablish “the power of a social 
hierarchy based on the capacity of addressing appropriate kinds of speech-acts 
to appropriate kinds of audiences” (Ibid.), no longer between general and 
troops, preacher and congregation, orator and audience, but between a culture 
industry and a mass audience. The network of digital cultural objects revivifies 
the mute letter. In its mixture of cultural materials, it advances towards the 
modern ideal of  
representation of heterogeneity and difference, of simultaneity and 
synchrony, in a world where (…) ‘everything should sound 
simultaneously’ (…) ‘one should hear the bellowing of the cattle, the 
whispering of the lovers, and the rhetoric of the officials all at the same 
time’ (Harvey 1992: 263). 
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Clearly, the material necessities of living, from daily meals to ecosystem 
services, cannot be digitized in order to be freely reproduced and exchanged. 
This prevents file-sharing networks from providing a model after which to 
wholly transform “the materiality of the lived world.” Yet the digital commons 
does not simply function as a fragile symbolic instantiation of the principles of 
freedom and equality. Participation in the digital commons is also part of lived 
experience (for those with access to the necessary technology and 
technological competencies) which can display these principles while also 
substituting for more materially-intensive activities, the cost of which threatens 
the ability of all, human and non-human, to access those resources which are 
biological necessities – food, water, medicine, shelter, and all the processes 
grouped under the label of ‘ecosystem services.’ 
To clarify the connection between a commons of aesthetic objects and politics, 
we can return to Mouffe’s notion of democracy as a symbolic mutation, and its 
connection to the phylogeny of human cooperation. As cooperation moves 
beyond the direct identification of interests in small groups, it becomes 
regulated by more abstract norms and group identities. These norms exist not 
only internally in group members, or recorded in cultural artifacts, but in a 
common symbolic space maintained and modified through practice. This 
symbolic space becomes the basis of both limitations and possibilities for 
concrete political action and concrete cultural expression. And such concrete 
acts and objects follow from particular ‘mutations’ of the symbolic space, 
particular arrangements of the sensible, such as democracy or the aesthetic 
regime. Politics and art do not of course exist only in a space of abstraction, 
but they do proceed through a discursive relationship with the symbolic 
structures which make human sociality possible. A mode of reproduction and 
transmission of cultural objects which manifests this symbolic space as a 
commons, by way of common availability, brings into focus the common 
nature of the symbolic space which both cultural production and the 
maintenance of economic structures depend upon. 
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What I would like to explore now is how this understanding of the political 
and aesthetic’s relationship to the commons can be expanded to include a more 
general understanding of society’s relationship to the non-human world, and 
the particular form such an understanding may take in a network society. 
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4. Society and Self in the Anthropocene 
In this chapter I will begin to elaborate on the conceptual implications of the 
network society’s alteration of the non-human environment on a global scale. 
From there I will reformulate and expand the notion of the ecological Self in a 
network context. 
4.1 The network society at the dawn of the Anthropocene 
The Anthropocene
11
, as a designation for a distinct geological epoch initiated 
by human activity, has not yet been officially adopted by the major 
associations in the discipline of geology. It may be years or decades until such 
a decision is made, but this has not prevented the concept from being taken up 
in a variety of other fields. Having a single word with which to invoke the 
scale of anthropogenic alteration of the non-human world has proven useful in 
the attempt to understand and describe the reach of civilization’s impacts – and 
how those impacts change the character of relations between humans and non-
humans. The concept of the Anthropocene can be of great help to us in 
understanding the network society as a context for the network Self. 
Anthropogenic climate change, habitat destruction and resource depletion 
provide the impetus to expand our understanding of the global network society 
and the conceptual space in which to do so. For the notion of the 
Anthropocene asserts the agency of the human species as an autonomous force 
at the geologic level at the same time it asserts the dependence of the human 
species on certain global conditions. While the dawning of the Anthropocene 
evokes the instability and sensitivity of the ecosphere in its susceptibility to 
human influence, it also displays its unity in common vulnerability. The 
                                              
11 The term Anthropocene was first proposed by Crutzen and Stoermer in 2000. (Chakrabarty 2009: 209). While 
human land use may have been causing significant ecosystem changes since before the invention of agriculture 
(see e.g. Ellis et al. 2013) , I will here be considering the Anthropocene as definitely beginning with the burning 
of fossil fuels, as it is here that the possibility of unprecedentedly rapid change of the entire global system first 
truly presents itself. 
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Anthropocene is the appropriate analytical context for the network society 
because the threat of climate change is serious enough that all contemporary 
phenomena should be judged by their relationship to it, and because the 
network society is the current apex of several centuries of fossil-fuel powered 
globalization; thus the Anthropocene and the network society have a closely 
intertwined lineage. The inception of the Anthropocene displays the full extent 
of the connectivity which serves as the organizing principle of the network 
society. The Anthropocene is a stage on which to locate the already-existing 
global networks of cause and effect that predate the economic, 
communicational, technological networks of the network society. The world of 
the Anthropocene sees the network society meeting itself. In as much as the 
processes of economic development that shaped the network society also 
formed the conditions of the Anthropocene, the network society occupies a 
world of its own creation. Yet the world’s susceptibility to such alterations 
shows the network society its own principles external to itself; the network 
society becomes the world as it forms the Earth in its image, and its image to 
the ecosphere. For Castells, the compression and reorganization of time in the 
network society means that “a secular biological rhythm has been replaced by 
a moment of existential decision” (Castells 2009a: 481). While Castells is 
referring here to how the untethering of life events (above all, procreation) 
from stable chronological patterns affects individual experience, his statement 
could just as well refer to societies or the human species itself. Historical 
rhythms, including the modern notion of progress, are suddenly replaced with 
a moment of existential decision regarding how to respond to human impacts 
on the ecosphere. 
Nigel Clark asks us to put anthropogenic climate change in the historical 
context of previous climactic shifts that have affected our species, as a way of 
“thinking through the human in terms of a constitutive vulnerability to forces 
beyond its control”, giving us  
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the idea of a fundamental exposure or radical passivity of the self [that] 
obliges us to consider (…) all that a body owes – not only to those with 
whom its linkages and alliances can be established, but to those who are 
no longer with us, those with whom we can never be together (Clark 
2010:47).  
The notion of fundamental exposure will be an important element in 
constructing the network Self, as well as in building a more expansive notion 
of communicative freedom that works to incorporate additional freedoms of 
the listener – the exposed – with the traditionally instituted freedoms of the 
speaker. Finally, network society and Anthropocene both call for a 
consideration of what is owed to, and thereby inherited from, those who are no 
longer with us, and how this inheritance is to be shared, invested, or tended. 
This includes the cultural inheritance which fills our aesthetic world and 
informs the material structures of our economy. It includes the inheritance of 
the environments which made our civilization and our biological being 
possible. Integrating our consideration of these different aspects of a common 
inheritance is a central aspect of, first, rooting the network society in the 
context of the Anthropocene, and later, beginning to establish the idea of the 
network Self. 
To analyze the network society as placed in the Anthropocene is to bring 
together the two essential shortcomings of the contemporary global economy, 
which are contradictory yet constituted in part by each other – failures of 
managing abundance and failures of managing scarcity. New economic 
efficiencies produce unemployment and wasted human capital, with the 
maldistribution of surplus financial resources leading to problems of over-
accumulation and contributing to periodic economic crises. The same 
economic system cannot properly integrate the abundances created by digital 
reproduction and transmission, with copyright holders and owners of physical 
and software infrastructure working to create artificial scarcities. At the same 
time, the global economy has great difficulty addressing the reality of 
scarcities in the living systems of the Earth. Comparing and integrating the 
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principles of file-sharing networks with the principles of deep ecology is one 
approach to addressing the interrelated deficiencies regarding both abundance 
and scarcity. 
Chakrabarty (2009: 210) asks: “has the period from 1750 to now been one of 
freedom or that of the Anthropocene? Is the Anthropocene a critique of the 
narratives of freedom?” I believe the correct response is to say that this period 
is the Anthropocene, because of certain definitions of freedom and their uses, 
and that narratives of freedom must be critiqued to determine what 
conceptions of freedom initiated the Anthropocene and what conceptions of 
freedom are better suited to it. Such a redefinition will be part of what Clark 
names  
an opening up of the political to the exorbitant energies beyond its 
normal bounds (…) [which] calls not only for political and economic 
trajectories apposite to longterm survival, but also for the vitalizing 
charge of new affective intensities (Clark 2010: 47, 49). 
4.2 The network as organizing metaphor 
In discussing the socio-cultural correlates of modern industrialism, Bauman 
makes the claim that  
the Fordist model was (…) an epistemological building site on which 
the whole world-view was erected (…) The way human beings 
understand the world tends to be at all times praxeomorphic: it is always 
shaped by the know-how of the day, by what people can do and how 
they usually go about doing it (Bauman 2006: 56). 
We may expect, then, that postmodern informational capitalism brings with it 
its own world-view, and, if informational capitalism takes the shape of a 
network society, this world-view will be informed by the idea of the network. 
Communications media, which, following Postman, serve as the metaphors 
with which we create the content of our culture, are increasingly networked. 
Flusser (2005: 7) suggests that the network image is increasingly used in 
scientific fields from ecology to molecular biology and atomic physics. This 
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may be seen as an effect of, and contributing factor in, the shift toward a 
praxeomorphic network world-view. Toulmin traces a tradition of constructing 
images of society using scientific and technological paradigms back to the 
roots of modernity – a modernity fundamentally shaped in many ways by the 
technology of printing (Eisenstein 1968). We can see, at the genesis of that 
modernity, a situation very much like that presented by the dawn of the 
Anthropocene. 
For Toulmin, modernity begins with a turn away from Renaissance humanism 
and towards Cartesian rationalism and a “quest for certainty” as a response to 
the chaos of the European religious wars of the 17
th
 century. Proponents of a 
strict rationalism hoped to find a way out of violent disagreement by 
establishing methods to discover universal, indisputable truths. In pursuing 
these truths, rationalists 
looked not just for a way to give knowledge the certainty that 
Montaigne and his fellow skeptics denied it: they also wanted to build 
up a fresh cosmology from scratch. The unique crisis that Donne 
intuitively recognized in 1611 – collapse of cosmology and 
epistemology simultaneously – evoked from the New Philosophers an 
equally unique reply: if everything in general is under threat at one and 
the same time, everything in general must be restored and underpinned 
in a brand new way (Toulmin 1992: 83). 
This required the founding of a new cosmopolis, a system of knowledge which 
fundamentally unifies the laws which order both nature and society. The 
resulting cosmopolis consisted in a 
Newtonian view of a stable system “kept in order” by universal and 
unchanging central forces. In the social realm, the Newtonian view 
called for stable institutions, unambiguous class structure, centralized 
power, and defense of the state's sovereign autonomy from external 
interference (Ibid.). 
Such a modern cosmopolis has “three foundations: certainty, formal 
rationality, and the desire to start with a clean slate” (Ibid.: 183) and is based 
on an image of nature as “a stable physical system of bodies moving in fixed 
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orbits around a single, central source of power – the sun and the planets as a 
model for the Sun King and his subjects” (Toulmin 1992: 184). Social orbits 
were defined by the newly emerging classes, replacing the decayed feudal 
system. 
When religious or moral normative certainties were shattered by the 
corruption of religious institutions, calculation emerged as a privileged 
source of unquestionable certainties (…) the organization of activities 
and of life itself in terms of an accountancy calculation was 
quintessentially an ordering through which man, on the scale of his own 
life, came nearer to the work which God (the ‘great watchmaker’) 
accomplished on a cosmic scale. Economic rationality functioned as a 
substitute for religious morality: through it man attempted to apply the 
eternal laws which governed the universe to the predictive organization 
of his own affairs. Its aim, beyond the material ends it gave itself, was 
to render the laws of human activity as rigorously calculable and 
predictable able as those of the cosmic clock’s workings (Gorz 1989: 
112). 
The dawn of the Anthropocene and the threat of ecological crisis it denotes 
signal a cosmopolitical inversion. In the 17
th
 century, social vulnerability to 
instability prompted a search for laws of stability in the non-human world. 
Today, the system of economic development which is a product of modern 
rationalism has led to postmodern cultural instability, but further and more 
essentially, has revealed a vulnerability to instability in the ecosphere. Now, in 
a reversal of the founding of modernity, instead of searching for fundamental 
structures outside the human which can be brought to bear on society, human 
civilization has revealed unstable structures in the non-human world. Ecology 
is an inescapable paradigm for a species that has discovered interdependence 
and connectedness in the ecosphere by means of altering it.  
One response to this inversion is to build upon the complicated instabilities of 
postmodern society in order to understand its place in a non-human world 
newly revealed as unstable. Toulmin sees much of the work in dismantling the 
old rationalistic modernity as already done, and the way forward in “an 
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ecological perspective [that] emphasizes (…) differentiation and diversity, 
equity and adaptability” (Toulmin 1992: 194).  
An ecological cosmopolis may thus avoid the objection to which the 
earlier, astronomical image was subject: viz., that it is arbitrary and 
oppressive in its effect. Biology provides less constricting analogies for 
thinking about social relations than physics did. In the organic world, 
diversity and differentiation are the rule and not the exception, while the 
universality of physical theories is rare. Different ecosystems or food 
chains, for instance, may coexist within a single habitat, without one 
species establishing dominance over all others; and the measures to 
maintain a balance between species vary from case to case. If an image 
of “central forces” and “stable equilibria” made the modern cosmopolis 
oppressive, an ecological model opens up the possibilities for diversity 
and change, and so can be emancipatory (Ibid.: 195). 
The network, existing as both abstraction and technological reality, is thus 
doubly available in constructing a new cosmopolis. 
While Castells’ analysis of contemporary informational capitalism suggests the 
extent to which the network has already been established as the primary social 
structure, in his view, the network society is also “increasingly structured 
around a bipolar opposition between the Net and the self” (Castells 2009a: 3). 
This is because “elites are cosmopolitan, people are local (…) the space of 
power and wealth is projected throughout the world, while people’s life and 
experience is rooted in places, in their culture, in their history” (Ibid.: 446). To 
move from the network society to an ecological society requires moving past 
this central conflict by reconsidering and altering how both the net and the self 
are defined and constituted. Castells sees this process already under way, as for 
example in the transnational counter-globalization movement, “a network of 
identities and interests” (Castells 2009b: 162) representing “a networking, 
decentered form of organization and intervention, characteristic of the new 
social movements, mirroring, and counteracting, the networking logic of 
domination in the informational society” (Ibid.: 427). The way forward is not 
an exodus from or a sabotage of global society’s networks, but a 
reconfiguration and redefinition of those networks from within. This is a 
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reprise of the way in which counter-hegemonic political movements of the 
industrial era reflected economic structures, when  
mass political parties, which characterized the political left of the 
industrial era, were modeled upon the experience of mass social 
movements, such as the labor movement or the peasant movement, with 
their organization in chapters, local committees, and delegated, federal 
structure (Castells 2009b: 115). 
On another level, action within networks, and using the structure and concept 
of the network, is necessary because the goal of a movement toward an 
ecological society must be to consider both their own networks and the 
“networking logic of domination” as being set within an ecological network 
from which opting-out is impossible. Devolution or abandonment of techno-
economic networks would still leave place-bound people connected to the 
ecospheric network and vulnerable to forces that operate on an ecospheric 
scale. Solutions to a problem such as anthropogenic climate change must take 
place at a global level; local solutions do not exempt anyone from this 
requirement. 
The path from the network society to the ecological society is a space of 
convergence from many directions. Casting it as a space of equivalence (in 
Laclau and Mouffe’s sense) requires drawing comparisons between past 
movements, present situations and future imaginaries, and between the 
networks of information that feed the global economy and the networks of 
information that describe the ecosphere. The place of the network image in the 
movement towards an ecological society can be seen in more depth by looking 
at its roles in Eckersley’s (2004: 5) proposition “of the state as a crucial ‘node’ 
in any future network of global ecological governance.” 
4.3 Networks, government and communicative justice 
Contemporary networks of political and economic power, constructed and 
maintained via symbols, are made possible by an array of information and 
communications technologies, and consumer applications of these 
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technologies play an expanding role in the lives of an increasing number of 
people, in all socio-economic strata, around the world. While information 
processing may be what drives informational capitalism, new communication 
technologies are also necessary for flexible production to become globalized. 
It is the communicative aspect of this technology, before its information-
processing ability, that most people experience more directly in their day-to-
day lives. In building upon the networks of capital and technology towards 
more democratic and ecological networks, we may look to the communicative 
element of such alternate visions of society, in light of the emphasis on 
communication within the current network paradigm. To begin such an 
exploration, I will look at the proposals of Eckersley (2004) in The Green 
State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty and Plumwood (2002) in 
Environmental Culture. Eckersley’s green state is founded on the idea of 
communicative justice, and Plumwood’s environmental culture is based in an 
ethics of communication. 
Eckersley and Plumwood converge on a vision of environmental politics 
centered on a public sphere which institutes deliberative and communicative 
equality. Eckersley describes “the vantage point of critical political ecology” 
as 
one that seeks to locate and incorporate the demand for social and 
environmental justice in the broader context of the demand for 
communicative justice. By environmental justice I mean, first, a fair 
distribution of the benefits and risks of social cooperation and, second, 
the minimization of those risks in relation to an expanded moral 
community. By communicative justice I mean a fair/free 
communicative context in which wealth and risk production and 
distribution decisions takes place in ways that are reflectively 
acceptable by all “differently situated others” (or their representatives) 
who may be affected (Eckersley 2004: 10). 
It should be noted that communicative justice is a prerequisite of social and 
environmental justice in this formulation. For Plumwood (2002: 95), social 
and environmental justice is a necessary indicator of communicative justice, 
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arguing that “if a process of political communication is working well, if it is 
inclusive and open in a real and not just formal way to all, it should be 
articulating the needs of all communicants and thus producing a certain kind of 
distributive product.” For Eckersley (2004: 140), communication is necessary 
to develop shared understandings according to which action can be taken, 
including, through the process of public deliberation itself, a sense of 
interdependence. Deliberation should be open to all humans and non-human 
beings affected by risk-generating social decisions. Eckersley posits that such 
inclusion would reduce the likelihood that a society would pursue 
environmentally risky behavior, by expanding the range of subjects toward 
which that society held responsibilities. Plumwood similarly points to the 
necessity of “political institutions which encourage speech from below and 
deep forms of democracy where communicativeness and redistributive equality 
are found across a range of social spheres” (2002: 65). Since the effects of 
ecologically destructive behavior will generally be felt first and most strongly 
by the socially disadvantaged and non-humans, this “below” provides an 
indication of the intensity and scope of those effects. 
How would communicative justice be established in the institutions of an 
ecological society, and how do those institutions and concepts relate to the 
digital commons as it exists today? Eckersley (2004: 140) proposes, on a 
general level, that a green state would feature constitutional provisions to 
“facilitate a robust ‘green public sphere’ by providing fulsome environmental 
information and the mechanisms for contestation, participation and access to 
environmental justice.” Plumwood (2002: 65), more broadly, calls for 
“institutions which encourage speech from below and deep forms of 
democracy where communicative and redistributive equality are found across a 
range of social spheres.” 
Clay Shirky’s description of the Internet as a space which “allows people to 
privately and publicly articulate and debate a welter of conflicting views” 
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(Shirky 2011: 34) presents it as a space of rich communicative potential. John 
Keane (2013) has coined the term “monitory democracy” to describe the way 
in which communication through ICT networks allows individuals and civil 
society organizations to observe and influence the workings of the state and 
other powerful institutions. This sort of monitory democracy, and especially 
the civil society organizations that practice it, could be seen as a model for an 
ecological democracy to come. In order to picture the relation between 
contemporary network communications and an ecological communicative 
ideal, we should also consider Morovoz’s critique of the current condition of 
ICTs. He warns that “The environment of information abundance is not by 
itself conducive to democratization, as it may disrupt a number of subtle but 
important relationships that help to nurture critical thinking” (Morozov 2011: 
95).  
For the Internet to play a constructive role (…) it needs to be 
accompanied by an extremely ambitious set of social and political 
reforms; in their absence, social ills may only get worse. In other words, 
whatever the internal logic of the technology at hand, it’s usually 
malleable by the logic of society at large (Ibid.). 
As Eckersley suggests, a general unguided flow of information may not be 
sufficient; specialized institutions dedicated to ensuring the accessibility of 
information relevant to environmental decision making and providing a 
platform for the voices of all those affected by such decisions may also be 
necessary. Contemporary communications networks taken as a whole are not 
focused towards this task, and discourse that takes place via ICTs may be 
influenced by imbalances of power which arise in digital networks or preexist 
them. Communication networks can function as a tool in instituting 
communicative justice, but the norm of communicative justice should also be 
used as a guide for making those networks more ethical. While 
communications technology can be a tool in promoting communicative justice, 
the digital commons can also been seen as an already-existing model of a 
system founded on such an ethic. The role of the digital commons here is 
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found in the overlap between it and “deep forms of democracy where 
communicativeness and redistributive equality are found across a range of 
social spheres” (Plumwood 2002: 65). This is in the extent to which it 
promotes redistribution, expands the types of speech in the public sphere, and 
redefines freedom of expression as dependent on occupying a position in a 
cultural ecosystem. 
Just as communicative ethics are central to Eckersley and Plumwood’s 
proposals, so too are they fundamental to Rancière’s definition of politics. In 
this definition, a political community comes into being when its members 
recognize each other as having a capacity for discourse, which in Aristotelian 
terms is a capacity for logos instead of ‘mere’ phōnē, of speech instead of 
noise. Politics begins from, and consists in, “making what was unseen visible; 
in making what was audible as mere noise heard as speech and in 
demonstrating that what appeared as a mere expression of pleasure and pain is 
a shared feeling of a good or an evil” (Rancière 2010: 37-38). That is, politics 
is founded by the ethical gesture of recognizing others as subjects capable of 
expressing and pursuing values. To attribute to all living beings engaged in 
autopoiesis (the process of self-creation, in Næss’ terms ‘flourishing’ or self-
realization) an interest in their own self-realization is to recognize the “mere 
expression of pleasure and pain”, not previously intelligible in rational 
deliberation, as the expression of value. Eckersley and Plumwood’s projects 
are then not entirely new political forms, but the continuation of the process of 
contesting the category of speaking subjects which is fundamental to politics 
conceived in this way. 
The phrase “differently situated others” used by Eckersley is important to keep 
in mind when considering the possibility of different notions of both self and 
network. Being situated is here the central element of what constitutes the 
other and the self. Selves are brought about and distinguished from other 
entities by their position in networks: political, economic and ecological. That 
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position is defined by a specific combination of connections to a particular set 
of other entities, but also requires connections which are shared with other 
entities not directly connected – whether through a particular material or 
affective chain, or by way of a connection that all entities have to a third entity 
– connections such as those that democratic subjects have to liberal “rules of 
the game” or that living beings have to global aspects of the ecosphere. This 
relationship between connectivity and self is a key element of the network 
Self. 
4.4 The ecological Self in the network society 
Some of the theoretical work to make the conceptual leap from the liberal self 
to the network Self has already been done by Vilém Flusser , and has been 
elaborated upon by Gochenour. Writing in 1988, Flusser presented a view of 
city, society and self as entities formed in a field of networks, or  
a net of relations among human beings, an “intersubjective field of 
relations.” The threads of this net should be seen as channels through 
which information like representations, feelings, intentions, or 
knowledge flows. The threads knot themselves together provisionally 
and develop into what we call human subjects. The totality of the 
threads constitutes the concrete life world, and the knots therein are 
abstract extrapolations (Flusser 2005: 7). 
 
These knots bring with them the concept of a nodal self “in which different 
lines are gathered together and contained” (Gochenour 2006: 7).12 “The 
notorious Self is seen as a knot in which different fields cross, as in the way 
the many physical fields cross with the ecological, psychic, and cultural” 
(Flusser 2005: 6). That is, Flusser sees this self arise both with new 
technologies and forms of social organization and with new frames of 
scientific understanding,  
                                              
12 It may be helpful to describe the nodal self by way of an analogy drawn from the realm of astrophysics. The 
nodal self could be seen not as a dot, or a void, but as a singularity, infinitely dense. The substance of its 
existence may only be in its relations to other nodes, but this does not mean it is merely a cipher through which 
these relations cross. A sufficient complexity of relations creates "incomparably unique individuals" (Gorz 1989: 
175), irreducible points in the total field of relations, just as a sufficient compactness of matter creates points of 
infinite curvature in physical space. 
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the concepts of other areas, for example, ecology (organisms are 
knottings together of ecosystems); molecular biology (phenotypes are 
knottings together of genetic information); or atomic physics (bodies 
are the knottings together of the four field strengths) (Flusser 2005: 7). 
 
Similarly, Castells proposes “a direct correspondence between the themes put 
forward by the environmental movement and the fundamental dimensions of 
the new social structure” (Castells 2009b: 180) in which “ecologists induce the 
creation of a new identity” (Ibid.: 184). Indeed, the term “space of flows” 
describes ecosystems as well as the sites of global financial transactions and 
communications. In both Flusser and Castells we see a convergence between 
ecology and the developments of the network society. To go further, and 
combine Næss’ ecological Self and Flusser’s nodal, network self, may 
overcome conceptual limits in both models. Since Flusser’s model of the self 
arises from its place in a network, changing the definition of the self 
necessarily involves changing the definition of the network. That network is no 
longer an “intersubjective field of relations,” increasingly mediated through 
technology, made up of symbols and other affective influences. It is an 
intersubjective field of relations encapsulating all human and non-human 
entities. It includes not just representations, feelings, and knowledge, but all 
the affective and material influences between entities. Such influences range 
from the emotions generated by viewing a landscape (or a representation of a 
landscape) to the transfer of oxygen from a photosynthesizing living being to 
the atmosphere and into an aerobic organism, or the transfer of energy from 
prey to predator. This network in which subjects arise is coextensive with the 
whole of the ecosphere, and the ecosphere can be visualized as a network. 
“The ecosphere, the whole planet, Gaia, that is the basic unit” (Næss 2005: 
18).  
Gochenour (2006: 7) states that “all communities are distributed systems of 
nodes in interaction with one another” and that “what has limited the concept 
of community to specific spaces has been the limitations on interactions 
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imposed by the limitations of communication technology.” But a much greater 
limitation, predating contemporary ICTs, is the limitation of the concept of 
community to the human species, and a corresponding limitation on the forms 
of interaction taken into consideration. Broadening the network fixes a 
shortcoming of Flusser’s image: a self entirely constituted by language and 
social interaction would seem to disappear entirely upon any retreat from the 
social sphere. A self constituted by placement in an ecological network 
continues to exist during retreat from the social field. It is existence outside of 
the network-as-ecosphere that is impossible. Within the ecological network, an 
entity, including the ecological whole itself, is “an autopoetic [sic] unity” 
which “arises only in relation to an environment from which it distinguishes 
itself, its own internal dynamics being inseparable from the environment in 
which it is found” (Gochenour 2006: 10). 
A network image can also be used to fortify a deep ecology formed around the 
concept of the ecological Self against certain criticisms and 
misunderstandings. To illustrate, I will work with Plumwood’s critique of deep 
ecology. 
While permitting that that the “problematic political developments” she 
associates with deep ecology do not follow necessarily from its “basic ideas” 
but are instead contingent and “in some conflict with certain of its basic 
insights” (Plumwood 2002: 213), she characterizes transpersonal ecology as a 
“cosmic” form of non-anthropocentrism, and the ecological Self as a unitary, 
assimilative identity. In her interpretation, “Naess treats removing the 
existential gulf [between humans and the non-human world] as meaning the 
expulsion of difference and the basing of value on forms of identity or 
equivalence to self.” She asserts the need instead for “frameworks based on 
maintaining the tension between Same and Different rather than generally 
eliminating difference in favour of sameness or vice versa” (Ibid.: 201). I hope 
to use the network image to explicate the way in which the ecological Self is 
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grounded and materialist rather than ‘cosmic’ or metaphysical, and relies on an 
identity formed through difference rather than unity. Seeing the ecological 
whole of the ecological Self as a network, and the self as a node within that 
network allows us to see the particular form that unity and difference take. Of 
central importance is to see node and network as simultaneously constituted 
and constitutive.  Following Flusser, the ecological nodal self is a knot of all 
the material (including affective) relations a node has with other nodes. The 
nodal self is entirely constituted by its relations, and, through the further chain 
of relations that connect all entities within the ecosphere, constituted by its 
place within the ecological whole. The ecological whole thus is constitutive of 
all entities within it (all nodes within the network) but it is also entirely 
constituted by the nodes and their relations. Since the nodes are defined by the 
specific array of material connections that constitutes them, which is their 
relative position within the network, the unity of the ecological whole is 
entirely dependent on, and constituted by, the difference of each node. The 
ecological network (and ecological Self) is not simply the total sum of nodes 
and connections. The ecological network exists in the interdependence of 
nodes, in the impossibility of either node or network preexisting the other. 
Thus, the identification of self with Self, the identification of node with 
Network, is not an identification of total unity or similarity. The network Self 
exists in the space between identification as node and as network, or between 
the node as constitutive of the whole and the node as constituted by the whole. 
What might have previously appeared as a “unity or fusion of interests” 
(Plumwood 2002: 197) becomes an overlay of the particular qualities and 
interests of each nodal entity in its role of constituting the whole with the 
shared interest of all nodal entities in the perseveration of the whole as a 
constitutive reality. This is not the identification of self with Self as an 
“expulsion of difference.” Instead, it is the identification of unity in difference. 
To borrow Flusser’s words,  
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it demands that we must surround ourselves existentially. We must stop 
wanting to recognize ourselves and others and instead seek to recognize 
others and to find ourselves in them again. We must break out of the 
capsule of the self and draw our selves into concrete intersubjectivity. 
(Flusser 2005: 9). 
The network, ecological Self is, precisely, a model of concrete 
intersubjectivity and not a ‘cosmic,’ metaphysical holism. Næss states that in 
deep ecology “it is taken for granted that the self is basically ecological. Talk 
about human beings in the environment is misleading, for we are as much out 
there as inside here. The beauty of a tree is as much in the tree as it is inside 
us” (Næss 2010: 14). We need qualify this language only slightly to see it in 
the network frame. We can say that the human being (and any other being) is 
‘in’ the environment, as much as it occupies a specific, relational place within 
the ecological network of constitutive material connections, but to be ‘in’ the 
environment does not mean to be separate from it; in fact it can only mean to 
be irrevocably a part of it. Since the nodal subject is entirely a knot of 
connections, including the sensory and cognitive affective valuations of 
aesthetics and ethics and the relation all entities share of being constituted by 
placement in the whole, “the beauty of a tree is as much in the tree as it is 
inside us” in more than a poetic sense only. This model, I believe, is sufficient 
for “recovering multiplicity and difference [in] a dual project of rejecting 
hyper-separation and also affirming difference, as responses to different parts 
of the logic of the One and the Other and to the Othering of nature” 
(Plumwood 2002: 202). 
Plumwood admits in her critique that “there is a considerable convergence 
here between the counter-hegemonic virtues of solidarity and mutuality and the 
kinds of virtues of openness Naess’s form of deep ecology has itself 
recommended” (Ibid.: 206). Plumwood faults deep ecology for focusing on 
value instead of ethics, but, as I have argued, the boundary between ethics and 
other fields concerned with the attribution of value should not be seen as 
definite. An ecological network model can in fact provide an ontological basis 
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for the values of communicative justice that Plumwood champions. Basing a 
communicative ethics on a communicative ontology, or indeed actually 
merging the two, follows from conceiving the ecological whole as a field of 
both material and affective relations, which is, in Næss’ language “placing, as 
Spinoza does, joys and other so-called subjective phenomena into a unified 
total field of realities” and thus overcoming the “cleavage into two worlds [of] 
the world of fact and the world of values” (Næss 2010: 114).  
Joining the concepts of the nodal self and the ecological Self allows us to 
clarify some of the vagueness that Næss points to in his own concept of the 
Self: 
The widening and deepening of the individual selves somehow never 
makes them into one ‘mass’. Or into an organism in which every cell is 
programmed so as to let the organism function as one single, integrated 
being. How to work out this in a fairly precise way I do not know. It is a 
meagre consolation that I do not find that others have been able to do 
this in their contemplation of the pair unity-plurality. ‘In unity 
diversity!’, yes, but how? As a vague postulate it has a specific function 
within a total view, however imperfectly (Næss 1989: 173). 
When the self is considered to be nodal, and the Self is identified with the 
ecospheric network, the “contemplation of the pair unity-plurality” becomes a 
fundamentally topographic activity. A network topology offers an answer to 
the question of how diversity is to be found in unity. The unique set of 
relations to other nodes that constitutes each entity is what defines a certain 
position within the network, and establishes diversity. These same relations are 
what constitute the unity which is also the precondition for each entity. The 
total view of all the connections which make up the self and the Self can never 
be fully grasped, and working out in a precise way the pair unity-plurality 
becomes not a separate activity, but a process comprising all activities which 
map constitutive relations between entities. The specific function of the vague 
postulate is to establish that the consideration of interests is always also the 
consideration of identity. This is a position from which a view of politics as 
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the competition of interests can be joined to the view of politics as identity 
formation and the view of politics as the opposition of forms of commonsense. 
The description of interests in any particular situation must also be a 
delineation of the relations which, in part, constitute the identities of all 
entities involved, and each mapping of interests and identities becomes a 
“specific distributio[n] of space and time, of the visible and the invisible” 
(Rancière 2010: 141). Thus, the opposition of interests takes the form of the 
clarification of the unity of the network and the elaboration of selves and the 
Self. It creates a space in which stated interests can be compared and critiqued 
on the basis of their place in a partial map of the unity of ecological relations. 
In an ecological politics, then, interests, and the demands of ‘interest groups’ 
are prioritized only according to the extent they are found to correspond to the 
ultimate interests of all opposing groups; that is, to the vitally constitutive 
relations all sides depend on. Politics becomes the identification of relevant 
higher-order gestalts. Self-realization, meanwhile, becomes a continual process 
of an individuals’ identification of the gestalts of their particular experience 
with higher-order gestalts, each gestalt describable as a network of relations 
between nodes. Valid political claims are convincing productions of gestalt 
views, and the making of such claims can be said to be the Self-realization of 
groups. The process of ecological identification can thus be analogized to 
Mouffe’s process of political identification: the movement from self to Self in 
self-realization is the creation of chains of equivalence through the ecospheric 
network. Both ecologization and democratic politics work through a process of 
identification which does not peremptorily equate the individual with an 
organic, given whole, which assumes consensus and an obvious harmony of 
interests, but by tracing certain constellations within a framework which is 
acknowledged as present but not directly invoked in every concrete decision 
and action. Thus, democracy is not consensus, and the movement through 
which self-realization comes to be identified with Self-realization is not one of 
a singular revelation, but is a process by which each individual traces networks 
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of identification, each configuration advancing towards a more complete 
identification with the entire network. That network is, in politics, the demos 
and the common institutions and history that inform “constitutional patriotism” 
and, in ecology, the ecosphere. 
The model of an ecological network Self allows us to continue the work of 
describing the deficits of the economic, political, social and technological 
networks which comprise contemporary network society. Meijas names one of 
central pathologies of the contemporary network “nodocentrism,” 
the assertion that only nodes need to be mapped, explained or accounted 
for. Nodocentrism means that while networks are extremely efficient at 
establishing links between nodes, they embody a bias against 
knowledge of – and engagement with – anything that is not a node in 
the same network (…) nodocentrism constructs a social reality in which 
nodes can only see other nodes. It is an epistemology based on the 
exclusive reality of the node. It privileges nodes while discriminating 
against what is not a node – the invisible, the Other (Mejias 2010: 612). 
This is what Castells describes as “the social construction of new dominant 
forms of space and time (…) a meta-network that switches off non-essential 
functions, subordinate social groups, and devalued territories” which creates 
“infinite social distance” between the network and “most individuals, 
activities, and locales around the world” (Castells 2009a: 508). Mejias’ 
proposed response is to focus on the paranodal, that which is excluded from 
the networks, the “multitudes that do not conform to the organizing logic of 
the network” which “exis[t] only to be bypassed or collapsed in the topological 
act of linking, of reducing the distance between nodes.” The project of 
“conceptualizing the paranodal” aims to “uncover the politics of inclusion and 
exclusion encoded in the network and suggest strategies for disidentifying 
from the network” (Mejias 2010: 612). He compares the paranodal to 
Rancière’s “part of those who have no part,” concluding that  
if social network services are a model for capitalist subjectification – 
indoctrinating social subjects to operate in the privatized ‘public’ space 
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of the network – then it is only in the paranodal where disidentification 
can take place and alternative subjectivities can emerge (Mejias 2010: 
613). 
However, the ecosphere is a network within which the networks of 
informational capitalism have always been embedded in. Hence, paranodal 
space “gives nodes their history and identity [and] animates the network” 
precisely because such paranodes are, properly considered, connected through 
larger ecological networks to nodes in the technological and economic 
networks from which they are excluded. This also allows for a more accurate 
reading of Rancière (2010: 33), since his “part of those who have no part” 
refers not only to the excluded and disadvantaged, but to the entire population 
and the equality they possess outside of their manageable, quantifiable 
characteristics. This democratic equality of the “part of those who have no 
part,” as the People, arises as a surplus above and beyond the aggregate of 
individuals, just as the unity of the ecological Self arises not simply from an 
aggregate of constitutive nodes, but from the role the whole has in constituting 
those nodes. Democratic equality is not an intrinsic characteristic of 
individuals, but a quality that arises in each only through constitutive 
membership in a whole. Positioning the paranodal as part of larger networks 
may also help us clarify what is meant by the network self. The network self is 
not the self as defined primarily through activity in technological networks. It 
is a method of mapping the interdependence and co-determination of selves 
that are antecedent to, even if accelerated by, those networks. 
From here, formulating and pursuing political projects is not a matter of 
disidentifying from the network, and working in “paranodal space” but in 
identifying and correcting the contradictions that arise between the exclusions 
of contemporary networks of power and the preexisting inclusions in 
ecological networks. This is, precisely, an ecological practice of dissensus, of 
overlaying the image of one world, the world of ecological interdependence, 
on top of another, the world of techno-economic networks. 
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5. Communalism, Cosmopolitanism, 
Commons 
In this chapter I will explore what I believe to be the most important 
implications of adopting a network model of the ecological Self and of using 
new hybrid frameworks for ecological politics. This includes further avenues 
of change or adaptation within deep ecology. To begin with, I wish to look at a 
localist and communitarian strain of ecological activism, its limitations, and 
how these might be tempered by a network cosmopolitanism. 
5.1 Green communalism against network cosmopolitanism 
Towards this purpose, and for the sake of brevity, I will mostly be engaging 
with biologist David Ehrenfeld’s positions in Swimming Lessons: Keeping 
Afloat In The Age of Technology (2002). This texts serves well as a discussant 
because of its deeply and explicitly held technological skepticism, its emphasis 
on the communal and its associated unwillingness or inability to engage with 
politics in the sense that has been discussed here. The narrative of Ehrenfeld’s 
argument is structured around an opposition between local communities and 
the multinational corporations of informational capitalism. While he is 
strongly opposed to the global network society as currently constituted, the 
form his opposition takes is actually strongly postmodern. This kind of Green 
communalism can be shown to be symptomatic of postmodernism rather than a 
coherent response to the postmodern condition which presents a way beyond it. 
It functions as what Castells labels a resistance identity, but its limitations 
prevent it from becoming the model for a project identity (Castells 2009b: 
383). In Ehrenfeld’s work, these limitations take the form of several 
contradictions, linguistic absences, and unanswered questions. 
As described by Bauman (2006: 92) “‘Community’ is these days the last relic 
of the old-time utopias of the good society (…) slimmed down, realistically, to 
the size of the immediate neighbourhood.” Ehrenfeld’s vision shows just how 
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slimmed down this utopia is, even when it has an ecological bent instead of a 
primarily ethnic or nationalist one. Community, in Swimming Lessons, can 
only be authentic when it is local, and functions as a zero-sum game. Thus, 
distributed communities made possible by ICTs create “the [mere] sensation of 
being part of a community of people working, creating, and playing together 
for the common good” (Ehrenfeld 2002: 47). This, he claims, can only be mere 
sensation without substance, because participants live in different climates and 
landscapes with different environmental problems. Yet in the Anthropocene 
we see that while geographically separate communities may occupy different 
environments, they also commonly occupy the ecosphere and are susceptible to 
phenomena of a global scale. They are in distinct regions of a global network 
but irrevocably connected to that network. Participation in a distributed 
community, for Ehrenfeld, necessarily requires the weakening of spatially 
contiguous communities. This reflects a communitarian tendency to “believe 
that we belong to only one community, defined empirically and even 
geographically” (Mouffe 1993: 20). Hence belonging to a ‘second’ community 
means belonging less to the first. But if we recognize ourselves as members of 
a demos, as selves in an ecological whole or nodal subjects in a network, then 
we see ourselves and others as “in fact always multiple and contradictory 
subjects, inhabitants of a diversity of communities (…) precariously and 
temporarily sutured at the intersection of those subject positions” (Ibid.). Such 
a view of zero-sum communities with absolute borders “simply reproduces at 
the community level what liberalism assumes at the individual level, the 
atomistic, autonomous, self-contained self with no essential ties to others and 
no imaginable motive for cooperating with other atoms” (Plumwood 2002: 
78). In the construction of a project identity capable of a new ecological 
politics, we must complicate such simple views of community, and we may 
need to temper or reject outright Næss’ proposed deep ecological principle of 
“cultivation of life in community (…) rather than in society” (Næss 2010: 
106). This is not to say that cultivation of life in (spatially contiguous) 
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community is not important on its own. What is to be avoided is viewing the 
patterns of connection bundled in the term ‘community’ as essentially distinct 
and separate from other kinds of connection in the full set of relations that 
individuals and groups have with others, and to privilege these connections 
based on geographical nearness, ethnic ‘identity’ and other characteristics that 
typically define the communal. 
Ehrenfeld’s limited focus on community is linked to his unwillingness or 
inability to engage deeply with the question of technology and global 
civilization. The use of technology is for Ehrenfeld a matter of individual 
decisions to opt-in to or opt-out of particular applications (for example, he 
drives cars but does not watch television, sends faxes but does not use e-mail). 
He says that “these choices are not arbitrary, although they may be disputed. 
What matters is that they are my choices” (Ehrenfeld 2002: 40). Yet the 
opposite is true of the sustainability of particular uses of technology: the 
aggregate effects of technologies are more important than whether individuals 
can pick and choose from individual applications. If it proves, for example, 
that the ecological toll of driving automobiles is much higher than using e-
mail, what ‘matters’ is not individual choice but that these choices can be 
made by society at large. This is not to say that anyone should be obligated or 
required to use certain technological applications in their private lives. The 
point is not that Ehrenfeld personally should choose to use e-mail or watch 
television, or choose not to send faxes or drive a car. The choice any individual 
has to use one of these technologies is predicated on the maintenance of 
infrastructures that make them possible. Such systems are collective 
endeavors, and what matters to sustainability are collective decisions which 
determine the range of technological choices available to individuals. While 
Ehrenfeld imagines himself opposed to global techno-economic networks, his 
relationship to the commodities and services it provides is perfectly 
postmodern. Contrarian simplification is simply another way for atomized 
individuals to define themselves through use – and selective refusal – of 
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commodities. Here we again see that “in the land of the individual freedom of 
choice the option to escape individualization and to refuse participation in the 
individualizing game is emphatically not on the agenda” (Bauman 2006: 34). 
Ehrenfeld can follow two seemingly contradictory symptomatic tendencies of 
postmodernity, by combining the individual identity construction of life 
organized around consumption with the “search for a primal shelter” that 
Bauman characterizes as its counterpart. Finding the appropriate role for 
technology is still a matter of individual choice, but the goal is no longer to 
remain perpetually open to novel commodity-mediated experiences. Instead, 
individual choices to use or avoid particular technologies serve as a way of 
resisting the “enormous forces backed by vast resources” that “push at us to 
adapt” to new technologies. In this “personal struggle [of] becoming the 
arbiters of our own adaptations (…) we have the power (…) of knowing that 
nature and community are on our side” (Ehrenfeld 2002: 40). The primal 
shelters of nature and community are presented as guides for an individualized 
approach to determining the role of technology and commodities. Thus 
informational capitalism and its postmodern individualization incorporate the 
reaction they engender, without the basic model being altered. 
Decisions about the use of technology that substantially influence the 
ecological impact of civilization are not made at the level of personal struggle 
with appliances. Yet in Ehrenfeld’s view, political life is out of the question. 
Community is the realm of consensus, not dissensus. Small, geographically 
defined communities are not only preferable but inevitable, as they will be all 
that remains after “the unmanageable techno-economic behemoth (…) 
collapses of its own weight” (Ibid.:101). Technology is an autonomous force 
in this view, but is telelogically doomed. Indeed, not only is technology 
autonomous, it would seem to be more autonomous than human society. Any 
increase in the justice and decency of human societies follows the vague rule 
“that systems that are greatly at odds with justice and good-ness do not last 
forever,” a law of history that is either “an indication of the existence of some 
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Design beyond our fathoming or is just the bright side of human fallibility” 
(Ehrenfeld 2002: 176). Concerted, purposive, collective action seems to have 
no place here. Without an idea of such action, we are forced to accept what 
Ehrenfeld freely admits would be the many negative effects of techno-
economic collapse and a communitarian reorganization: 
A major cause of suffering will be problems arising from excessive 
loyalties to small communities and states. We can expect to see all the 
ancient, familiar side effects of smallness and decentralization: bigotry, 
racial and religious hatred, the subjugation of women, and intolerance 
for handicapped people, homosexuals, visionaries, and anyone else who 
can be labeled as different (Ibid.: 174). 
This is not to mention the famine, migration and violent conflict that could 
occur on a massive scale in a collapse-driven transition, a transition that would 
see “a kind of international caste system in which the poor of the developing 
world are consigned to (energy) poverty in perpetuity (…) combin[ing] 
Malthusian environmentalism with Hobbesian conservatism” (Beck 2010: 
263). Resignation to this fate is hardly an ethical position.  
Nor is it necessarily true that a turn to localism would produce sustainable, 
ecologically harmonious results. As Plumwood (2006: 76) states, “there is a 
huge gap between the ideal ecological consciousness attributed by 
bioregionalists to autarchic communities and the actual consciousness and 
behaviour of the small-scale communities we can see around us.” Her cogent 
argument is worth quoting at length: 
Although small-scale communities can reduce epistemic and responsive 
remoteness, and in some areas such as energy use can greatly reduce 
consequential remoteness, they can often also offer people fewer 
alternatives to damaging forms of economic activity, so that benefits 
from reducing remoteness can be offset or cancelled out (…) 
Observable small-scale communities (like the one I live in) suggest that 
proximity to local nature does little to guarantee the first condition of 
the bioregionalist, the transparency to inhabitants of ecological 
relationships and dependencies (…) Even with goodwill, many 
ecological impacts may neither be containable nor evident at the level 
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of the local community, for example, the contribution of local animal 
waste to the global store of biospheric methane. Familiarity with the 
wildlife of a particular community might tell you that a certain animal is 
common locally, but it will not tell you that it is very uncommon or 
extinct everywhere else, information that may be crucial to encouraging 
enough restraint to allow the animal to survive the intensified local 
demands of a small-scale self-sufficient economy. Here autarchy could 
actually hinder the transparency of ecological relationships and the 
development of a critical sense of place that can situate local 
relationships and communities in relation to wider communities 
(Plumwood 2006: 76). 
The flaw in the ideal of autarky, as with Ehrenfeld’s privileging of spatially 
contiguous over distributed communities, is that it assumes a greater 
transparency of relationships and dependencies in geographically immediate 
contexts. Not only may this prove at times to be an unfounded assumption, in a 
period of economic globalization and ecosphere-wide environmental change, 
the opposite may in fact be true. If the most significant changes on a local level 
are caused by processes occurring on a global scale, it is precisely at the local 
level where the relevant relationships and dependencies will be most opaque. 
The scientific certainty around global anthropogenic climate change is a 
product of an internationally distributed community just as much as the 
economic processes that drive that change. Yet by Ehrenfeld’s standard, 
climate science is the product of a ‘pseudocommunity.’ The effect on the local 
of global processes cannot be wished away, and categorically privileging the 
contiguous over the distributed does not advance societies’ ability to 
understand or control them. Furthermore, focusing on the geographically near 
at hand may run counter to the goal of orienting decision making to longer 
timeframes.  
5.2 Human responsibilities in glacial time 
If we try to think in terms of a much longer, ‘glacial’ time scale, the culpability 
humanity has for initiating changes in the global climate leads to the question 
of what positive responsibility humanity has for the ecosphere, as a system 
which makes possible the self-realization of the Earth’s living beings. For 
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while the history of global climactic conditions reveals “a constitutive 
vulnerability to forces beyond its control” (Clark 2010: 47) in the character of 
humanity, this vulnerability is also constitutive for the majority of life on this 
planet, as evidenced by the series of mass-extinction events that mark the 
history of life on Earth. If we are to seriously uphold the self-realization of all 
life as a principle guiding our species’ behavior, we must consider our 
responsibilities on the scale of glacial time. Thus we cannot follow Ehrenfeld 
in his prediction and fatalistic acceptance of technological civilization’s 
immanent collapse, or the communitarian principles he offers for plotting the 
future beyond it. Just as Næss includes the continuation of techno-scientific 
progress in his sketch of the next century’s ecological society, so must we 
expect to continue the use of advanced technology while integrating both our 
negative and positive responsibilities (to do less harm and to prevent harm, 
respectively) as part of the ecosphere into our decision making. Mass 
extinction due to the run-away effects of anthropogenic climate change and the 
already greatly accelerated rate of extinction due to economic activity are 
failures of human civilization. However, allowing a mass extinction event to 
occur, caused, for example, by an asteroid impact, when further technological 
progress would provide methods of prevention would just as surely be a 
species failure. In Næss’ words, “if (…) human beings in some remote future 
could avert a glacial age, or the impact of a comet, then I tend to think that no 
norm should be used against interference of this magnitude in natural systems” 
(Næss 2010: 187). The path to making civilizational decisions in the frame of 
glacial time does not run backwards, to a past before the ‘timeless time’ of 
informational capitalism, but beyond it. Technological evolution’s role in our 
ecological responsibilities gives an ecological and ethical weight to the project 
of discovering ecological potentials within contemporary technological 
developments. To reject technology outright would be to join informational 
capitalism in “the culture of the annihilation of time, which is tantamount to 
the canceling of the human adventure” (Castells 2009a: xliii). 
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Thus, we need an active shaping and directing of the “techno-economic 
behemoth” instead of refusal or resignation. This requires selves capable of 
political activity at local, regional and global levels of human and ecological 
networks. It requires people and projects that move beyond the mandatory 
individuation of postmodernity and its communitarian counterreaction. And it 
calls for ways of living in technological, social and ecological networks. We 
can find a communitarian streak in deep ecology, as when Næss doubts the 
wisdom or possibility of urban multiculturalism, and speaks of the “pseudo-
richness of cultures within the borders of a metropolitan area like Los 
Angeles” (Næss 2005: 272). But elsewhere Næss states that just such 
“derogatory talk about big cities and city lifestyles may be counterproductive” 
as “big concentrations within small areas are necessary to minimise 
devastating effects upon other kinds of life than the human,” and thus “more 
effort is needed to improve life quality in the areas of concentration, not more 
effort to spread the population all over the globe” (Næss 1989: 155). In 
statements more central to deep ecology’s project, we find a good description 
of the situation: “in short, there is no way back to societies that belong to the 
past, but there is a way back to ecological sustainability” (Ibid.: 589). Instead 
of communal autarky, we find encouragement that “both a trend toward 
centralization of political decisions and a trend toward decentralization must 
be envisaged” (Ibid.: 197) and a call “to take into account the present-day 
diversification of subcultures – rapidly changing groups of people trying out 
‘new’ ways of life in conscious opposition to what is ‘customary’ within a 
particular culture” (Ibid.: 272). We may proceed from this basic embrace of 
diversity and pluralism. This does not mean abandoning either the idea of 
community or actually existing local communities. It does entail a shift from a 
view of organic, bounded communities, and “the idea of community as a unity 
or fusion of interests” (Plumwood 2002: 208) to a view of communities as a 
particular network of interests within and connected to other networks, each 
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node in each subsidiary network constituted by its relations to others, and 
constituting the whole. 
5.3 At the interstices of politics and aesthetics, wildness and the commons 
In this section, I attempt to draw parallels between human and non-human 
ecologies, of societies and cultures on the one hand, and of nature on the other, 
by means of a meditation on the term ‘wildness,’ and its meanings and value. 
The Anthropocene, and the specter of ecological crisis, cast doubt on Castells’ 
characterization of the network society’s place in history. In his description, 
human history has proceeded from an original epoch of the domination (or 
determination) of ‘culture’ by ‘nature’ through a modern era of the domination 
of nature by culture, to the current, postmodern, network society in which 
“culture refers to culture, having superseded nature to the point that nature is 
artificially revived (‘preserved’) as a cultural form.” This is “the beginning of 
a new existence… marked by the autonomy of culture vis-à-vis the material 
bases of our existence” (Castells 2009a: 508-509). But, as discussed in the last 
chapter, anthropogenic climate change puts on display both nature’s 
vulnerability to human action and humanity’s continued vulnerability to and 
dependence on nature. It is too early to declare ‘nature’ to be entirely 
subsumed by culture. Yet the reach of ICTs and the global character of climate 
alteration do suggest that “the difference between ‘close by’ and ‘far away’, or 
for that matter between the wilderness and the civilized, orderly space, has 
been all but cancelled” (Bauman 2006: 11). Nature retains some form of 
autonomy, but is not a distinct sphere. This autonomy does not then reside in 
an absolutely separate ‘wilderness’ but in a ‘wildness’ that transects nature and 
culture. “Civilization is permeable, and could be as inhabited as the wild is” 
(Synder 1990: 15). Where does wildness permeate? 
We can find wildness in the principles of diversity, plurality, and democracy. 
Rancière defines the demos in opposition to the ordering and management of 
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the population by its characteristics. In so much as wildness requires and is 
defined by an element of being unmanaged, we can rephrase Rancière’s 
definition of the demos as being the population delineated and united by the 
principle of its wildness. This is the wildness of “a subject who ‘rules’ by the 
very fact of having no qualifications to rule” (Rancière 2010: 40), the wildness 
of there being “no good reason as to why some men should rule others” (Ibid.: 
53). The notion of wildness also allows us another angle from which to see the 
demos as a ‘surplus’ community, if we read surplus in the sense of abundance. 
In a moment, I will discuss abundance as one of the characteristics that gives 
wilderness and the commons a shared border. 
Wildness is a necessary counterbalance to the modernizing impulse “to re-
configure the totality of the material world in order to tum it into the product 
of its own immaterial power” (Ibid.: 81). Wildness is an attribute of the “mute 
letter” of literature under the aesthetic regime, as a windblown seed that goes 
its own way, rather than one “planted by a master (…) in the soul of a disciple” 
(Ibid.: 157). 
Gary Snyder concludes that contemporary cities qualify as natural, since they 
“do not deviate from the laws of nature” but are not wild, as they “are habitat 
so exclusive in the matter of who and what they give shelter to, and so 
intolerant of other creatures, as to be truly odd.” To be wild requires “a 
diversity of living and nonliving beings flourishing according to their own 
sorts of order” (Synder 1990: 11-12). Here we clearly see the ecosophical 
valuation of living beings’ right to their own autopoietic self-realization, but 
also an identification of wildness with diversity and tolerance. We can draw a 
parallel here between the opposed principles of wildness and unwildness and 
of politics and police. Wildness is a requirement for liberty and diversity, and 
tolerance is a requirement for wildness. 
The idea of wildness can also animate Shirky and Morozov’s explanations of 
the role of the digital commons in the nurture and spread of democratic 
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culture, as discussed in Chapter 3. The importance of the digital commons is 
not primarily in a capacity for direct, concrete measures to promote and 
instantiate certain values, but in the lessons imparted by, and the intrinsic value 
of, the diversity and wildness of free exchange. The digital commons becomes 
the site of a communicative and aesthetic wildness not ultimately separable 
from the wildness that runs through the continuum of nature and culture. 
Snyder locates the origins of the commons, “the ancient mode of both 
protecting and managing the wilds of the self-governing regions”, in those 
places that were between the cultivated and the wild, “between the extremes of 
deep wilderness and the private plots of the farmstead (…) embracing both the 
wild and the semi-wild.” This commons “is essential even to an agricultural 
village economy because its natural diversity provides the many necessities 
and amenities that the privately held plots cannot” (Synder 1990: 30). The 
commons and the wild are brought together by notions of richness and 
diversity, abundance and surplus. 
If we can return to Thoreau’s early praise of wildness, we may be able to see 
the special position occupied by the free exchange of music in the digital 
commons: 
In short, all good things are wild and free. There is something in a strain 
of music, whether produced by an instrument or by the human voice, – 
take the sound of a bugle in a summer night, for instance, – which by its 
wildness, to speak without satire, reminds me of the cries emitted by 
wild beasts in their native forests (Thoreau 1994). 
Thoreau sees a wildness that permeates both culture and nature. Letting music 
loose through the circuits of the network society brings an element of wildness 
to the technology in the lead of reshaping the world following principles of 
growth and consumption. This loosing creates ‘appropriate’ technology not by 
replacing existing technology but by finding a new use for it, identifying an 
alternative regime within dominant networks. 
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There is, perhaps, a risk of complacency in discovering and nurturing this 
cultural wildness, of seeing in it an adequate replacement for wildness in 
nature, or as a consolation for its loss. Indeed, the whirl of capital itself can be 
seen and experienced as a form of wildness, as Næss admits:  
Rich people who work in the world of business and are supporters of 
the deep ecology movement sometimes ask in all seriousness whether 
green utopian societies must look so dreary. Why portray a society that 
seemingly needs no big entrepreneurs, only organic farmers, modest 
artists, and mild naturalists? A capitalist society is, in a certain sense, a 
rather wild society! We need some degree of wildness, but not exactly 
of the capitalist sort. The usual utopian green societies seem so sober 
and tame. We shall need enthusiasts of the extravagant, the luxurious, 
and the big – but they must not dominate (Næss 2005: 615). 
By what assessment can we judge wildness of the “capitalist sort” as 
insufficient, and disqualify it, in its present form, from inclusion in green 
societies of the future? To what extent can we find in the digital commons an 
alternative method of providing such extravagance, luxuriousness, and 
bigness? One of my themes has been the tendency of capitalist wildness to 
favor liberties of property over other forms of liberty. Thus the unmanaged 
nature of capital reduces other forms of cultural wildness and diversity over 
the long term. More fundamentally, the capitalist sort of wildness threatens the 
wildness of the non-human world and the viability of cultural and natural 
systems, and thus the possibility of wildness and ultimately any other 
normative values. 
Free exchange within the digital commons promotes diversity and richness by 
increasing the availability of cultural objects. There is an “intimate relation 
between complexity and diversity. When the number of elements increases 
linearly, the number of possible relationships increases factorially” (Næss 
1989: 202).  As discussed in Chapter 3, to the extent to which the material 
structures of economies of transmission are more tenably open to collective 
ownership, there is a greater opportunity for collective decision making aimed 
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towards reducing the material extensity and environmental impact of such a 
system. 
The celebration of cultural wildness – capitalist or otherwise - must be 
accompanied by a mindfulness of its placement in the higher-order gestalt 
comprising nature and culture, now differently but no less inseparable than in 
the epoch of nature’s domination of culture. Wildness becomes an important 
value to the extent it inspires appreciation for it, and its associated values of 
diversity, toleration and liberty, in the realms of both culture and nature
13
, and 
the innumerable areas in which the distinction between those realms is not so 
clear, and as much as it encourages the cultivation of an eye towards the 
relationships between cultural and natural wildness. 
At this point some clarification of the term ‘higher-order gestalts’ is in order. 
This concept might appear to reintroduce the prevalence and necessity of 
hierarchy – Næss (1985: 58) uses the language of “a complex realm of gestalts, 
in a vast hierarchy.” Yet this is a form of hierarchy distinct from the 
hierarchies of the representational regime, pre-modern society or state 
bureaucracy. This form of hierarchy is one of wholes contained by larger 
wholes, of configurations of nodes within larger networks, and in this form of 
hierarchy the idea of simultaneously constituting and being constituted by 
larger wholes is crucial. Such a hierarchy is not created by valuing some 
elements more highly than others, but requires always a dual valuation. 
Higher-order gestalts may be admired for their complexity, and specially 
valued for being the context and precondition for lower-order gestalts, but this 
necessitates recognition that the lower order gestalts that constitute them are 
also, reciprocally, the context and precondition of the higher-order gestalts. 
This is not a hierarchy of one element above another, but of one element 
                                              
13 If we see, for example, the peaceful coexistence of species in different niches within the same ecosystem as an 
example of toleration in nature, we can identify tolerance as a major contributor to increases in diversity and 
complexity. 
114 
encompassing another. Such is the ontological basis for a politics which limits 
the extent to which the interests of larger wholes allows for sacrificing the 
interests of individuals and the extent to which individuals may ignore the 
interest of larger wholes. 
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6. The network Self as a project identity 
In order to sketch the outlines of a new eco-democratic project identity, it will 
be useful to mull the character of modernity’s project identities, and of 
modernity itself. To return to Chapter 2, a project identity, as defined by 
Castells, is “a blueprint of social values and institutional goals that appeal to a 
majority of citizens without excluding anybody” through which collective 
social actors may “reach holistic meaning in their experience (…) expanding 
towards the transformation of society” (Castells 2009b: 369, 10). 
Bauman (2006: 3) describes a spirit of modernity which is concerned with the 
‘melting’ of “the pre-modern solids” which it found “in a fairly advanced state 
of disintegration; and one of the most powerful motives behind the urge to 
melt them was the wish to discover or invent solids of – for a change – lasting 
solidity”. The quest for sustainability is just such a search for lasting solidity, 
although it comes in at least two forms, one being what Eckersley (2004: 109) 
terms “weak ecological modernization” which aims at the adjustment of the 
(post)modern solids, the other being a project of inventing the solids of 
‘ecomodernity.’ Following this pattern of dissolution and reformation, we can 
look for elements of ecomodernity latent within postmodernity, just as Harvey 
sees postmodernity as coalescing from a set of attributes latent within 
modernity. An ecomodernity will only cohere through adopting and opposing 
various elements from the continuum of modernity and postmodernity. This 
process of cohesion includes the analysis and correction of fundamental, fatal 
errors of theorization and application in the projects of modernity. 
In Critique of Economic Reason (1989) André Gorz identities economic 
rationalization, the relentless pursuit of quantification and efficiency, as the 
central principle of both capitalist and state-socialist projects of modernity. In 
Marx’s analysis, the “division of labour into an infinite number of 
interchangeable tasks of an indifferent, ‘accidental’ character” that 
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characterizes industrial production “suppresses the ‘limited relationship of men 
to Nature’ and their ‘limited relationship to one another’ and, as ‘the universal 
development of the productive forces’, engenders a ‘universal intercourse 
between men’” (Gorz 1989: 23). This creates a proletarian class who obtain “a 
direct interest in (…) subordinating the social process of production to their 
common control”, and this “proletarianization of the producers therefore 
promises to be merely one facet of a grandiose and potentially emancipatory 
enterprise of rational unification of the social process” (Ibid.: 25). Gorz thus 
identifies the “principal utopian content” of this project as the destiny of the 
proletariat in realizing “the unity of the real as the unity of Reason” and to do 
so as “individuals divested of any individual interest” (Ibid.: 26). In this 
“universal voluntary collaboration of ‘the united individuals’ (…) each 
individual ‘as total individual’ assumes the totality of social production as her 
or his personal task” (Ibid.: 27). Yet the practical result of this theory’s 
application was far from utopian: 
Soviet-style socialism thus offered a sort of caricatural magnification of 
the basic features of capitalism. Pursuing accumulation and economic 
growth as its principal goals, it attempted to rationalize this pursuit by 
replacing spontaneous hetero-regulation by the market with 
methodically programmed, centralized hetero-regulation of the 
economy as a whole. It thus divorced – in all spheres of activity – the 
functional conduct demanded by the overall rationality of the system 
from the rationality of individuals’ self-regulated modes of conduct. 
Because it was divorced from the intuitive understanding of their 
surroundings and relations with one another of which individuals were 
capable, this methodically programmed rationalization established 
Reason as a separate power exercised over them and not by them and 
established the realm of Reason as the dictatorial rule of those who, as a 
result of their functions, were its custodians (Gorz 1989: 42).
14
 
Thus, the primacy of economic rationalization as the organizing principle of 
society leads, in Gorz’s view, either to the capitalist “hetero-regulation” of “a 
                                              
14 If we follow Jameson’s (2005: 12) determination that utopia as a form is defined not by positive blueprints but 
by the conjectural removal of aspects from the society which it compares itself to, then the magnification of 
features of capitalism within Soviet-style state socialism qualifies it as a failed utopia, even before we judge this 
result by other metrics and values. 
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commodity-producing society [in which] people (all of them!) are under the 
control of things” (Heinrich 2012: 75) or the dictatorial rule of the custodians 
of Reason. How could an ecomodern project identity both correct for the 
narrowly ratiocentric limitations of modernity and give modernity an 
ecological context? And what does the form of the network ecological Self 
specifically contribute to such a move? 
Deep ecology’s insistence on returning social deliberation to ultimate goals 
and fundamental norms allows for identifying modern ratiocentrism
15
 as such a 
norm and allows for the possibility of replacing it, or casting it in a subordinate 
role to broader foundational norms. This ratiocentric fundamental norm could 
be called ‘Efficiency!’, ‘Rationalization!’, or ‘Growth!’ and, because it is a 
fundamental norm 
it does not assert that the economic system such as it is, in the current 
international situation, needs growth – which would leave open the 
question of foreseeable changes in either that system or situation – but 
that growth is good in itself: the more the better (Gorz 1989: 121). 
To avoid this terminally growth-oriented result, the “unity of the real” must be 
realized as something other than “the unity of Reason.” But if pluralistic 
democracy is to be understood as “more than the mere consequence of the 
acceptance of the principle of toleration” and instead “as the end of a 
hierarchical type of society organized around a single substantive conception 
of the common good, grounded either in Nature or in God” (Mouffe 1993: 51), 
then the holism of nature mysticism or communalism is insufficient. So too 
would be to take the network society itself as the new, postmodern “unity of 
the real” – this would serve to justify the position of those who constructed the 
network society in its current form, and those who are empowered by it. The 
                                              
15 ‘Ratiocentrism’ refers to the primacy of reductive forms of rationality. In Gorz’s analysis, this is reductive 
rationality is economic rationalization as an end in itself; in Plumwood’s it is a narrowly anthropocentric, 
patriarchal rationality of domination, which she refers to generally as ‘centrism’. Ratiocentrism does not 
correspond directly with the concept of ‘logocentrism’ in linguistics; indeed, if politics involves the recognition 
of phône as logos, it could rightly be called a logocentric process. See also Jameson (2005: 65). 
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ecosphere in its totality is the only sufficient “unity of the real” (since it is the 
higher-order gestalt which makes the network society possible) but the form of 
its unity can best be understood as a network unity. If the ecosphere, as the 
unity of the real, is taken to be a holistic, singular unity, we may imagine the 
dictatorial rule of “those who, as a result of their functions” would be the 
custodians of the ecosphere, or of ‘Nature’ – precisely the dark future 
envisioned by those critics who see the prospect of ‘environmental fascism’ in 
the ideas of deep ecology.
16
 The application of a network view would preclude 
such a custodial dictatorship in the service of Ecological Reason, at the same 
time it would correct for one of the critical points of failure in the Marxist 
project of modernity. Dictatorship, in the form of custodial oversight of 
society’s organizing principle, becomes necessary because that modern project 
assumes the development of a “total individual” who “assumes the whole 
totality of social production as her or his personal task.” Yet this proves to be 
flatly impossible; “the Marxian utopia by which functional work and personal 
activity could be made to coincide is ontologically unrealizeable on the scale 
of large systems” (Gorz 1989: 42). That is: in a complex society with a system 
of industrial production (especially a globalized system), no individual can 
fully apprehend their role in the totality of social production, and assume it as 
their personal task. The network ecological Self proves a more feasible project 
identity for the construction of an ecomodernity than the total individual was 
for a Marxist utopia, because of the form of relation between part and whole in 
the network. The state-socialist relationship between part and whole, between 
individual and society, allowed for the  
divorc[e] – in all spheres of activity – [of] the functional conduct 
demanded by the overall rationality of the system from the rationality of 
individuals’ self-regulated modes of conduct [and] the intuitive 
understanding of their surroundings and relations with one another of 
which individuals were capable (Gorz 1989: 42).  
                                              
16 Notably Regan (1984). See also Carter (2005), Næss (2005: 94). 
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Individuals are subjugated to society’s organizing principle, which becomes a 
“separate power exercised over them and not by them.” A network whole, on 
the other hand, constitutes its nodes at the same time it is constituted by them. 
The overall rationality of the network – ultimately, the overall functioning of 
the ecosphere – is nothing except the relation of nodes to other nodes. A 
genuinely ecological organizing principle could not properly be manifested as 
a separate power exercised over individuals instead of by them, because an 
ecological power is only the exercise of individual nodes’ relations. An 
ecological network society would then fulfill Bauman’s definition of an 
“autonomous society,” as one of “perpetually deliberated self-constitution, 
something that may be only a shared accomplishment of its members” 
(Bauman 2006: 40). This self-constitution could, however, include and even 
require state mediation wherever individuals recognize the need for functional 
conduct addressed to the well-being of network wholes that cannot be 
addressed by any individual precisely because none are ‘total’ individuals. In 
the context of politics and state power, Self-realization is not a matter of 
transforming the self into a ‘total individual’ who comes to identify with the 
functional demands of society as a whole. Since that whole comes about 
through individuals’ and groups’ self-regulated modes of conduct, intuitive 
understandings and relations, the process of identification between self and 
Self is not the creation of a ‘total individual’ but the identification of self-
interest with both one’s own and others’ self-regulated modes of conduct and 
with the functional conduct of larger institutions which aims to maintain and 
improve the conditions of possibility for self-regulated conduct. 
An ecomodern project expands and clarifies the opposition of “glacial time” to 
“timeless time” that Castells identifies with the environmental movement, and 
helps explain the meaning and cause of timeless time. Timeless time is the 
paradoxical creation of a society organized around a principle of economic 
rationalization, which by means of technological efficiency creates ‘free time’. 
But such a society is “a system fearful of the expansion of this time, yet which 
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does its utmost to increase it, and which, in the end, can find no purpose for it 
other than seeking all possible means of turning it into money” (Gorz 1989: 7). 
The collapse suggested by the idea of ‘timeless time’ is the result of a 
continually accelerating process by which time is simultaneously ‘created’ – by 
reducing the labor time required in production – and converted into money – 
by “monetarizing, transforming into jobs and economicizing, in the form of 
increasingly specialized services for exchange on the market” (Gorz 1989: 7). 
It is through this dual action that time disappears, and becomes ‘timeless’. The 
ecological appeal to glacial time, in its insistence on limits to economic growth 
in the present, aims to slow this conversion of time into money, and thus to 
save time for future generations of life on Earth.  
The demonetization of cultural objects in digital free exchange is a deployment 
of the technologies of efficiency to stand against and even reverse the 
conversion of time into money. In this, it is ripe to be joined with the 
ecological appeal to glacial time in a common project presenting alternatives 
to the central role of economic growth and economic rationalization as an 
absolute principle guiding the organization of society, in order to defend time, 
and its human uses, in the present and future. File-sharing, or the defense of 
file-sharing, becomes a strategic position from which to combat the conversion 
of money into time; strategic in as much as it is solidly located within the 
network society and the logic of technological efficiency, and within daily 
experience. 
To clarify the digital commons’ role in the construction of a new project 
identity, it may be helpful to draw parallels between the proletarianization of 
labor and the digitization of consumption. In Marx’s analysis, the 
proletarianization of labor comes into being through “the division of labour 
into an infinite number of interchangeable tasks of an indifferent, ‘accidental’ 
character, which is now seen as social (and no longer natural)” (Gorz 1989: 
23). This creates “a class for whom work is directly social labour determined 
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in its contents by the functioning of society as a whole and which, 
consequently, has a vital, overriding interest in taking over the social process 
of production in its totality” (Gorz 1989: 24). In the digitization of cultural 
objects, they become “an infinite number of interchangeable” objects, in as 
much as all objects which may be digitized become ‘indifferent’, 
interchangeable bits, with each new copy of an object the same as the last and 
each object being copied and transmitted approximately as easily, and each in 
the same manner. In the BitTorrent protocol for peer-to-peer file sharing, each 
object is further divided into arbitrary, ‘accidental’ pieces. This parallel is not 
merely a coincidence – the further breakdown into interchangeable pieces is 
the mechanism which allows the protocol to transmit data more quickly and 
efficiently, with that efficiency increasing the more widely each object is 
distributed.
17
 That is, subdivision into interchangeable parts is structurally 
crucial to the function of both proletarianized industrial production and the 
digital commons; it is not simply a shared superficial feature.  
This structural parallel also suggests the potential of the digital commons to 
create a class for whom, to modify Gorz’s treatment of Marx, consumption is 
determined in its contents by the functioning of society as a whole and which, 
consequently, has a vital, overriding interest in taking over the social process 
of consumption (and economies of transmission) in its totality. To some extent, 
this process is already undertaken in the very establishment of a digital 
commons, to the extent that the consumption of digital objects is co-
determined with all other consumers. The digital commons does not create this 
situation of co-determination and this interest in autonomous social control of 
                                              
17 I will give a cursory explanation of why this is the case. In earlier methods of network file-sharing, a file would 
be transmitted in a linear fashion, from the first bit of the file to the last, from one uploader – a person with the 
file on their computer – to one downloader. In the BitTorrent protocol, each file is broken into pieces, and one 
uploader may begin transmission to multiple downloaders. Downloaders may receive these pieces in any order, as 
they will be recombined into the original digital object upon receipt of all the pieces. This means that 
downloaders can receive pieces from multiple ‘peers’ simultaneously, as soon as any of them have any of the 
pieces, not, as in previous protocols, only from a single peer who possess the complete file. This means that the 
more widely distributed each file is, the faster speeds of transmission become, the more efficiently each peer’s 
bandwidth is used, and the more readily available each object becomes. 
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the social product, just as the Anthropocene does not mark the beginning of 
co-determination of and by the ecosphere. They are both deepenings of this co-
determination which also provide a new method of making this co-
determination visible. 
There are a number of reasons this digital transformation of consumption, 
analogous to the proletarianization of production, is potentially important for 
the construction of an ecomodern project identity. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
consumption is a central activity in postmodern, individualized identity 
construction, taking over a role filled by craft in pre-industrial identity 
construction. Furthermore, capitalist modernization required “educating the 
worker/producer into becoming a worker/consumer" (Gorz 1989: 44). That is, 
for workers to be “functionally integrated” into a system of industrial 
production, “society must be sufficiently wealthy for the workers to be offered 
material compensation; and, secondly, the workers must agree to view their 
work as a means of procuring such compensation.” The worker/consumer must 
be “conditioned and socialized in such a way that they take their salary and 
what it allows them to buy as their principal goal and their work as a means of 
achieving that goal” (Gorz 1989: 44). Moving past the model of the 
worker/consumer is one of the primary tasks of an ecomodern project identity. 
The use of freely and easily reproducible digital objects opens the possibility 
of following the deep ecological maxim: “Increase the sensitivity to and 
appreciation of what there is enough of for all”, that “instructive slogan” 
which is “a way to maximize our ability to derive deep satisfaction from the 
goods of which there still are, or could be, enough” (Næss 2005: 202). File-
sharing’s focusing of consumption towards aesthetic experience qualifies it as 
a potential element of an “ideological change (…) of appreciating life quality 
(dwelling in situations of intrinsic value) rather than adhering to a high 
standard of living” (Næss 1989: 29).  
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The digital commons’ place in a project of ecomodernity is where abundance 
and scarcity meet, a location where the fundamental norm of economic 
rationalization and growth, the primacy of property and ownership, and thus 
the Lockean liberal subject, can be contested and reformulated. If ownership is 
taken to be central to liberty, then economic growth, and the increase in the 
ownership of things, becomes necessary for the expansion of liberties. At the 
same time it is seen as necessary to alleviate material deprivation, since the 
alternative of redistribution curtails the right to ownership, and therefore is an 
unacceptable limitation on liberty, so conceived. A reconceptualization of 
liberty, which allows for a greater degree of redistribution by decoupling the 
expansion of liberty with the expansion of property, addresses the latter 
concern. The discovery and creation of forms of abundance outside, or parallel 
to, private property – in the commons – provides an alternative to the private-
property based model of materially expansive liberty, by presenting a vision of 
an aesthetically and experientially expansive egalitarian liberty. 
The digital commons, or its valorization and advancement, is not a project in 
and of itself, or at least can no longer be, due to its very success. “Every 
realization of a certain project – be it religious, ideological, or technical – is 
always also a negation of this project, a termination of this project as project” 
(Groys 2008: 7). The digital commons has already achieved the goal of 
allowing the mimetic flourishing and dispersal of cultural objects. One could 
advocate for the expansion of this function to a greater number of people, and 
the digital commons is always the site of a continual expansion of the range of 
cultural objects it includes – but its internal goals have basically been 
achieved. The defense of the digital commons against the interventions of 
states and corporations forms at first only another resistance identity. In order 
to take on the aspect of a project, the digital commons must become part of a 
“promised image”, an ideological vision in which it can play a part. In a 
project of ecomodernity, it can serve as an experiential model for the relation 
between individuals and the social product, and as a mechanism for the 
124 
promotion of the “sheer plurality of cultural differences, regardless of (…) 
deepness” that Næss (2005: 263) posits may be essential to “development 
through deep cultural changes” and the contribution it can make to what 
Castells (2010: 185) calls “the critical matter for the influence of new 
ecological culture (…) its ability to weave threads of singular cultures into a 
human hypertext.” 
At the very least, file-sharing deserves to be included in the set of activities 
available to those attempting to construct greener societies, by means of new 
usages of currently existing infrastructure, alongside such behaviors as, for 
example, vegetarianism and other sustainability-conscious eating patterns 
(alternative uses of the existing agricultural and distributional infrastructure) 
and the use and advocacy of public transit (an alternative use of urban and 
transportation infrastructure). Perhaps the closest analogy would be to the 
groups existing in a number of cities in which members stop paying directly 
for public transport, and use the group’s monthly fees in order to pay the 
resulting fines, at lower rates than either the fines or legitimate transit passes 
would be for the members as individuals. In this case as well, the 
contravention of existing laws is used to make a point about how public goods 
should be held in common and made available to individuals, and, in that it 
promotes public over private transport, a point about how technological 
infrastructure should be subject to collective decisions regarding its energy and 
material efficiency and overall environmental impact. File-sharing makes more 
far-reaching conclusions about the nature of public and private goods and of 
consumption. As of now, the discourse around file-sharing does not often 
make reference to matters of the environment. But wherever decentralized 
sharing systems are more efficient than centralized property-based systems, the 
critique based on environmental impact is just as available for use as it is in the 
promotion of public over private transport. 
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Morozov cautions that ‘the Internet’, to the extent it can be treated as a 
coherent object, should not be considered to be more than the sum of its parts, 
and that there is much more to be gained by analyzing each phenomenon 
discussed under the rubric of ‘the Internet’ according to its own characteristics, 
rather than in terms of what it shares with a supposed essential character of 
‘the Internet’ (Morozov 2013b: 40). Yet this does not imply that there are no 
wholes that are greater than the sum of their parts. Such wholes are necessary 
for the construction of a project identity: without them, there is little reason for 
individuals to look past themselves and the near-at-hand. If the whole is equal 
to the sum, then each part may as well mind its own business. This may 
partially explain why activists mobilizing around issues that fall under the 
banner of ‘the Internet’ are so liable to treating it as such. They know, more or 
less consciously, that such wholes are required. If we are searching for wholes 
greater than the sum of their parts, we may find better, more fundamental 
wholes in the demos, the commons and the ecosphere. The network ecological 
Self is a model for the relationship between part and whole, node and network, 
and the nature of their constituting each other. It is this understanding of inter-
constitution that is needed to counter a tendency toward authoritarian calls for 
the sacrifice of the good of the part to the good of the whole. It is this balance 
that is the core of the jointure suggested by the concept of ‘liberal democracy’, 
which recognizes both the necessary liberties of the individual and the 
essential surplus of the demos. Thus liberal democracy can, should, and 
perhaps must serve as the departure point for the formation of an ecological 
project identity and the construction of an ecological modernity. Its deficits, as 
currently instantiated, are in the parts it doesn’t see or consider, and in the 
connections between parts it ignores, which currently blind it to the greater 
surplus-wholes which contain it and make it possible. 
None of this is to identify the file-sharer as a new class destined to be the 
vanguard of history – just as the naturalist, or the Næssian mountaineer, 
immersed in the autonomy of the non-human world, cannot serve as this 
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vanguard. The earlier theorization of the industrial proletariat as the custodians 
of the teleology of history was critically flawed, and as Gorz argues, 
contemporary informational capitalism precludes such a class arising now. 
The condition of post-Marxist Man is that the meaning Marx read in 
historical development remains for us the only meaning that 
development can have, yet we must pursue this meaning independently 
of the existence of a social class capable of realizing it. In other words, 
the only non-economic, post-economic goals capable of giving meaning 
and value to savings in time and labour are ones individuals must 
discover within themselves. No historical necessity imposes on us the 
reflexive revolution which the defining of these goals implies (Gorz 
1989: 96). 
What is open to both file-sharer and ecologist is the possibility of being co-
participants in the construction of an ecomodern identity. If such an identity is 
created, “it will not be because this is the meaning of history but because we 
will have made history take on this meaning” (Ibid.). 
File-sharing does not represent the inevitable future of the commons. Indeed, it 
may be superseded by the ‘celestial jukebox’ model, wherein culture is 
delivered by streaming services, carefully, if subtly, kept enclosed by copyright 
holders and service providers. The celestial jukebox faces its own problems, 
including service provides struggling to turn a profit, artists and companies 
unsatisfied with their share of income, and the prospect of future innovations 
by pirates. Yet whatever the fate of the free exchange of digital cultural objects 
in its current form, such exchange can continue to provide an image of more 
egalitarian relations in all the networks which constitute our selves, societies, 
and environments. 
The digital commons needs ecosophy in order to remain part of a meaningful 
future-oriented project. Ecosophy, on the other hand, can use the digital 
commons to provide it with an example of “that for which there is enough for 
all” which transects contemporary human society and its economic structures, 
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in order to prevent ecology being confined to the space of a Nature which is 
defined as separate from society, and is rapidly shrinking. 
A defense of the digital commons does not necessarily imply an endorsement 
of any particular plan for ICT-enabled ‘direct democracy’. Recommendations 
of digital direct democracy, ‘open government’ and the like, whether 
“technoescapist” or “technorationalist” only further reify the postmodern trend 
of mandatory individualization, the interest-group model of politics and the 
consensual state’s focus on the management of populations. The first two 
aspects are clearly on display when Mark Zuckerberg imagines political parties 
being replaced by individuals using ICT networks to temporarily coalesce 
around specific issues concerning them before quickly dispersing. When, for 
example, Beth Noveck states that “the digital environment offers new ways to 
engage in the public exchange of reason (…) with new tools, people can 
‘speak’ through shared maps and diagrams rather than meetings” (Morozov 
2013b: 176) we not only see an expression of the consensual state’s 
management of the population according to its characteristics, but we glimpse 
the endpoint of this principle. The consideration of individuals as possessing 
logos, rational speech, is repealed, and they are interpreted as merely 
possessors of phône. Instead of being subjects who speak, citizens become 
objects read by technocrats. While Zuckerberg’s vision of individuals 
networking based on common interests in specific issues may qualify as liberal 
and political (while Noveck’s vision is quite illiberal), neither is democratic. 
Neither invokes or requires a demos, an identification of the populace as a 
body invoked through the principles of liberty and equality. Democracy does 
not require that each individual has the opportunity to directly contribute to 
every political decision, and may well not be improved by systems that aim to 
enable such input. Democracy is strengthened when democratic principles 
transect the public sphere, processes of political decision making, places of 
employment and all other social realms. The substance of political democracy 
is in the continual deliberation and contestation over the proper interpretation 
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and application of the principles of freedom and equality in each concrete 
situation. Ecological democracy expands political democracy in a non-
anthropocentric direction, placing the demos in the larger context of the 
ecospheric network. The ecosophical principle of the right of each being to 
their particular modes of self-realization provides a guide as to how we may 
begin to undertake the effort of applying the democratic principles of freedom 
and equality to the non-human world. 
Ecomodernity, or any other image of a green society, is not hidden in today’s 
networks of information and communications technology, waiting to be found. 
But the broader network of relations which constitutes the ecosphere sits 
behind those networks, waiting for the connections between these lower and 
higher gestalts to be illuminated and mapped; for the effects of the network 
society on the ecological network to be traced, alongside the network society’s 
dependencies on that network. To do so is also to insist on the ontological 
reality of those networks and their priority in relation to the network society. 
Through such activities, the means and the ends of the technical and economic 
networks may be fundamentally questioned. Over 20 years ago, Vilém Flusser 
asserted that in a civilization of such a scale and scope, everything must be 
“spoken of in images (…) city image, world image, human image” (Flusser 
2005: 328). In the attempt to make the networked ecological Self a project 
identity, the elucidation and enumeration of social and ecological connections 
becomes both a central activity and a symbolic representation of the identity 
itself. It is by integrating Næss’ concept of the ecological Self that the “world 
image” and “human image” can come to correspond, and thusly we can 
identify the self both in the individual node of the network and in the network 
as a whole, with the liberal citizen and with the demos, another networked 
whole greater than its parts. For many proponents of network technologies, the 
network is simply what brings together atomized individuals. Positioned 
against this is the claim that networks are the very substance of what 
constitutes the individual.  
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Our current technological networks are potential tools of an ecomodern project 
only to the extent that they foster activities which encourage more democratic 
and ecological relations, and can thus qualify for inclusion in a greener society, 
and serve as a model for the expansion of such relations. Despite its 
shortcomings, networked communication does expand the space of public 
deliberation, and it can be shaped to fill this role more ably in the future. The 
digital commons is a source of abundance in a world economy which 
simultaneously attempts to create artificial scarcities while underestimating or 
ignoring the real scarcities and limits of the non-human world. The abundance 
and equality of the digital commons are in many cases made illegal by an 
expanded regime of intellectual property law. Its defense and advocacy is thus 
a point of equivalency in the construction of a project identity, in fighting 
against damage done by too-expansive property rights to democracy and the 
non-human world. Meanwhile, the construction of such a commons, available 
to participation and experience, is a model and reminder of the importance of 
the commonly-held, in both democratic society and the ecosphere. 
We can see the beginnings of a project identity under construction in the 
organized advocacy for file-sharing and copyright reform found in parts of 
Europe. The incompleteness and ambiguity of that project bring into focus 
what the notion of a network ecological Self brings to such an attempted 
construction. Advocates of file-sharing depict the movement existing around 
the issue as heterogeneous. As quoted in Lindgren and Linde (2012: 155), a 
book published by the Swedish organization The Bureau of Piracy describes 
the views existing within the movement as comprising “both the hacker’s, the 
artist’s, the philosopher’s and the ordinary file sharer’s ... From Public Enemy 
to Friedrich Hayek, from the history of video games to Michel Foucault, from 
computer networks to pharmaceutical manufacturers.” In discussing the 
Bureau of Piracy’s emphasis on individual autonomy and freedom of choice, 
Lindgren and Linde describe the following statement from a Bureau 
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representative as containing “a rather neo-liberal idea that what is good for the 
individual will also be good for others”: 
It is a kind of egoism that has to include other people, sort of ... For me 
to be satisfied, other people around me need to be satisfied too. So, I 
guess that’s the basis of the file sharing movement, maybe ...Not built 
on an idea that man has to be in solidarity with others to be good. And 
like, ‘you ought to be like this, for moral reasons, and therefore we 
should’. If we show solidarity towards one another, then it gets better 
for everyone, kind of. A very primal view of solidarity, you could say.” 
(Lindgren and Linde 2012: 159) 
In what Lindgren and Linde see as “rather neo-liberal” we can also identify a 
budding ecosophical impulse. The notion of “primal solidarity” draws close to 
de Waal’s emphasis on pre-cognitive empathy, while the broader idea of 
solidarity following naturally from action rather than from admonitions that 
“you ought to be like this, for moral reasons” parallels Næss’ priority of the 
Kantian beautiful over the good, and of identification before ethics. The 
statement “if we show solidarity towards one another, then it gets better for 
everyone” is much closer to deep ecology and Self-realization than the 
neoliberal notion of collective gains arising from the aggregate pursuit of 
rational self-interest. Here, as with Næss, self-interest must come to be 
identified with solidarity. Self-interest alone cannot serve as an adequate 
replacement for solidarity, and solidarity benefits from a felt convergence with 
self-interest. 
While the political groups explicitly animated by advocacy of a free digital 
commons, chiefly the Pirate parties, may currently suffer from many structural 
difficulties and multiple deficits of maturity, their attraction to a guaranteed 
minimum income (Zeh 2012, The Economist 2013), at least, suggests some 
intuitive grasp of the essential connection that Gorz (Van Parijs 2009) and Van 
der Veen and Van Parijs (1987) make between growth, consumption, and 
equality. A guaranteed minimum income can be seen as an adequate 
application of the principles of freedom and equality to the economic sphere, 
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in that, and only if, it allows all individuals equal access to physical 
necessities, and with that access, the freedom to choose their own economic 
activity beyond the coercive requirement to accept any employment available 
in order to meet basic needs. Such a democratization of the economy and the 
amelioration of modern economic rationalization's internal contradictions 
require a common external principle which can provide an alternative to 
continual and unlimited growth – and this an ecological view provides. 
There are a number of other examples of contemporary organizations, 
movements and groupings that use a de-centered, network structure and ICTs 
to advocate for democratization, the digital commons, the defense of 
ecosystems and the ecologization of societies, such as Occupy Wall Street, the 
Indignados, Anonymous and 350.org, the last of those focused on immediate 
action to halt anthropogenic climate change. None of them alone provides a 




 century project identity, and it remains 
unclear the extent to which they will accomplish their short and long term 
goals, or be thwarted by centers of economic and state power, an inability to 
foster sufficient popular support, or situational changes which render their 
premises irrelevant or outdated. Each effort faces different external conditions 
and internal dynamics, and it would be difficult at this point to determine 
whether network structures will help or hinder the accomplishment of their 
respective goals. A preliminary attempt to make such determinations would 
require a sociological study of each separately, and even one such study was 
not within the scope of this thesis. The link I hope to have begun to make here 
is not a specific connection between any single example of a contemporary 
group and greener societies of the future. Rather, it is the connection between a 
network-praxeomorphic reconsideration of how the self is constituted and 
future blueprints for how individuals view both action within society and the 
type of actions (and their justifications) that state institutions may take in the 
interest of larger social and ecological wholes. Throughout this project I have 
aspired not simply to make the case that democracy, ecology and network 
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technology are compatible, but to argue that democracy, ecologization and 
network technology reinforce, and perhaps even require one another for each’s 
continued survival into the future.  
The matter of conclusions brings us back to Næss, and when he says 
There is nothing in “ecosophy,” or in any other, more fragmentary work, 
that I would regard as established. On the contrary, I feel that all I have 
published has been “on the way.” Before proofreading is done, I have 
normally fathered heaps of notes for improvements, modifications, and 
elaborations. When I leave a subject and proceed to something new, it is 
always because I am impelled to do so by the movement of my own 
thought and actions, not because what I leave seems well enough worked 
out and accomplished. With greater talents, I would have produced 
better-rounded-off works, but basically I think that human beings are 
something essentially on the way, destination unknown, and that they are 
justified in expressing themselves, talented or not, as they move along 
(Næss 2005: 316). 
The exploration in the preceding pages has certainly been ‘on the way’. The 
network ecological Self is as much a framework for image-making as a 
concrete image. The commons is a much a concept to be instantiated as a 
territory to be defended. And the project of constructing a greener future 
consists as much in continually discovering how to see things in an ecological 
light as it is does in particular ecological institutions. 
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